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ABSTRACT 
Keywords: microfinance, sustainability, success, subsidy, agency costs, moral 
hazard, adverse selection, outreach, screening and selection and selection. 
The thesis examines factors that influence sustainability and success of microfinance 
institutions in Ghana. The topic is important, particularly in poverty stricken Africa, 
where microfinance institutions play a significant role in supporting governments’ 
initiatives to reduce/alleviate poverty. The developed model is tested using data 
collected from 14 face-to-face interviews and 114 questionnaires. The data is 
analysed using different techniques- descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and 
regression analysis. The research design and scale of the study are appropriate to 
both the problem addressed and doctoral level research. A number of factors in the 
model developed were found to be influencing the sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions.  
A model was proposed that seeks to offer an explanation of sustainability and 
success of Microfinance Institutions in Ghana. The proposed model identified five 
categories being: institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, 
environment/governance and success. 
Single factor analysis established positive relationships between sustainability and  
all the five factors but placed more emphasis on three out of the five factors namely; 
success, business strategy and environment/ governance. Multiple factor analysis 
established no significant differences in the sustainability with respect to the type of 
MFI, ownership and source of funding. 
Multiple Regression which allows for the testing of theories or models established a 
significant relationship between the Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and the 
predictors, especially the drop-out rate of clients and average loans. The Subsidy 
Dependence Index (SDI) was calculated for the various types of MFIs and the result 
was a high dependency ratio especially among the FNGOs. Though the dependency 
is on the decline, it is very slow indicating that most MFIs will depend on subsidies 
for a very long time to come.  
Finally it was observed that the relatively high interest rates charged by most of the 
MFIs tended to defeat the purpose for which the microfinance movement came 
about. Not only did the study confirm the research model, but it also revealed that 
most owners did not exhibit a deep sense of involvement and used general 
knowledge to practice in Ghana. 
The study concluded that success factors, business strategy, and 
environment/governance were the most critical of the sustainability factors in Ghana. 
It is therefore important that managers develop institutional capacities especially in 
managing the agency problem effectively if they have to be sustainable and 
successful. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Background to the Research 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990‟s a consensus has emerged among governments and donors that 
microfinance institutions constitute an effective weapon for poverty alleviation. For 
this purpose, microfinance institutions have been set up in many countries to play the 
intermediary role between the suppliers of funds and the poor. The key objective of 
these institutions as required by the donors is poverty eradication by providing 
financial services to as many poor people as possible. However, considering that 
donor resources are not unlimited, the need has arisen for the microfinance 
institutions to be financially independent (sustainable). To do this they must also be 
profitable. The challenge facing them is how to lend to a significant number of the 
poor without compromising the need to be viable and sustainable financial 
institutions. There is thus a conflict between sustainability and profitability (Von 
Pischke 1996). 
Microfinance has gained much importance and acceptance as a tool for economic 
development, especially in developing countries. Since the pioneering works of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), microfinance has evolved as an economic 
approach intended to benefit low income men and women. The spread of 
microfinance across low income economies helped to stimulate growth by providing 
small financial services to people who had no access to formal financial institutions 
either for credit or savings. In Ghana, the financial liberalization policies of the 
1980‟s coupled with a relaxed regulatory environment for microfinance resulted in 
tremendous growth and spread of microfinance institutions (Steel and Andah, 2003). 
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Aryeetey and Gockel (1991), show that microfinance institutions are pivotal as far as 
credit for development is concerned. However, the critical issue which has assumed 
important dimension in academic and policy circles is the sustainability of 
microfinance institutions. This is important to the development of financial 
intermediation at the micro level. The main issue regarding sustainability has to do 
with how microfinance institutions manage the dynamic situation between lenders 
and small borrowers and institutional staff productivity in the provision of efficient 
and productive loans. A well managed lender-borrower relationship translates into 
the ability of the institution to manage the associated problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. This eventually helps the institution to obtain more yields on 
loans, generate revenue and reduce reliance on grants or subsidies. The sustainability 
and success of microfinance therefore hinges on an effective management of the 
agency issues in microfinance. 
Despite the concern for sustainability, the focus in developing economies especially 
sub-Saharan Africa seems to be only on provision of credit. However the problems 
emanating from credit provision by microfinance institutions and the attendant 
problems of high default coupled with the heavy reliance on donor support, give 
cause to investigate the dynamics of managing the agency problem. 
This  study provides a focus on how microfinance institutions are dealing with the 
performance issues of agency, moral hazard, adverse selection and more especially, 
sustainability It does so by analyzing data on the workings of 14 Executive 
Directors/Managers in qualitative interviews and 130 Directors/Managers in research 
questionnaires. The sample was chosen to provide a broad insight into the different 
types of microfinance institutions. The use of organizational leaders (executive 
directors and relationship managers) as „‟key respondents‟‟ is relatively widespread 
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in strategy research (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Bowman and Ambrosni, 1997). The 
executive directors/managers by their positions are expected to give the direction to 
their various institutions while the activities of the relationship managers as 
expressed in the questionnaire confirms or conflicts the directives of the executive 
directors. 
This particular chapter is divided into 4 sections. Section 1 provides the introduction 
to the study by outlining the justification for the research and its intended 
contribution, the research problem and questions, the scope of the research, as well 
as the structure of the thesis.  
1.1.1 Justification of the Research 
This section is dedicated to providing the justification for the research. This is 
achieved by first providing an overview of the gaps in the current literature (section 
1.1.2), which is explored in greater detail in chapter two, and the resulting 
importance of this research to micro financing. 
1.1.2   Gaps in Existing Research  
There are two main gaps in the literature that this study aims to address. The first is 
that most of the empirical works on performance (especially sustainability and 
success) of microfinance have been in the South American and Asian countries 
(Khan, 1979; Bell, 1990; Nevajas et al., 2000). Very few studies have tested the 
sustainability of such institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. In Ghana studies on the 
performance of microfinance institutions have not empirically tested the 
sustainability and success of such institutions through the agency theory. Again, most 
of the studies have been in the area of impact analysis (see Appendix L). 
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Secondly, these studies have tended to concentrate on the operations and coverage of 
microfinance institutions and informal money lenders with little focus on their 
sustainability and success. Thus, there is very little information on how Ghanaian 
microfinance institutions manage the agency problem. This research therefore 
examines the management of these performance problems and how they translate 
into sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Ghana. 
 
1.1.3 Importance of the Research 
As mentioned in section 1.1.2, this research will address the issue of imposition of 
sustainability of microfinance theories of the Latin American and Eastern European 
economies where the movement first began. It therefore intends to add to the limited 
number of research works carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, this study will 
help give a new perspective on the factors that affect sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions and provide additional evidence that prove or disprove the 
existing evidences.  
The principal issues being raised have to do with sustainability and success and how 
these translate into the ability of MFIs to operate successfully. It is therefore 
imperative to investigate the situation of MFIs to determine if they are likely to 
continue to exist and serve their useful purpose or have their success overcrowded 
with operational hazards. It is obvious that the set of possible solutions is quite large 
and complex; hence the need to examine these further especially with respect to the 
African situation. More so, since microfinance has the objective of advancing 
development through the empowerment of the poor, it becomes relevant and almost 
obligatory to examine critically the related issues within the African context. 
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Secondly, this study will also throw more light on how institutions can overcome 
market failures. It will be drawing on new developments in the microfinance 
movement and also point to unanswered questions and ways to reframe old debates. 
Finally, this study will investigate the factors that impinge on sustainability and 
success of microfinance institutions in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) especially 
Ghana. The importance of addressing the issues and the resulting importance of this 
research can be viewed from the intended LDCs literature and managerial 
contributions of this research. 
 
1.1.4 Intended Contribution to LDCs Literature 
As mentioned in section1.1.2, the current literature containing sustainability of MFIs 
appears to be relatively small and highly concentrated on impact analysis. This study 
is important from LDC literature contribution in that it adds to the relatively small 
number of sustainability studies, but more importantly it combines both quantitative 
and qualitative methods (see section 6.1.4) to study sustainability and success in the 
microfinance sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area that does not appear to be 
sufficiently covered at this point. 
 
1.1.5 Intended Managerial Contributions 
From a managerial contribution view, this research is important for a number of 
reasons described in section 1.1.2. Understanding sustainability and success is 
important to the microfinance sector in that it provides them with greater 
understanding of the variables that need to be skillfully manipulated in order to 
establish viable and enduring institutions.  
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1.1.6 The Research Problem and Issues 
Given the justification of the research provided in section 1.1.1, this study examines 
the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in developing countries 
especially countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, this study investigates the 
following research question: 
  
An answer to this question requires investigation into factors that are perceived to 
impact on sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the development of sub-research questions. The factors that impact on 
sustainability are grouped as follows: Institutional Characteristics, Agency costs, 
Business Strategy, Environment/ Governance and Success. This research problem is 
investigated by gathering data from 114 relationship managers of microfinance 
institutions in Ghana regarding their activities and then matched with interview data 
collected from 14 Executive Directors and Managers on similar issues. 
The sub-research questions have been developed under their various sub-headings 
which are outlined below: 
Q.1) Which are the major institutional characteristics that impact on sustainability 
of microfinance institutions? 
Q2) What are the issues of sustainability and agency costs that impact significantly 
on an MFI?  
What are the significant factors that influence sustainability and success 
of microfinance institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa with specific 
reference to Ghana? 
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Q3) Which of the business strategies adopted has a significant influence on 
sustainability of microfinance institution?  
Q4) Which environmental/ governance factors have the most impact on sustainability 
of an MFI? 
Q5) Which success factors have the most impact on MFIs? 
1.1.7 The Scope of the Research 
This study focuses on the financial services sector, specifically on micro financing in 
Ghana, with Ghana being used as a proxy for less developed countries south of the 
Sahara. Based on the recommendations of Churchill and Iacobucci (2002) and 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) in defining the unit of analysis for the 
study, the individual Chief Executive/Relationship Manager within the microfinance 
institution or financial services sampling frame represents the unit of analysis. 
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1.1.8 Structure of the thesis 
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financial services sector and patterns and trends of poverty in Ghana. Chapter 3 looks 
at existing literature on performance of microfinance. Chapter 4 deals with the 
exploratory qualitative research which together with chapter 3 lead to the 
development of hypotheses in Chapter five. Chapter 6 discusses the research design 
and methodology used in the empirical research and the reason for the choice of 
methods. Chapters 7-12 cover empirical part of the research. The thesis ends with 
implications and policy recommendations in chapter 13. 
 
1.1.9 Section Summary 
This section provided the introduction to the study by outlining the justification for 
the research and its significance, the research problem and issues, the scope of the 
research, as well as the structure of the thesis. The following chapter discusses the 
background to the research by looking at a brief geography of Ghana as well as its 
economy, financial systems and pattern and trends of poverty in Ghana.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Country Context 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the history of the Country Ghana by looking at its geography, 
the economy, the financial systems and the incidence of poverty which microfinance 
seeks to address. 
 
2.2 Geography
1 
Ghana is located in West Africa with a size of 238,533 square kilometers, roughly 
the size of Illinois and Indiana in the United States of America. Although the official 
language is English, Ghana is surrounded by French speaking countries; Cote 
d‟Ivoire on the west, Burkina Faso on the north, Togo on the east and the Gulf of 
Guinea (Atlantic Ocean) on the south. 
The topography of Ghana is a generally low physical relief except in the east. There 
are five distinct geographical regions: low plains inland from Atlantic coast; northern 
plateau stretching from western border to Volta River basin averaging 450 metres in 
height; mountainous uplands along eastern borders, bisected in the south by Volta 
River Gorge; Volta River Basin in centre; and dissected plateau up to 300 metres 
high in north. The climate in Ghana is tropical, governed by interaction of dry 
continental air mass from the northeast and moist southwest equatorial system with 
an annual mean temperature of between 26
0 
C and 29
0
 C. Annual rainfall varies from 
more than 2,100 millimeters in the South to 1,000 millimeters in the North. 
Vegetation is heaviest in south, thinning to savanna and dry plains in the north. The 
next section (Section 2.3) gives an overview of the economy of Ghana. 
  
1 Wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography of Ghana 
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2.3. Economy 
At independence in 1957, the economy of Ghana was based on gold and the country 
was relatively prosperous. At independence Ghana had foreign reserves of not less 
than UK£500 million and per capita income of about US$300 that was comparable to 
other middle income countries like South Korea (Leith and Lofehie, 1993). 
Notwithstanding the lack of industrialization, the economy appeared to be stable and 
prosperous, as it was the leading producer of cocoa at the time (Aryeetey and Fosu, 
2002). 
After independence, Ghana embarked on rapid import-substitution industrialization 
through the establishment of state enterprises as guided by the declaration of the 
Development Decade (1960-1970) by the United Nations (UN) (Aryeetey and 
Harrigan, 2000). The political philosophy at the time being socialist inclined, also 
influenced how the industries were financed and controlled in most cases by the state 
(Aryeetey and Fosu, 2002; Bhasin and Annim, 2005). Akuoko- Frimpong (1990) 
reported that by 1960, Kwame Nkrumah the first president of Ghana had completely 
shifted away from the colonial master (Great Britain), rejected open market economy 
and had adopted a centrally planned and regulated economy. The state then became 
the predominant economic agent in Ghana. 
After mid-1960s, the economy stagnated, characterized by weak commodity demand, 
outmoded equipment, overvalued currency, smuggling, foreign debt and 
mismanagement which left a lot of state enterprises highly unprofitable. In 1983, the 
government of the day, Provisional National Defence Council, changed its initial 
political and economic principles and its initial political and economic direction by 
accepting market economic principles as dictated by the IMF and the World Bank. 
This led to the government embarking on Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
12 
 
which is a structural adjustment program. The objectives of the ERP can be 
summarized into five main elements: 
1) The realignment of relative prices to foster growth in production and export 
2) A shift from direct government intervention towards reliance on market 
forces 
3) The restoration of fiscal and monetary discipline and liberalizing trade and 
payments regime 
4) The rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure and 
5) Structural and institutional reforms aimed at increasing efficiency and 
encouraging growth of savings and investments (Hoefter, 2001; Aryeetey 
and Harrigan, 2000; Akuoko-Frimpong, 1999). 
Describing the initial results of the ERP as generally positive, Aryee et al (1999) 
noted a reduction in inflation rate from 125 percent in 1983 to 33 percent in 1986 and 
reaching 10 percent in 1992. The economy then started to enjoy a positive Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate estimated at 5 percent per annum, as a result of 
an increase in the country‟s traditional exports of cocoa, gold and timber. On the flip 
side, however, private investment did not improve much, remaining at about 11 
percent to 16 percent which indicated that a major chunk of investment continued to 
be that of public sector. The increase in GDP is therefore inversely matched with 
high foreign debt and little improvement in standard of living. 
The macroeconomic performance showed a downward turn after 1991. The 
cumulative effect being that the GDP growth rate slowed down averaging 4.2 percent 
for the period 1992 to 1998. Export rose from a record low of 9 percent before 1983, 
to 11 percent for the period 1985-1989, but recorded no growth for the period 1990-
1996. Unlike exports, import growth became substantially positive at 5 percent 
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during the same period (Aryeetey and Fosu, 2002). By the year 2000, the economic 
conditions had systematically deteriorated. Budgetary imbalances had become 
entrenched. Adverse terms of trade had worsened, in addition to delays in 
disbursements. The continued delays in external inflows compelled the government 
to borrow internally. This raised local interest rate surpassing 50 percent per annum 
at the end of 1999. Interest on national debt constituted over 40 percent of total 
recurrent expenditure (CEPA, 2001). 
During the period 2000 to 2005 however, the economy appeared to be responding 
well to the economic measure implemented by the government in an attempt to 
reverse the decline experienced up to 2000. GDP showed upward trend from 4.2 in 
2001, to 4.5 in 2002, and hitting 5.8 by the year 2005. The domestic debt reached its 
lowest level in several years in 2003, with further fall in 2004. Consequently, interest 
rate on 91 Day Treasury bill fell to around 11.45 percent by the end of 2005. The 
annual average inflation rate fell to 14.8 in 2002; however it went up to 26.7 percent 
in 2003, before slipping back to 14.4 percent in 2005. Inflation at the end of 2007 
stood at 18 percent   while the 91 Day Treasury bill ended at 10.3 percent. The above 
stated success notwithstanding, according to Sarpong (2004) the private sector 
growth continued to be limited by access to finance and high interest rates. There 
existed a lot more work to be done in the areas of structural and institutional reforms. 
The privatization of state enterprises had been extremely slow. Institutions continued 
to be weak. Perceptions about corruption continued to rise (CDD, 2005). 
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2.3.1 Oil Discovery
2 
In June, and September 2007, a consortium of companies comprising Kosmos 
Energy Ghana (Kosmos), Tullow Ghana Limited (Tullow), Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation, Sabre Oil and Gas Limited, E.O. Group, in conjunction with the Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), announced discoveries of significant 
quantities of oil and gas in offshore deepwater Tano/Cape Three Points Basins.  
Since the announcement of these discoveries a great deal of work has been conducted 
on the discoveries with the view to producing the oil and the gas from the fields by 
the year 2010. The discoveries which were made in two deepwater blocks of 
Deepwater; West Cape, Three Points, and Deepwater Tano blocks are under two 
separate Petroleum Agreements and operated by Kosmos and Tullow respectively.  
The discovered oil and gas resources in the two blocks were found to be in pressure 
communication, and therefore are said to be contained in the same reservoir. Under 
this circumstance, the Petroleum Law requires that the discovered oil and gas 
resources in the two blocks be produced as one unit would reduce cost and optimize 
the recovery of the oil and gas in the field. The two discovered fields to be unitized 
have been designated as „Jubilee Field‟, in commemoration of the country‟s jubilee 
year celebration. The appraisal so far indicates that the field contains recoverable 
reserves at 90% probability of at least 800 million barrels of light crude oil, with an 
upside potential of  about three billion barrels. The current development of the 
Jubilee Field is based on the 800 million barrels recoverable reserve. 
 
2 Daily Graphic, Thursday, July 17, 2008. 
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Table 2.0: Ghana Macroeconomic Indicators 2003-2007  
INDICATOR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
5.2 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.3 
Annual Average 
Inflation 
26.7 12.6 14.4 11.68 10.73 
91 Day Treasury Bill 
(%) 
 
18.66 17.06 11.45 10.24 9.91 
Prime Rate 21.5 18.5 15.5 14.0 13.5 
Current Accounts 
Balance ($m) 
40.8 -151.3 -406.5 3,027 3,878.86 
   Source: Databank Research and Information Limited 
 
2.3.2 The Financial System in Ghana
3 
Finance is the oil for growth. It is indeed the life-blood of the economic system. The 
financial system is the vessel that carries this life-blood through the economic 
system. It is the system of institutions and operations that brings the financial 
resources into productive use (Sowa, 2003). 
In most developing countries, the economies are characterized by dual systems 
running parallel- monetized and non-monetized; formal and informal systems. On the 
one hand is the money economy where transactions predominantly take place with 
money as a medium of exchange and on the other is the non-monetized rudimentary 
economy where the subsistence economy and the barter dominate. The other kind of 
dualism refers to the formal financial system with banks and other formal financial 
intermediaries as distinct from the informal system made up mostly of various shades 
of rotating credit systems and money-lenders. 
 
3 Center for  Policy Analysis 2003 
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In the 1980s, when most African countries adopted an IMF/World Bank supported 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), financial sector reforms formed a major 
part. The financial sector reforms involved institutional restructuring, enhancement 
of the legal and regulatory framework for banking operations and liberalizing interest 
rates. Clearly the financial sector reform has more to do with the formal system than 
with the informal sector activity. In particular, policy reform by way of interest rate 
liberalization affected the formal sector directly and any impact on the informal 
financial activity was only secondary. 
For most African countries, the financial system was virtually underdeveloped in the 
period up to independence. After the introduction of money in the colonies, 
principally for the reason of taxation, not much was done to develop the financial 
system of the colonies. There were only few expatriate banks, which catered for the 
needs of the expatriate merchants. These banks failed to advance loans to local 
peasants and entrepreneurs primarily because they lacked collateral securities. Credit, 
thus circulated only among the big expatriate commercial houses and therefore could 
afford to provide „good‟ collateral. The collateral demanded included life assurance 
policies, stocks, shares, bills and other financial instruments, which could not be 
found in the portfolio holding of the natives. Thus, after independence, most African 
governments initiated plans to indigenize their banking sectors so as to make credit 
easily accessible to the indigenes (Sowa, 2003). 
After independence, the pressure to develop economically led to fiscal pressures, 
which put severe strain on the financial sector. With interest rates fixed at 
ridiculously low levels, most governments borrowed cheap from the financial system 
and thereby crowded out the private sector. As the economies of African countries 
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run into more macroeconomic problems, the financial sector became more and more 
distressed. For instance, the high inflation rates experienced in some countries 
together with the devaluations that were introduced to correct the imbalances left 
most banks with negative net worth (Sowa, 2003). The bulk of the banks‟ resources 
are absorbed by the public sector. Faced with an ample supply of relatively low-risk, 
high return government paper, banks and other financial institutions have had little 
incentive to engage in or develop the capacity for lending and equity finance for the 
private sector (Acquah, 2003). The governor of the Bank of Ghana has observed that 
the macroeconomic instability of LDCs has fostered a short-term perspective, among 
both savers and lending institutions. One-third of all bank deposits are demanded 
deposits, and terms for bank loans rarely extend beyond one year (Acquah, 2003). 
For purposes of this research, the following constitute the financial sector of Ghana: 
banking, insurance, capital market and non-bank financial activities.  
 2.3.3 Introduction and History of Banking in Ghana4 
The banking sector is the largest contributor to Ghana‟s financial sector. Commercial 
banking in Ghana dates back to 1894 when Bank of British West Africa (now 
Standard Chartered Bank-Ghana) was established. It was followed by Barclays in 
1917 and in 1952, the Bank of Gold Coast, and now Ghana Commercial Bank. After 
independence in 1957, the government established various commercial and 
development banks to meet the country‟s financing needs. Reflecting the general 
economic trends over several years, most Ghanaian banks had become weak, 
financially distressed and insolvent by the mid 1980‟s with significant non-
performing loan books.   
 
4 Centre for Economic and Policy Analysis and Bank of Ghana 
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To address this problem and with the assistance of the World Bank, the Government 
in the late 1980‟s launched the Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) to 
restructure distressed banks, clean up non-performing assets, restore banks to 
profitability, reform legislation and the banking supervisory system, allow the entry 
of new banks and financial institutions and develop the money and capital markets. 
These efforts led to the establishment of new private banks.  The Governor of the 
Bank of Ghana in remarks delivered to the Commonwealth Business Council in 
London, June 25, 2003 on „Liberalizing Ghana‟s Financial Services Sector:  „the 
Role of Overseas Banks‟ argued that liberalizing entry and encouraging foreign 
banks and investors in the financial services industry would have advantages that 
must be balanced against its potential costs and risks. According to the Governor 
another benefit of a competitive, open system is that it forces all financial firms 
operating in an economy to offer the highest returns to savers and the lowest cost of 
capital to investors. 
To achieve the desired competition, the Governor was of the view that the entry of 
foreign banks of international standing surely mitigates the anti-competitive 
disadvantages inherent in concentration and enhanced market power of domestic 
banks, giving impetus to dynamic efficiency. The Governor however acknowledges 
that excessive numbers within the system could dilute the franchise value of banks 
and increase instability. 
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2.3.4 Introduction and History of Insurance in Ghana
5 
The early insurance companies in Ghana were all British and subject to the United 
Kingdom Board of Trade regulations. The reason for this must be obvious as Ghana 
was still a British colony until 1957. These British insurers were represented by 
Chief Agents. A Chief Agent is a person who held a power of attorney on behalf of a 
registered insurer under an Act of British Parliament and might accept proposals and 
sign and issue insurance cover on behalf of that insurer.  
The Royal Exchange Assurance Company which operated in Ghana in the early 
1920‟s through the Barclays Bank was the first to open its own branch office in 1927 
in Ghana. In 1955, the first local insurance company-Gold Coast Insurance 
Company- was formed to transact only life business, and the African life to be 
precise.Until this company was founded, the then expatriate companies used to 
insure mainly European lives. The Ghanaian insurance market (like most sub-
Saharan African markets), is a very small sub-sector of the national economy.  Gross 
Premiums for 2003 totalled about ¢704 billion.  
This was about 1.08% of the country‟s GDP, compared with 12.7% for South Africa, 
5.56% for Zimbabwe, 3.05% for Kenya and 1.38% for Ivory Coast. Like other 
insurance markets in developing countries, Ghana‟s insurance market is 
predominantly Non-Life insurance accounting for only 19% of total gross premiums 
for 2003. 
 
 
5 Ghana Insurance Year Book 1995/96 
20 
 
2.3.5 The Capital Market 
The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), which is at the heart of the Securities Industry in 
Ghana, is making its mark on the emerging markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. With a 
mission to be a relevant and significant vehicle in mobilizing and allocating long-
term capital for Ghana‟s economic development and growth, the GSE has in recent 
times been attracting companies and investors from across the world to list on or 
invest in its market (Yamoah, 2006). 
Under the FINSAP, Ghana‟s capital market was established in 1989. The GSE began 
full operations in November 1990 with 12 listed companies and one Government 
bond. Market capitalization increased from ¢30.46 billion in 1991 to ¢91,857.28 
billion in 2005 while the listed companies increased from 12 to 29 (Sowa, 2003). 
Thus, the GSE established itself as a profitable investment venture for the Ghanaian 
economy with year-end market capitalization of ¢91,857.28 billion at the end 2005. 
There is no doubt that the GSE has the potential to attract long-term financing of 
investment in Ghana (Sowa, 2003). During the 15 years of its existence, the market 
has raised about ¢2,291.93 billion and US$16.6 million through equities and bonds 
(Ghana Stock Exchange market statistics, December 2005). 
 
2.3.6 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
The Government of Ghana in the late 1980s launched the FINSAP to restructure 
distressed banks, clean up non-performing assets, restore banks to profitability; 
reform legislation and the banking supervisory system to allow the entry of new 
banks and financial institutions and develop the money and capital markets. The 
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development of money and capital markets was to encourage competition in the 
financial services sector (Sowa, 2003). 
Some of the new financial institutions that came in the wake of FINSAP are; 
discount houses, finance houses, acceptance houses, building societies, leasing and 
hire-purchase companies, venture capital funding companies, mortgage financing 
companies, savings and loans companies and credit unions. 
 
2.3.7 Patterns and Trends of Poverty in Ghana
 
According to Andah and Steel (2003), long before the introduction of reforms in the 
financial sector, African governments have been interested in making credit available 
to poor households. These ranged from state-run Development Financial Institutions 
such as Agricultural Development Banks, which provided subsidized credits to 
farmers and other donor-funded programs, targeted at the poor. There were also 
government support to some rural banks, cooperatives and credit unions, which were 
mandated to provide loans at subsidized interest rates to poor small farmers. But 
these efforts failed to reach the poor due to over-dependence on government funding, 
pervasive political patronage, political influence in disbursing donor-funds, 
difficulties in ensuring repayments from subsidy recipients and failure of interest rate 
subsidies to reach the poor. The failure of these policies prompted the decline of state 
sponsored development banks and led to the need for financial market reforms.  
However, the financial market reforms have concentrated on the formal financial 
systems without inclusion of services to the rural poor. Market liberalization resulted 
in the withdrawal of such organizations from direct service provision to 
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smallholders. These reforms led to the reluctance of most commercially oriented 
banks to engage in business involving smallholders. This brought to the fore the need 
to create means of channeling seasonal inputs to smallholder producers on credit 
against the background of high administrative costs and defaults among small 
borrowers. To cater for small borrowers a number of microfinance institutions were 
set up. These microfinance institutions existed before the reforms, but their activities 
were formalized under the institutional and legal reforms of the financial sector 
restructuring. These institutions come in all shapes and sizes ranging from Non-Bank 
Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs) to donor agencies and NGOs. 
Poverty in Ghana has remained a disproportionately rural phenomenon up till now. 
Eighty-six percent of the population living below the poverty line in Ghana, are in 
the rural areas. The distribution of the population living below the poverty line 
ranges between one percent in Urban Coastal and about 50 percent in Rural 
Savannah. The contribution of Rural Savannah to total poverty in Ghana has 
consistently been increasing. From about 33 percent in 1991/92, the contribution of 
Rural Savannah to total poverty increased to 37 percent in 1998/99 and has increased 
further to about 50 percent in 2005/06. In 1998/99, sharp geographic variation in the 
pattern of poverty were found to be more marked with extreme poverty and remained 
the same in 2005/06. 
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2.4.0 Development of MFIs in Ghana
7 
Microfinance is not a recent phenomenon in Ghana. It has been an age-old practice 
intended to reach out to all those who have not benefitted from the development 
process. Empirical evidence has established that less than 15% of the population in 
developing countries including Ghana has access to the mainstream financial 
services (Aryeetey, 1995). For such groups, investment should be financed through 
own savings, equity or credit. Some of the current informal sector practices such as 
money lending, SUSU, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) date 
back to ancient societies in Ghana and elsewhere (Aryeetey and Gockel, 1991).                                            
                                                  Fig 2.0: Map of Ghana: Regional   distribution 
Formal microfinance institutions in Ghana 
consist of 122 Financial NGOs, 4 Susu 
operators and associations under Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) 
and Regular Savings and Credit Associations 
(RESCAS), 30 Rural Banks, 5 Credit Union 
Associations, 30 Apex Bodies, 30 Business 
Development and Service Providers, 12 
Savings and Loans Companies and 1 Social 
Investment Fund under the Government of 
Ghana poverty alleviation scheme. The 
informal sector consists of a host of money lenders.     
7 Ghamfin   bulletin  2005                            
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The legal and regulatory frameworks for microfinance activities is covered by a host 
of legislations, Moneylenders Ordinance (1940 and 1957), Co-operative Decree, 
1968, NLCD 252, Banking Law 1989, ( PNDCL 225) and Non-Banking Financial 
Institutions (NBFI Law 1993, (PNDCL 328). With regards to the Susu operators 
there is very little regulatory instruments covering these since they do not have 
corporate entities. 
All these institutions service small-scale farmers, artisans, fishermen and small-scale 
traders. The informal finance sector consists of a host of money lenders. The 
microfinance institutions are scattered all over the regions of Ghana with the Greater 
Accra Region having the greatest concentration. 
 
2.4.1 Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) 
The Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) is a Ghana Government 
initiative in conjunction with the World Bank which was set up in 2004 with a capital 
of US$ 50 million. The target of this scheme is the productive poor and marginalized 
in the society and it seeks among other things to empower these people financially in 
the short term. Specifically, the beneficiaries include petty traders, farmers and those 
engaged in the sale of farm produce with added value. 
Under the MASLOC scheme, individuals, groups and businesses are eligible to apply 
for loans between GHC 100,000 and GHC 250,000. Groups need to have a minimum 
of 25 members to access up to GHC 250,000. Each member of the group can access 
GHC 10,000 which is refundable within one year with 10% interest. Other categories 
which can access loans from GHC 20,000 attract the going Bank of Ghana prime 
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rate. The MASLOC scheme has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
some selected rural and community banks which are to be directly engaged in the 
disbursement of small loans to small and medium scale businesses. This according to 
them will ensure proper disbursement and due diligence on clients by the banks 
before loans are disbursed to beneficiaries. 
Table 2.2 Regional Distribution of MFIs 
Regions FNGO
s 
Susu Rural 
Banks 
CUAs Apex 
Bodies 
BDSP Savings 
And 
Loans 
GOG Total 
Greater 
Accra 
29 2 1 1 3 10 6 - 52 
Central 8 1 2 1 3 2 - - 17 
Western 8 - 2 - 3 3 2 - 18 
Eastern 9 - 4 1 3 1 - - 18 
Volta 14 - 4 - 3 2 1 - 24 
Ashanti 9 1 9 1 3 6 3 1 33 
Brong 
Ahafo 
7 - 5 1 3 2 - - 18 
Northern 18 - 2 - 3 2 - - 25 
Upper 
East 
11 - 1 - 3 1 - - 16 
Upper 
West 
9 - - 1 3 1 - - 14 
Total 122 4 30 6 30 30 12 1 234 
Source: GHAMFIN 2005. 
FNGO-Financial Non-Governmental Organizations, CUAs-Credit Union Associations, 
 BDSP-Business Development and Service Providers, S&L-Savings and Loans Companies, 
 GOG-Government of Ghana 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has provided the introduction to the country context by describing the 
geographical location of Ghana, review the economy of Ghana and its financial 
systems. Patterns and trends of poverty were considered. The chapter finally 
discussed the development and regional distribution of MFIs in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction and Structure of the Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the significant literature related to the research problem 
outlined in the earlier chapter. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the seminal  
literature that has been reviewed in this chapter. The extensive review of literature is 
necessary for the development of the conceptual framework and hypotheses 
developed in the next chapter. 
 
Table 3.1 Literature Review Structure 
Seminal to the Study 
Roots of microfinance. 
Market intervention and interest rates. 
Linking Agency theory to moral hazard, adverse selection and subsidy. 
The paradigm shift-subsidy. 
Sustainability, success and outreach. 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) 
Group Lending 
 
As detailed in Table 3.1, this chapter focuses on the literature surrounding the issues 
of microfinance and market intervention, agency theory, moral hazard, adverse 
selection and subsidy as well as the relationship between sustainability, outreach and 
group lending. 
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3.1.1 Roots of Microfinance 
Microfinance has been described in various ways. Kimenyi, Wieland and Von-
Pischke (1998) have described it as a small-scale financial services for both credit 
and deposits, that are provided to people who farm or herd; operate small or micro 
enterprises where goods are produced, recycled, repaired or traded; provide services; 
work for wages or commissions; gain income from renting out small amounts of 
land, vehicles, draft animals or machinery and tools and to other individuals and 
groups in developing countries in both rural and urban areas. Robinson (2001) 
describes microfinance as a collection of banking practices built around providing 
small loans, typically without collateral and accepting tiny savings deposits. 
 
According to Otero (1999) microfinance is the provision of financial services to low-
income poor and the very poor self-employed people. These financial services 
according to Ledgerwood (1999) generally include savings and credit but can also 
include other financial services such as insurance and payment services. Schreiner 
and Colombet (2001) define microfinance as the attempt to improve access to small 
deposits and small loans for poor households neglected by banks. Therefore, 
microfinance involves the provision of financial services such as savings, loans and 
insurance to poor people living in both urban and rural settings who are unable to 
obtain such services from the formal financial sector. 
The terms microcredit and microfinance are often used interchangeably but they are 
not the same. According to Sinha (1998) microcredit refers to small loans whereas 
microfinance is appropriate where NGOs and microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
supplement the loans with other financial services such as savings and insurance. 
Therefore, according to him microcredit is a component of microfinance. 
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According to Robinson (2001) and Otero (1999), microfinance is a relatively new 
term in the field of development gaining attention in the 1970s. Prior to then, from 
the 1950s through to the 1970s, the provision of financial services by donors or 
governments was mainly in the form of subsidized rural credit programmes. These 
often resulted in high loan defaults, high losses and an inability to reach poor rural 
households (Robinson, 2001). Robinson states that the 1980s represented turning 
point in the history of microfinance in that MFIs such as Grameen Bank and BRI 
began to show that they could provide small loans and savings services profitably on 
a large scale. They received no continuing subsidies, were commercially funded and 
fully sustainable, and could attain wide outreach to clients.  
 
The 1990s saw accelerated growth in the number of MFIs and an increased emphasis 
on depth of outreach (Robinson, 2001). Dichter (1999) refers to the 1990s as the 
microfinance decade. Microfinance had now turned into an industry according to 
Robinson (2001). Along with the growth in microcredit institutions, attention 
changed from just the provision of credit to the poor, to the provision of other 
financial services such as savings and pensions when it became clear that the poor 
had a demand for these other services (MIX, 2005). The importance of microfinance 
in the field of development was reinforced with the launch of poorest families, with 
credit for the self-employed and other financial and business services by the end of 
2015. 
 
3.1.2 The Grameen Bank 
The roots of microfinance can be found in many places, but the best known story is 
that of Muhammad Yunus and the founding of Bangladesh‟s Grameen Bank 
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(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). During the 70s Bangladesh started to 
rebuild its economy after gaining its independence from Pakistan. The challenges 
were great as widespread famine brought about by flooding killed tens of thousands 
(Sen, 1981). Government surveys found over 80 percent of the population living in 
poverty in 1973-1974 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1992) 
Muhammad Yunus, an economist and a lecturer, started a series of experiments 
lending to the poor households in the nearby village of Jobra. Even the little money 
he could get from his own pocket was enough for villagers to run simple business 
activities like rice husking and bamboo weaving (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). Yunus found that borrowers were not only profiting greatly by 
access to the loans but they were also repaying reliably, even though the villagers 
could offer no collateral. Realizing that he could only go so far with his own 
resources, in 1976 Yunus convinced the Bangladesh Bank, the Central Bank of 
Bangladesh, to help him set up a special branch. Very soon that was replicated in 
other places. Assured that the successes were not flukes or region-specific, Grameen 
Bank went nation-wide. One innovation that enabled Grameen Bank to grow rapidly 
was group-lending, a mechanism that allows the poor borrowers to act as guarantors 
for each other. In the early years funding was supplied by the International Fund for 
Agriculture and Development (IFAD), the Ford Foundation and the governments of 
Bangladesh, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. 
 
3.1.3 Section Summary 
 
This section has provided a working definition and historical perspectives of the 
microfinance revolution. Section 3.2 focuses on understanding the matrices in 
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microfinance. This is to complete the background literature discussions and set the 
tone for investigating the fundamentals of the workings of the microfinance industry.  
 
3.2 Market intervention 
 
Policy makers throughout the world have actively tried to improve financial markets 
in poor regions, but often with disappointing results mainly due to mismanagement 
of resources and interest rate restrictions by state-owned development banks. Again 
the traditional banks and other financial institutions have systematically kept low-
income households outside their credit delivery networks, forcing them to resort to 
informal and non-conventional systems of mobilizing credit. Against this 
background, microfinance emerged as a promising way to rethink banking for the 
poor (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
 
When markets fail, hardworking entrepreneurs cannot obtain all the capital needed to 
run their business and as a result they turn to the local moneylenders who charge 
very high interest rates thereby compounding the poverty levels of the locals. 
However, Adams (1984) argues that rural credit markets are far more competitive 
than typically imagined. He cites studies that show that moneylenders are charging 
rates in line with their transaction costs and risks. This view is supported by 
Bottomley (1975) and Basu (1997). Reasons for the high interest rates by 
moneylenders have been explained variously. The basic reason is that money lenders 
cannot recover anything at all from those who default since there is no collateral, 
hence the high interest rates compensating for possible defaults. Singh (1968) argues 
that the high interest rates are mainly due to high opportunity costs, not to monopoly 
profits. With capital so scarce, he argues, if money lenders invested their money 
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directly in farm enterprises they would earn more than average returns. Aleem (1990) 
argues that if markets are truly competitive, then interest rates should be driven down 
to the marginal cost of lending, which is the cost of lending an extra dollar, which is 
typically below the average cost. Steel at al. (1997) also provides evidence that 
average costs are much higher than marginal costs in surveys in Ghana, Malawi, 
Nigeria and Tanzania.  
 
According to Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), most of the costs incurred 
by moneylenders surveyed in Africa involve the pre-screening of clients. Once that is 
taken care of, administrative costs of handling loans- the largest element of the 
marginal cost of lending is small. Aleem (1990) describes a situation in which there 
are too many moneylenders serving few clients. The truth is that moneylenders are 
unable to cover their fixed costs of lending, and therefore interest rates stay high 
because returns to scale cannot be reaped. Robinson (2001) concludes that if much of 
informal money lending can be explained by a form of monopolistic competition, 
then it can be argued that banks can cost-effectively gain reliable information about 
borrowers that is far broader in scope than the information   which informal lenders 
have access. 
 
3.2.1 Microfinance and Interest Rates 
 
One issue that has generated much debate in microfinance is the issue of interest 
rates. Along with the diagnosis of the problem of shortage of investment capital 
available to poor households, goes the assumption that credit obtainable from local 
informal sources carries too high an interest rate. Interest rate is the price of money. 
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As a price it is made up of a number of components as far as the lender is concerned. 
It is the means through which the lender: 
 Pays for the cost of the funds that are being lent (cost of capital). If these 
are from savers then the savers are likely to expect a return which will at 
least cover inflation and so maintain the value of their savings; 
 Recovers the costs of providing the service (costs of administration): the 
costs of the staff employed to give and recover loans and the costs of the 
office, vehicles and stationery that are necessary to provide that service. 
 Covers losses as well as result of those who default on their loans (costs 
of default). 
The interest rate which is charged to borrowers is usually called the 
nominal interest rate. This may be different from the real interest rate, 
which is calculated as the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation 
in the country. 
The prevalence of high interest rates in informal credit markets is so well 
documented. There are two main arguments (Von Pischke, 1991; Germidis, Kessler 
and Merghir, 1991). The first view is that informal credit markets are non-
competitive and that monopolistic money lenders charge high interest rates, 
extracting substantial profits. A variant of the monopolistic moneylender is the 
lender whose primary aim is not to extract interest payments but to force the 
borrower to default. There is considerable information in support of the argument 
that some informal commercial lenders gain monopoly profits collected in financial 
form, land or labour (Darling, 1978; Indian School of Social Sciences, 1976; Rao, 
1977; Sharma, 1978; Vyas, 1980; Marla, 1981; Kamble, 1982; Roth, 1993; 
Robinson, 1988 and 1994a). 
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There is also evidence to support the opposing position that most rural lenders are 
neither exploitative nor malicious (Von Pischke, Adams and Donald, 1983; and Von 
Pischke, 1991). It is argued that they are providers of important financial services in 
rural areas.  According to Von Pischke, Adams and Donald (1983), operations of 
moneylenders are frequently more cost- effective and useful to the poor than those of 
the specialized farm-credit institutions, cooperatives and commercial banks that 
governments use to supplant moneylenders. The emerging perspective is that 
informal financial arrangements are generally robust and socially useful. Widespread 
use of informal finance suggests that it is well suited to most rural conditions. This 
thesis will seek to find out if the interest rates charged by the MFIs are realistic 
against the backdrop of the fact that their clients are the so called poor and 
marginalized in the society. 
 
3.2.2 Agency Problems 
 
Modern economics has made great strides in understanding the agency theory that 
are ubiquitous in economic life (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
Consider a borrower and a lender. The borrower has a project, but no money to 
finance it; he must then turn to the lender. Here the agency problem refers to the 
lender‟s inability to observe the borrower‟s characteristics such as the project 
riskiness, borrower‟s efforts or profits. These information problems create 
inefficiencies, and microfinance can be seen as one attempt to overcome them. In this 
case, the tension involves a “principal” (the lender) trying to do business with an 
“agent” (the borrower). 
According to Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), the information problems 
arise at three distinct stages. First, prior to extending a loan, the lender may have 
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little if any reliable information about the quality of the borrower. Sometimes a bit of 
quick scouting around by a loan officer can yield the required information, but too 
often the necessary background check on borrowers is prohibitively costly. Better 
information can prevent the lender from mistakenly extending a loan to a “low 
quality” borrower without adequately accounting for the risk involved. Second, once 
the loan has been granted, the lender does not entirely know how the borrower will 
use the resources. Will the borrower work hard to ensure that the investments are 
successful? Or might the borrower work less hard than he or she would if the project 
was entirely self-financed? Third, once investment returns have been realized, the 
lender may not be able to verify the magnitude of the returns. It is tempting then for 
the borrower to claim to have had bad luck and ask for a reprieve in paying the loan, 
when in fact the investment was highly profitable. Having information about the 
borrower‟s true profits would allow the lender to be able to prevent future 
misconduct by the borrower.  
The absence of formal credit institutions in village economies is often attributed to 
these kinds of agency problems. They are accentuated when individuals cannot offer 
good collateral, and when legal enforcement mechanisms are weak (Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
 
3.2.3 Adverse selection 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pioneered a family of adverse selection models in which 
banks lack good information about the riskiness of the borrowers‟ projects. Banks, 
the argument goes, are therefore unable to discriminate against risky borrowers and 
interest rates become exceedingly high. Such rates in turn drive worthy borrowers 
out of the credit market. This is a market “imperfection” since worthy borrowers do 
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not participate in the credit market when efficiency would suggest that they should 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Inefficiencies due to adverse selection 
arise when banks cannot adequately distinguish safer borrowers from riskier 
borrowers. When that happens, all borrowers are charged the same interest rates, and 
safer borrowers end up effectively cross-subsidizing riskier borrowers. 
 
3.2.4 Moral Hazard 
 
Moral hazard is defined as the incentive by someone (agent) who holds an asset 
belonging to another person (the principal) to endanger the value of that asset 
because the agent bears less than the full consequence of any loss (Chaves and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). For example a borrower‟s effort to repay may be largely 
unobservable by an MFI; it cannot readily determine what is attributable to the lack 
of effort by the client as opposed to bad luck or external forces. An MFI that could 
observe the borrower could relate the terms of the loan contract to the effort put in by 
the borrower, but because it costs too much to do this, the best the MFI can do is to 
ensure that the cash flow and debt capacity of the borrower are sufficient to service 
the debt. MFIs must also set terms of the loan that are acceptable to the borrower and 
result in behavior that the MFI prefers (Ledgerwood, 2000). This usually means 
giving the borrower more risk than the MFI would be ready to assume if it had better 
information (Yaron, Benjamin and Piperk, 1997). 
 
3.2.5 Section Summary 
 
This section has provided a review and an understanding of the microfinance 
matrices. Section 3.3 focuses on the pillars on which the operation of every 
microfinance institution stands. 
37 
 
3.3 Subsidy 
 
In the 1950s, governments and international aid donors subsidized credit delivery to 
small farmers in rural areas of many developing countries because it was thought of 
as a developmental tool. It was assumed that poor people found great difficulty in 
obtaining adequate volumes of credit and were charged high interest rates by 
monopolistic money-lenders. Development finance institutions, such as Agricultural 
Development Banks, were responsible for the delivery of cheap credit to poor 
farmers. These institutions attempted to supervise the uses to which loans were put, 
and repayment schedules were based on the expected income flow from the 
investment. Returns were often overestimated. For example, calculations would be 
based on agricultural yields for good years (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). As a 
result loans were often not repaid. The credibility and financial viability of these 
subsidized credit schemes were further weakened by the use of public money to 
waive outstanding and overdue loans at election time (Adams and Von Pischke, 
1992; Lipton, 1996; Wiggins and Rogaly, 1989). A dependence on the fluctuating 
whims of governments and donors, together with poor investment decisions and low 
repayment rates made many of these development finance institutions unable to 
sustain their lending programmes. Credit provision for the poor became transitory 
and limited. 
 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), it is commonly believed that further 
institutional innovation and microfinance expansion will continue to rely on public 
intervention and financial support. In fact most of MFIs that reach large numbers of 
female and male clients below the poverty line require state or donor transfers to 
subsidize their costs. They further stressed that the most successful MFIs that have 
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achieved financial sustainability have required investments by the state or donors in 
the past. Such public investments are justified from a public policy perspective only 
if the discounted social benefits of public investment in microfinance are expected to 
outweigh the social costs. These costs include the opportunity costs of forgoing the 
benefits of other public investments, such as primary education, when scarce 
government or donor funds are used for microfinance (Zeller et al., 1997). The 
subsidy dependence index has become a widely accepted operational measure to 
quantify the amount of social costs involved in supporting the operations of a 
financial institution. 
 
3.3.1 The Paradigm Shift 
 
There is a shift from subsidized delivery programmes to commercial intermediation 
internationally (Robinson, 1975). During the 1960s and 1970s, governments and 
donors promoted large-scale credit since it was subsidized in rural credit programmes 
in developing countries around the world. Since it was assumed that subsidized credit 
was required to stimulate agricultural growth, agricultural finance came to be treated 
essentially as a subsidized crop input. This approach was based on the assumption 
that poor farmers need credit for productive inputs, that they cannot save enough for 
the inputs they require, and that they cannot afford to pay the full cost of credit. 
Therefore, subsidized credit programmes would be required for the adoption of new 
agricultural technologies, enabling farmers to produce more crops, increase their 
incomes and repay their loans. It was further assumed that, in general, lower-income 
people do not save, or prefer to save in non-financial forms. Therefore, savings 
mobilization would require that people be taught financial discipline. As a result, 
compulsory saving is often required as a condition for obtaining a subsidized loan. 
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The assumptions, however, were at variance with reality. By the late 1960s and early 
1970s, serious difficulties with subsidized credit programmes had begun to become 
apparent. By the late 1970s, criticisms of the rationale behind these policies filled 
development literature (Donald, 1976; Von Pischke, Adams and Donald, 1983; 
Adams Graham and Von Pischke, 1984). The distortions and failures of the 
subsidized rural credit programmes included the following: 
1. Credit subsidies tend to encourage corruption and were captured by wealthier 
and more     influential households 
2. The diffusion of many agricultural innovations in developing countries does not 
depend on formal credit 
3. Subsidized credit programmes frequently have high default rates and large losses 
4. Credit subsidies, channeled to local elites, buy political support for governments 
and once offered are difficult to dislodge 
5. In many cases subsidized credit depresses savings mobilization and the 
development of sustainable financial institutions. 
It has become evident that subsidized credit has similar effects on small and 
microenterprises and leads to the perpetuation of a policy environment in which most 
lower-income borrowers, both rural and urban, are typically unable to gain access to 
institutional credit (Costello, Steams and Christen, 1991; Robinson, 1992, 1994a; 
Rhyne and Rotblatt, 1994). Robinson (1992), concluded by saying, “even the best of 
the MFIs that operate with subsidized loan portfolios are effective either in capturing 
savings or in providing microloans. They cannot afford to be effective in both 
because they do not have a large enough spread to cover the operating and financial 
costs that would be required. Sustainable microfinance has occurred only in systems 
that provide commercial intermediation”. 
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3.3.2 Savings 
Savings mobilization has long been a controversial issue in microfinance 
(Ledgerwood, 2000). In recent years there has been increasing awareness among 
policymakers and practitioners that there are a vast number of informal savings 
schemes and MFIs around the world have been very successful in mobilizing 
savings. These developments attest to the fact that low income clients can and do 
save. The World Bank‟s Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance Institutions found 
that many of the largest, most sustainable institutions in microfinance rely heavily on 
savings mobilization. According to Paxton (1996a), in 1995 over $19 billion was 
held in the surveyed microfinance institutions in more than 45 million savings 
accounts compared to nearly $7 billion in 14 million active loan accounts. He further 
argued that deposits provide a highly valued service to the world‟s poor who seldom 
have reliable places to store their money or the possibility to earn a return on savings. 
The survey also found that the ability to effectively mobilize deposits depends 
greatly on the macroeconomic and legal environment. Statistical analysis of the 
surveyed institutions reveals a positive correlation between the amounts of deposits 
mobilized and the average growth in per capita GNP of the country from 1980 to 
1993. Likewise, higher deposit ratios are negatively correlated with high levels of 
inflation. Finally, the amounts of deposits are positively correlated with high levels 
of population density. Furthermore, institutions operating with donor funds generally 
were found to have a high rate of loan portfolio growth, while deposit-based 
programmes grew more slowly (probably due to lack of funds). Also, institutions that 
mobilized deposits were found to have higher average loan sizes and were more 
likely to work in urban areas than institutions providing only credit. This latter 
finding relates to the fact that most institutions that collect savings must be regulated 
41 
 
(see chapter 11) to do so. Larger urban institutions tend to be regulated more often 
than the smaller MFIs, and they often reach a clientele at a higher income level. 
 
3.3.3 Market imperfection 
Microfinance institutions help augment economic development. However, for this to 
occur, microfinance institutions must be able to sustain themselves financially and 
economically. Sustainability of a microfinance institution as defined by Schreiner 
(2000) is “… the ability to repeat performance through time”. Performance here 
refers to maintaining substantial outreach, ability to generate regular revenue whilst 
reducing operational costs, and the ability to manage the lender-borrower 
relationship effectively. Interest rate management and savings mobilization problems 
have been pointed out as causes of lack of sustainability and eventual failure of such 
financial schemes (Adams, Graham and Von Pischke, 1984). These factors, have 
however been seen as being secondary to the main problems facing the sustainability 
of microfinance schemes; information asymmetry and imperfect markets. These 
factors breed the twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection acknowledged 
as very important by most authors ( Khan, 1979; Stiglitz, 1990; Siamwalla et al., 
1990; Aleem, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Besley, 1994; Yaron, 1994; Sharma and 
Zeller, 1997) as crucial in MFIs‟ survival and success. Moral hazard (which is 
mainly problems with repayments and defaults) and adverse selection (which has to 
do with the issue of screening out those likely to default) can be categorized into 
three main problems: 
1. The problem with screening 
 2. The incentive problem 
3. The enforcement problem 
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The first deals with the fact that since borrowers differ in default likelihood it 
becomes difficult and expensive to determine the level of risk for each borrower. In 
the case of the incentives problem the ability to ensure that borrowers engage in 
activities that facilitate repayment is the problem. It is noted that probability of 
default on a credit facility depends on the probability that gross returns on the project 
for which the credit facility is being sought is less than the principal and the interest 
on the loan. The third and final problem of enforcement is obvious; how do you 
enforce repayment? Throughout the literature on microfinance, these issues continue 
to dominate. Lending institutions may therefore reduce loanable funds or go out of 
business. Such problems lead to a form of credit rationing and little investment in the 
economy. 
Propositions to help overcome these problems are varied and extensive. Hoff and 
Stiglitz (1990) outlined two mechanisms: the direct and indirect mechanisms to deal 
with the issues. With regards to the indirect mechanism they argue that lenders 
should design their loan contracts such that they can extract enough information 
covering problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The design here could be 
in the form of an interest rate arrangement or loan size. The interest rate then 
assumes a dual function: as the price and an instrument for regulating the risk 
compositions. However, charging the interest rate because of default may result in 
changing the mix of projects undertaken by borrowers especially where they favour 
expected net return. Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) go forth to add the threat of freezing 
credit as another alternative in the indirect mechanism. Here borrowers for fear of 
being denied future access avoid default. For the direct mechanism, resources are 
employed by lenders to screen applicants and enforce loan repayments. Methods 
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regarding the use of collateral such as land in the case of developing countries are 
also far advanced. 
Authors (Yaron, 1994; Khandker and Khan, 1995; Morduch, 1999; Schreiner and 
Yaron, 1999; Schreiner, 2000) have summarized the sustainability and success of 
MFIs into their ability to exit subsidy dependence and fully cover their operational 
costs. A measure of subsidy dependence, the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) has in 
this regard been widely used in measuring the sustainability of microfinance 
institutions. According to Morduch (1999) sustainability of MFIs is at two levels; 
operational sustainability which deals with the ability of an institution to recover 
operational costs and financial sustainability which deals with the ability to operate 
without reliance on donor subsidy. Indeed, Schreiner and Yaron (1999) contend that 
the Subsidy Dependence Index is a summary of the sustainability of a MFI. Subsidy 
dependence, a common phenomenon with MFIs could itself undermine their future 
existence. This is because donor fatigue is a regular problem with reliance on grants 
from donors. A microfinance institution that is unable to raise enough revenue will 
collapse quickly after donor withdrawal, (Schreiner, 2000). Even in the midst of 
permanent subsidy, increased revenue generation by an MFI, will help increase 
outreach and expand its operations to its advantage. The ability to generate 
substantial revenue from on-lending and other activities and eventually exit subsidy 
dependence depends on how the MFI is able to manage the dynamics between 
lenders and borrowers in the provision of microfinance. 
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3.3.4 Sustainability  
A substantial amount of empirical works on sustainability of microfinance have been 
in the South American and Asian countries (Khan, 1979; Bell, 1990; Siamwalla et 
al., 1990; Aleem, 1990; Besley, 1994; Chavez et al., 1996; Navajas et al., 2000). Two 
important indicators have emerged in examining the sustainability of MFIs. Yaron 
(1994) in a study of rural finance institutions which engage in microcredit activities 
in Indonesia and Bangladesh used these two criteria to measure sustainability: 
1. Financial Self-Sustainability 
2. Substantial Outreach 
Financial self-sustainability is attained when return on equity (ROE), net of subsidy 
received, equals or exceeds the opportunity cost of funds. In this regard a positive 
on-lending interest rate, which is able to cover administrative costs and maintains the 
value of equity in real terms, is advocated for. Again, high loan collection rates as 
well as a high deposit rate to increase voluntary savings and proper management of 
administrative costs with efficient loan processing are factors outlined under 
financial self-sustainability. On measures of outreach, Yaron (1994) examined the 
value of loans and savings extended, the type of financial services offered, the 
number of branches, percentage of poor served, real annual growth rate and 
participation of women. 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) in their study of 13 MFIs in seven countries used real 
interest rate charged, six-month arrears rate, frequency of loan collection, availability 
of voluntary savings facilities and availability of incentives to repay to determine the 
financial sustainability. Thus, lower arrears rate, high frequency in loan collection, 
the existence of material incentives to borrowers and staff of the institutions 
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maximized the repayment rate. In addition, the subsidy dependence ratio was 
estimated to determine the level of dependence of the institutions, where a low index 
was indicative of further financial sustainability. The study concluded that financially 
viable microfinance institutions are able to impact incomes of beneficiaries 
significantly. 
 
3.3.5 Success 
Sharma and Zeller (1997), Navajas et al., (2000) have generally agreed to most or all 
of these measures outlined under the two criteria as being very effective in 
determining the success or otherwise of MFIs. In this regard, four microfinance 
institutions, Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC) in Thailand, 
Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) and Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa (BUD) both 
in Indonesia and Grameen Bank (BK) in Bangladesh were classified as very 
successful in the early 1990s. An important phenomenon that characterized these 
institutions is group lending. In group borrowing, the costly job of screening, 
monitoring and enforcement of repayment is transferred largely from the MFI to the 
group members. 
There is also varied evidence (Udry, 1990; Besley, 1994; Khandker et al., 1995; 
Sharma et al., 1997; Navajas et al., 2000) on measures of dealing with the problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection to ensure sustainability and success of 
microfinance operations. Llanto (1990) also argued that since groups internalize the 
costs of acquiring and generating information, they must be encouraged to tap 
lenders‟ resources. This arrangement results in what Stiglitz (1990) refers to as “peer 
monitoring” where according to him:  
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“Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending programmes 
elsewhere”.  
Basu (1997) also argues for group borrowing since it increases access of poor 
farmers to institutional credit by increasing the size of entitlement set, thereby 
removing problems of economies of scale. There is a caveat here, however; a 
member may choose a riskier project because of the knowledge that other members 
or peers will repay the amount involved in the event of default. Alternatively an 
individual may decide to default based on the perception or the likelihood of 
members defaulting. 
Institutional development, that is engaging in activities that on the surface are not 
directly linked to the first duty of credit allocation such as training of clients in 
entrepreneurial development skills and social development have also been found to 
make MFIs a success. Groups are also obliged to contribute to an emergency fund to 
help members in times of emergency. Grameen Bank and other MFIs that were 
deemed as being successful were seen to have engaged in such activities (Yaron, 
1994; Jain, 1996; Sharma et al., 1997). Jain (1996) is of the view that the success of 
Grameen Bank and of MFIs in general lies in the adoption of such policies which he 
terms “strategic credit policies”. In addition, the motivation of employees as well as 
policies to forestall the flouting of organizational norms by powerful clients is also 
important. In all of these, the loan recovery rates were noted to be very impressive, 
98% for Grameen and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and 
100% for others such as Association for Social Advancement (ASA) (Sharma et al., 
1997). Authors such as Yaron (1994), Khandker and Khan (1995), Schreiner and 
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Yaron (1999) and Schreiner (2000) have further gone ahead to define economic 
sustainability and institutional viability as means of measuring the success and 
viability of MFIs. They use subsidy dependence indices to judge the sustainability or 
otherwise of microfinance institutions. According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), there 
is a critical triangle of microfinance reflecting the three objectives of financial 
sustainability, outreach and impact as represented in Figure 3.0 
FIGURE 3.0 The critical triangle in achieving economic sustainability of 
microfinance (Zeller and Meyer, 2002). 
Microeconomic and sectoral policy framework and socioeconomic environment 
 
 
 
 
 
The analytical framework points to the wide set of potential trade-offs and synergies 
that needs to be understood by policymakers, microfinance practitioners and 
researchers alike. The triangle in Figure 3.0 is drawn with an inner and an outer 
circle. The inner circle represents the many types of institutional innovations that 
contribute to improving financial sustainability (such as employment of cost-
reducing information systems), impact (such as designing demand-oriented services 
for the poor and more effective training of clients), or outreach to the poor (such as 
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more effective targeting mechanisms or introducing lending technologies that attract 
a particular group of clients). The outer circle represents the external socio-economic 
environment as well as the macro-economic and sectoral policies that directly or 
indirectly affect the performance of financial institutions. Innovations at the 
institutional (the inner circle) and improvements in the policy environment (the outer 
circle) contribute to improving the overall performance of financial institutions. 
All microfinance institutions attempt to contribute to these objectives, but many 
stress one particular objective over the other. Some may produce large impacts but 
achieve limited outreach. Others may have smaller impacts but are highly 
sustainable. The potential trade-offs between depth of outreach and financial 
sustainability have been noted, but trade-offs may also exist between impact and 
financial sustainability. Following the work of Ohio State University and other 
institutions in the 1980s, the view emerged that the building of lasting financial 
institutions requires that they become financially sustainable, that is, they cover their 
costs. Some analysts including Otero and Rhyne (1994); Christen et al. (1995) have 
argued that increasing the depth of outreach (reaching the poorest of the poor) and 
sustainability are compatible objectives. However, Hulme and Mosley (1996), along 
with others argue that there appears to be a trade-off between improving outreach 
and achieving financial sustainability. 
 
3.3.6 Outreach 
Donors and practitioners have increasingly recognized that the sustainable provision 
of formal or semi-formal financial services to the poor and other sectors of the 
population is a useful tool in poverty alleviation, enterprise development and 
financial sector deepening (Paxton and Cuevas, cited in Zeller and Meyer, 2002). 
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Von Pischke (1991) describes a frontier between the formal and informal financial 
sectors. Those outside the frontier do not have regular access to formal financial 
services. They comprise a heterogeneous population, whose degree of exclusion 
from financial services may vary and whose distance from the poverty line in their 
respective countries may differ (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). In measuring 
institutional outreach it is important to distinguish between the extent (or breadth) 
and the depth of outreach. The extent or breadth of outreach is represented by the 
absolute number of households or enterprises (or relative market penetration) in the 
target population reached by the institution; the depth of outreach indicates how deep 
into the pool of the underserved the institution or programme has been able to reach. 
 
Despite the urgent need for increased outreach in microfinance there are barriers. A 
study for USAID (Christen, Rhyne and Vogel, 1994) revealed that only a few highly 
specialized microfinance institutions developed during the past 15 years, are 
achieving both outreach and long-term financial sustainability. The first of these 
barriers is the fact that most developing countries suffer from low level development 
of their national financial systems. Their financial systems have been impaired by 
fiscal imbalances, volatile inflation, financial repression and weak legal and 
regulatory frameworks (Gurgand, Pederson and Yaron, 1994). Effective outreach is 
inhibited by factors which are specific to agriculture and to rural economies based on 
agriculture. Many elements of the rural sector are poorly developed. Markets for 
products, land use and labour are inefficient and strongly localized (Collier, 1989; 
Hoff, Stiglitz and Braverman, 1993). Credit markets are no exception to this pattern 
and are negatively affected by the weak economic environment in rural areas. 
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Low population density adds to the difficulties faced by rural financial institutions in 
their outreach effort, especially in view of the poor transportation and 
communication infrastructure. Population density in Sub-Saharan Africa is 21 
inhabitants per square kilometer compared with more than 200 in some low and 
medium income Asian countries. 
This section has provided a review of the pillars on which every microfinance 
institution stands. Additionally, the current thinking in the use of subsidies and the 
critical issue of market imperfection were discussed. The sections following 
immediately focus on the vehicles used in microfinance delivery. 
  
3.3.7 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) 
According to Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), one way to avoid steep 
costs charged by moneylenders is to borrow from neighbours and friends, but while 
interest rate may be low or even zero, social costs and obligations can be 
considerable. ROSCAs provide an alternative solution, based on pooling resources 
with a broad group of neighbours and friends. 
ROSCAs tend to have simple structures. The basic element is a group of individuals 
who agree to regularly contribute money to a common ”pot” that is allocated to one 
member of a group each period. Twenty people, say, may agree to contribute $15 
each for twenty months, generating a monthly pot of $300. At monthly intervals the 
group meets to collect dues and allocate the proceeds, with past recipients excluded 
from getting the pot again, until every member has had a turn with the $300 pot. 
ROSCAs thus successfully take the bits of surplus funds that come into households 
and translate those bits into a large chunk that can be used to fund a major purchase. 
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The simplicity has advantages. The life of a ROSCA has a clear beginning and end, 
accounting is straightforward (one has to keep track of who has received the pot 
already and who is in line to do so), and storage of funds is not required since money 
goes straight from one person‟s pocket into another‟s (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005). ROSCAs come in a number of variations, and each has implications 
for what ROSCA offers, how it stays together and who is attracted to join. The main 
variants involve the way groups determine who gets the pot. The order of receipt 
may be predetermined and unchanging from cycle to cycle. The order may be chosen 
randomly at the beginning of each cycle, or in the most current fashion may be 
allowed to bid for a given pot, rather than simply waiting for their turn. 
 
3.4. Group Lending 
Group lending refers specifically to arrangements by individuals without collateral 
who get together and form groups with the aim of obtaining loans from a lender. The 
special feature is that the loans are made available individually to group members, 
but all in the group face consequences if any member runs into serious repayment 
difficulties (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). In the Grameen Bank case, 
the groups are made up of five people. In the BancoSol case, groups can be as small 
as three people while FINCA in Costa Rica groups can range from ten to fifty 
women. As long as the loans are being repaid, the cycle of lending continues. 
According to Fugelsang and Chandler (1993), if one member defaults and fellow 
group members do not pay off the debt, all in the group are denied subsequent loans. 
This feature gives customers important incentives to repay promptly, to monitor their 
neighbours and to select responsible partners when forming groups. The mechanisms 
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rely on informal relationships between neighbours that facilitate borrowing for 
households lacking collateral. The programme sometimes called “joint liability” 
combines the scale advantages of a standard bank with mechanisms long used in 
traditional modes of informal finance (Besley and Coate, 1995; Armendariz de 
Aghion, 1999a). 
 
 
3.5 Women Empowerment 
Government and non-governmental organizations in recent years have introduced 
microfinance programmes, especially in developing countries by offering financial 
services to low income households specifically targeting women. The assumption 
behind this move is that women in poor households are more likely to be credit 
constrained and therefore less able to undertake income-earning activities. Accessing 
credit by women has been boosted in the context of poverty reduction and women‟s 
empowerment objectives. In meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
 7
, 
goal three aims at promoting gender equality and empowering women. However, 
only a few studies have successfully investigated this impact in a rigorous manner 
(Pitt et. al, 2006).  
Though many people agree that women empowerment is an important development 
objective for microfinance programmes, it is still unclear what women empowerment 
means. 
 
 
7 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were agreed at the United Nations Summit in September 2000 by nearly 190 
countries. 
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Kabeer (1999) explains that women empowerment refers to the process by which 
those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such 
ability. This ability to exercise choice incorporates three inter-related dimensions: 
resources which include access to both material and social resources now and the 
future. It also includes the process of decision-making, negotiation, deception and 
manipulation and achievements that are the well-being outcomes. The interpretation 
of women empowerment and its measurement also varies across different studies.  
 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
As discussed in the introductory section, the focus of this chapter was to review the 
literature that is germane to understanding the microfinance phenomenon as well as 
the historical perspectives. The chapter began by discussing the failure of formal 
financial institutions to serve society‟s poor hence the emergence of the microfinance 
movement. 
The second phase of this chapter introduced the microfinance matrices that underpin 
the development and understanding of microfinance as a tool for credit delivery to 
the majority of poor people. It specifically examined the following: interest rates, 
agency problems, adverse selection, moral hazard and market intervention. 
The third phase discusses the microfinance pillars: subsidy, savings, sustainability, 
success and outreach. The issue of market imperfection was discussed as well. 
The fourth phase of the chapter was dedicated to the vehicles used in the delivery of 
microfinance. Finally, the chapter discusses the role of microfinance in women 
empowerment. 
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Summary Table for the Chapter 
1. The evolution of MFIs and its linkage to Grameen Bank. 
2. Market intervention policies and why the need for it 
3. Information asymmetry and imperfect markets and how they breed the 
twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
4. The critical role of subsidies and its current thinking. 
5. Microfinance lending schemes 
6. Sustainability and Success factors 
7. Microfinance and Women Empowerment 
55 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Exploratory Research 
4.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research method and the results of the exploratory 
research. Semi-structured interviews with Chief Executives of fourteen microfinance 
institutions were conducted. The main purpose was to seek their perception of the 
factors that impact on sustainability and success of microfinance institutions. This 
qualitative approach was also to assist in confirming the subsidy dependence index 
(SDI) and the operational self-sufficiency (OSS) model, developed out of existing 
literature and the development of research hypotheses. The lack of information and 
theory concerning the performance of microfinance institutions in Sub-Sahara Africa 
in general and Ghana in particular were the major factors that contributed to the 
decision to conduct the qualitative interviews. 
The exploratory research covered the following areas: the history and institutional 
characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, environment/ governance and 
success. 
4.2: The Research Method 
 
This consists of the exploratory research process, population, sampling procedure, 
firm size analysis, profile of sampled institutions and the interview process. 
 
4.2.1: Exploratory Research Process 
 
This exploratory research process involved the following steps. First, a literature 
review was carried out to identify the factors to consider in the exploratory research 
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and the interview guide. (See Appendix A). Second, semi-structured interviews were 
piloted on five Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) covering each of the various 
segments of microfinance to find out the suitability of the interview guide which was 
developed from the literature review. A summary of the findings was sent to each 
respondent for their comments. Changes that emanated from the feedbacks were 
effected where necessary. Third, full scale semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with nine Chief Executive Officers to gain an understanding of the 
performance of these microfinance institutions. Fourth, the individual interviews 
were transcribed, summarized and pulled together into tables (Appendices… B, C, D, 
E, F). All these respondents were the main decision makers in their institutions. Data 
analysis was mainly based on case and cross content analysis. Descriptive statistics 
were also used. 
 
4.2.2 Population 
 
The sample was based on data from Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network 
(Ghamfin), which is the oversight body for all the registered microfinance 
institutions as noted in Chapter Two (see Table 2.2). The data has been cleaned to 
exclude the Apex bodies and the Business Development and Service Providers 
because they do not provide microfinance services directly to the poor. The sectors 
covered were: Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs), Savings and 
Loans companies (S&L), Credit Union Associations (CUAs), Rural/Community 
Banks and Susu operators. 
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4.2.3: Sampling Procedure 
 
The data was stratified based on the number of clients and branches as shown in 
Table 3.1. An institution was selected based on size and from each sector to allow for 
differences arising from size and geographical spread and peculiar institutional 
characteristics and modes of handling the lender-borrower relationships. 
 
Table 4.1: Firm Size Analysis 
TYPE Large Small to Medium 
Financial NGOs 3 2 
Savings & Loans 
Companies 
2 1 
Credit Union Association 1 1 
Rural Banks 1 1 
Susu companies 1 1 
Total 8 6 
 
Other characteristics of the sampled institutions are provided in Table 4.2 as shown 
below. 
 
4.2.4: Profile of Sampled institutions 
 
FNGO 1-This institution was established in 1996 but its microfinance project started 
in the year 2000 as an autonomous division. Its roots could be traced to the United 
States of America but currently receiving funding from other continents. Its Head 
Office is located in the capital city of Ghana. 
FNGO 2-This institution was established in 1978 but was re-launched in 2007. It is 
the business arm of a Christian organization and is also an affiliate of an international 
NGO based in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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FNGO 3-This institution was established in 1994 but later was split into two with the 
new unit engaging in Savings and Loans. Its capital is foreign and has its Head 
Office located in the capital city of Ghana. It has the highest number of branches in 
terms of FNGOs. 
FNGO 4-It started as the country office of an American NGO. The plan was that 
when the country office acquires some capacity they will start soliciting for funds 
from other sources that an American NGO cannot go and solicit for funds. Its Head 
Office is located in Accra, the capital city of Ghana. 
FNGO 5- This was established in 1998 and is into urban microfinance. It migrated 
from a neighbouring West African country where they were helping Ghanaians 
resident in that country to grow their businesses through micro credit. 
S & L 1- This institution was carved out of a FNGO. It was established in 2004 with 
foreign capital. Its Head Office is located in Accra, the capital city of Ghana. 
S & L 2- It was established in 2002 under a different name. It is part of an 
international group on three continents of Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
They currently have over 130,000 clients. They are located in 22 countries 
worldwide, with two main foreign shareholders. 
S & L 3- Was established in 2007 and was established as a service provider to one of 
the leading commercial banks in the country. They have both local and foreign 
capital. 
CUA 1- The first CUA was established in 1955 and is regionally dispersed in almost 
all institutions in Ghana. Head Office is located in Accra and now 90% self-
sustaining. 
CUA 2- It was established in 1971 and is located on the campus of one of the major 
Universities in the capital city of Accra. 
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RB 1- Located in one of the densely populated communities of the capital. It was set 
up to provide specific service to the community by the Government in 1987. 
RB 2- It was established in 1985 by the Government to provide specific service to 
the community. 
SUSU 1- Was established in 2006 by a young University Graduate who was once a 
Banker and was also a Consultant to the Government on poverty alleviation 
strategies. They are operating with a family capital with husband and wife as the sole 
shareholders. 
SUSU 2- It was established in 1996 as a sole proprietorship. He operates from his 
house and it is located in the harbour city of Ghana, Tema. They only serve one large 
market with about 2,000 clients. 
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Table 4.2: Profile of Sampled Institutions 
No. 
Name of 
Institution 
Ownership  
Geographical  
spread 
Methodology Sector Services 
1 FNGO 
Foreign 
 
ER,NR,UE,UW,BA Group, 
Individual 
Trading, 
Agric. 
Credit, 
Savings 
     Training 
2 
FNGO Foreign&Local  
Ecumenical 
GA,ER,BA Group, 
individual 
Trading Credit, 
Business 
Dev. 
Services 
3 
FNGO          
Foreign&Local 
GA,AR,BA,WR,ER, 
UE,UW,VR,NR,CR 
Group, 
Individual 
      Trading        Credit 
4 
FNGO 
 
 
Foreign GA,BA,WR,ER,UE 
UW,CR,NR 
Group 
 
Trading, 
Agric. 
Credit , 
Training 
5 FNGO Foreign GA Group     Trading          Credit 
6 
SAVINGS 
& LOAN 
CO. 
Foreign GA,AR,BA,WR Group, 
Individual 
 Trading Credit, 
Savings 
7 
SAVINGS 
& LOANS 
CO. 
Foreign GA,AR,WR,BA Individual Trading, 
Agric 
Personal 
Credit, 
Savings 
8 
SAVINGS 
& LOANS 
CO. 
Foreign&Local GA,AR,BA,ER Group, 
Individual 
Trading Credit, 
Savings 
9 
CREDIT 
UNION 
Local 
members 
GA,CR,VR,WR,NR 
ER,UE,UW,BA,AR 
Individual 
workers 
Mixed Credit, 
Savings, 
training 
10 
CREDIT 
UNION 
Local 
members 
GA Individual 
workers 
      Mixed Credit, 
Savings 
11 
RURAL 
BANK 
Government GA Group, 
Individual 
Mixed Credit, 
Savings 
12 
13 
14 
RURAL 
BANK 
     SUSU. 
 
     SUSU 
Government 
Sole proprietor 
 
Sole proprietor 
GA 
GA,CR 
 
GA 
Group, 
Individual 
Group, 
Individual 
 
Individuals 
Mixed 
Mixed 
 
Trading 
Credit, 
Savings 
Credit, 
Savings 
 
Credit, 
Savings 
 
  
S&L-Savings and Loans Companies,  CUA- Credit Union Associations, RB- Rural Banks, SUSU- Local version of  
ROSCAS 
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4.2.5: The Interview Process 
 
An interview guide was used (see Appendix A). Each interview lasted between 26 to 
63 minutes. Respondents were allowed to freely discuss the performance of their 
institutions. In all 14 institutions were contacted.  
4.3: Cross Institutional Analysis 
 
This section analyzes the major factors that impacted on performance of 
microfinance of the sampled officials. The section is structured under the following 
main themes: institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, and 
environment/ governance and success. 
This section aims at enhancing generalizability of the findings as well as to deepen 
the understanding and explanation of sustainability and success of microfinance as 
discussed with the 14 Executives. 
 
4.3.1 Institutional Characteristics 
 
The following imperatives have been used to scan the characteristics of the 
institutions: ownership, geographical spread, motivation, clientele, funding and 
information gathering (See Appendix B). 
 
4.3.2 FNGO Characteristics  
 
Most of the Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (60%) were foreign owned, 
and the remaining two were a partnership between foreign and local entrepreneur. 
Four had local Chief Executives with one having a foreigner.  
Four out of the five Executives interviewed were of the view that there was the need 
to expand beyond their current geographical spread. One however was emphatic in 
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saying that they did not have any immediate plans of expanding beyond the capital 
city since they were into urban micro financing. Apart from one, all the FNGOs had 
good regional penetration with one present in all the ten regions of the country. 
All the FNGOs interviewed emphasized that their primary concern was the 
eradication of poverty by empowering the poor through the provision of finance for 
micro enterprises. All the five Executives indicated that they were in the trading 
sector with two extending their services to cover agriculture which they agree was a 
high risk area. One Chief Executive indicated that 90% of their clientele were 
farmers. 
One FNGO relied solely on foreign grants and subsidies to finance their operations; 
another had a revolving foreign capital, with another having a combination of foreign 
capital and local debt financing. The remaining two borrow from the commercial 
market to finance their operations. Information gathering on clients was seen as 
essential to all the Executives before disbursement of funds. They all relied on the 
community itself for the supply of critical information which then becomes the basis 
of all contractual agreements. 
 
4.3.3 Savings and Loans Characteristics 
 
Two of the Savings and Loans institutions were 100% foreign investment with the 
third being a partnership between a local bank and an international finance company. 
All the companies had the same geographical spread with their head offices located 
in the capital city. The Executives held the view that it was advantageous to locate 
near markets especially, to facilitate easy collection of cash from clients and also 
savings which was central to their operations. Two of the Executives indicated that 
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they dealt with only traders whilst the third had a mix of traders, farmers and 
individual office workers who want loans for home improvement. 
Their motivation according to all the interviewees was to empower or transform the 
economically active but poor people who have been neglected by the traditional 
banks. One Executive declared “once you are poor, and we believe a small loan can 
turn you around, we consider you a client. We want to transform the economically 
active into sustainable livelihood. We have Christian mission alongside, but that 
does not override business assessment and thinking”. 
All the savings and loans companies interviewed do not rely on grants and subsidies 
for their operations but had foreign start-up capital.  Information on their clients, they 
all agree is central to their operations. They do this through their field officers who 
are trained in this area. They also use the community to gather information about 
their potential clients which is then scrutinized alongside the application forms 
submitted by the clients. 
 
4.3.4 Credit Union Characteristics 
  
Credit Unions (CUs) are registered by the Department of Cooperatives as 
cooperative thrift societies that accept deposits from their members and give loans as 
well. The first credit union in Ghana was established at Jirapa in the Upper West 
region in 1955 by Canadian Catholic mission (World Bank, 1994). This then grew to 
141 largely parish-based unions in the northern part of the country in 1960. By 1968, 
when they were brought under the legislation and the Ghana Cooperative Credit 
Unions Association (GCCUA) was formed as an apex body, there were 254 CUs 
with a membership of 60,000 (Quainoo, 1997). 
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CUs are grassroots financial co-operatives offering savings and loan facilities 
exclusively to their members at favorable interest rates. They are generally small, 
both in terms of membership and volume of funds. They pay interest on deposits and 
charge interest on loans to members. Loans tend to be short or medium-term and 
largely for consumption purposes as well as the purchase of essential household 
items. In many cases, they provide members with access to credit which would not 
be available from the formal banking system (Offei, 2001; GCCUA, 2002). 
Individual members make predetermined periodic deposits into their accounts and 
may borrow up to two times their savings balance. Most CUs require borrowers to 
provide security, in addition to being in good standing with their deposits. Ideally, 
this can be in the form of a guarantee from another member of the credit union who 
has an adequate uncommitted savings balance. Some CUs use the susu method of 
calling on members daily to collect their daily savings and loan repayments. CUs are 
innovative in providing both credit insurance (which pays off outstanding loan 
balance in case of the death of the borrower) and a contractual savings programme 
(which matches savings, up to a limit, if held at death or to maturity) Department of 
Cooperatives, 2001; Steel and Andah, 2003,2004). 
The Credit Unions are owned by the clients collectively through their savings which 
is their main source of funds.   They are in all the ten regions of the country with the 
apex body located in the capital. According to one chief Executive, the philosophy 
behind the establishment of the unions was for community development and to help 
people to cultivate the habit of savings. He contended that you cannot make someone 
spiritually strong if the person is hungry. Therefore they tried to find a balance 
between the social, economic and spiritual needs of human beings to make them a 
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complete whole. Their source of information on the clients is from the community 
and you can only qualify for a loan after saving for a period of time. 
 
4.3.5 Rural Banks Characteristics 
 
Both Executives indicated that they were set up purposely by government to bring 
banking to the door step of the rural community. They are located in the rural 
settings of the capital city. Their clientele was a mixture of traders, farmers, artisans 
and government salaried workers. Their source of funding was initially from 
government but now it is the deposits they receive from clients .The Executives 
interviewed were of the opinion that they were playing important roles in their 
communities by the provision of small credits to the locals. They did not differ on 
information gathering on clients to form the basis for qualification for a loan. They 
also agreed it was the work of their loan officers who are trained specially for this 
purpose. 
 
4.3.6: Susu Companies Characteristics 
 
Both Executives were sole proprietors but one had friends investing substantially in 
the business. However, he and his wife remain the only shareholders. They differed 
in terms of market spread. Whilst the older company was content with serving one 
market in the capital, the relatively younger company had two regional presences 
with five branches in these regions. They did not differ in terms of clientele who 
were mentioned as traders, artisans and hawkers. Their motivation was to mobilize 
small savings from clients thereby inculcating in them the habit of savings and also 
to extend credit to them. They agreed that since it was a community-based project, 
gathering information on their clients was relatively easy.  
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4.3.7: Section Summary 
 
Financial Non-Governmental Organizations were mostly owned by foreign interests 
and they had the highest regional presence. All the institutions were motivated by the 
desire to bring banking to the poor and the marginalized in society, with savings as 
the pivot of their operations. Traders form the core of all the institutions interviewed 
except the credit unions that operated from within organizations and as such had their 
clientele as the workers from within. There was no marked difference in terms of 
information gathering on clients for the purpose of loan disbursements.  Most of the 
FNGOs tended to have foreign capital, while the rural banks were funded by 
governments. The credit unions and the savings and loans companies depended on 
members‟ savings, while the „Susu‟ companies were personally funded by the 
owners.  
4.4. Agency Costs 
 
Sustainability of a microfinance institution is defined by Schreiner (2000) as “the 
ability to repeat performance through time”. Efficiency in the allocation of public 
resources to microfinance compared with alternative policy interventions requires 
that performance be evaluated by comparing the social benefits generated by the 
financial system with its social costs. In theory, a financial institution is financially 
sustainable if its social benefits outweigh its social costs (Zeller et al., 1997). The 
following would be used to analyze financial sustainability and agency costs: sources 
of income, subsidy dependence/exiting, number of branches, contractual agreements 
and relationship with clients. These findings have been tabulated as Appendix C. 
 
 
67 
 
4.4.1: FNGO Agency Costs 
 
All the Chief Executives of the Financial NGOs interviewed agreed that their main 
source of income came from the interest charged on loans advanced to clients. Three 
(60%) however indicated they invested some of their idle funds in treasury bills 
which also earned them income for their operations. Four (80%) of the Chief 
Executives indicated that they relied on subsidies and grants and two (40%) did not 
have any immediate plans of exiting. The remaining two (40%) however indicated 
that they were looking for other sources or about exiting subsidy dependence. Only 
one of the five FNGOs did not depend on subsidies.  
 
Three (60%) of the FNGOs had ten and above branches in line with their 
geographical spread indicating the breadth of their outreach. Though one is an urban 
institution with its branches only in the capital city, their outreach was good 
considering the rapid growth over relatively short period of time. The basis of the 
contractual agreements for all the FNGOs were the application forms filled in by the 
clients. Again, all the Chief Executives agreed that their relationship with their 
clients were cordial with one describing the clients as partners to signify how 
important they perceive them in their scheme of things. 
 
 
 
4.4.2: Savings & Loans Agency Costs 
 
All the savings and loans companies earn on-lending interest just like the FNGOs. 
They also invested in treasury bills to boost their income base. One of the companies 
is a service provider to one of the leading commercial banks in the country and 
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unlike the other two, earn fees and commissions in addition to their traditional on-
lending interest. 
None of the savings and loans companies depended on subsidies and grants for their 
existence. One actually had exited the subsidy dependence and was now 
operationally self-sufficient, funding its operations from funds generated internally. 
All the companies sited their branches in almost the same cities and towns, indicating 
a strong preference for urban micro financing. The Executives of savings and loans 
companies also needed to protect their investments by entering into contractual 
agreements with their clients which was done through the filling and signing of loan 
agreement forms. These agreements were legal in nature which clearly spells out the 
obligations of both parties and the consequences of a default. 
The Executives of the savings and loans companies interviewed were unanimous in 
indicating that the success or otherwise of micro financing depended on an 
atmosphere of cordiality between the provider of the credit and the beneficiaries. One 
Chief Executive declared “microfinance is based on trust, quality of service and 
professionalism. You are dealing with people from different backgrounds and 
therefore you need to be tactful, diplomatic and above all firm. Without these 
qualities your investment would go up in flames”.9 
 
4.4.3: Credit Union Agency Costs 
 
The main source of income for all the credit unions came from interest on lending. 
They all agreed that they invested their idle funds in treasury bills thereby earning 
interest to finance their operations. Other sources of income were income from fixed 
deposits and dividends on shares. 
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The large credit union association used to be subsidy and grant dependent for their 
operations but are currently 90% self-sufficient. The smaller of the two started off 
with deposits and savings by clients to build up their capital and have never been 
dependent on subsidies or grants whether foreign or local. 
Credit Union Associations are normally work-based or community associations of 
people with a common interest. There are over four hundred and fifty (450) credit 
union associations in Ghana with the apex body located in the capital city and they 
have oversight responsibility for all the unions. All the credit unions used specially 
designed loan forms as the basis of contractual agreement. All the Chief Executives 
interviewed indicated that they had very good relationships with their clients. 
 
4.4.4: Rural Banks Agency Costs 
 
All the Chief Executives of rural banks interviewed said the main source of their 
income was the interest they earn on lending to clients. They also invest their idle 
funds in treasury bills to augment their income base. 
Due to their localized nature, they did not have many branches. They also agreed that 
filling of loan agreement forms, formed the basis of all the contractual agreements 
with their clients. They all described their relationship with their clients as very 
friendly or good. 
 
4.4.5: Susu Companies Agency Costs 
 
The two Chief Executives of the Susu companies interviewed all stated that their 
main source of income as interest on loans they advance to their clients. The Chief 
Executive of the large company indicated that they also earn commission on certain 
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unspecified transactions. They also look out for profitable short- term ventures that 
would bring them more income. 
None of the Susu companies had ever operated on subsidies or grants. The Chief 
Executive of the large Susu Company is a young university graduate who once 
worked in one of the big banks as an Information Technology Specialist. His 
ambition is to grow his company with many branches to eventually become a savings 
and loans company. As a result he has been able to open five branches which is very 
uncharacteristic of Susu companies. The use of loan agreement form was very 
common to the two companies. They both described their relationship with their 
clients as very cordial. 
 
4.4.6: Section Summary  
 
Interest on loans as a source of income is common to all the institutions interviewed. 
This is followed by investment in treasury bills. Two institutions earn commissions 
and one is an extension of one of the commercial banks to whom they provide 
services. The other is an ambitious young graduate who was once a banker. Credit 
Unions are the only institutions that invest in shares thereby earning dividends. 
Subsidy dependence or grants were a feature of the FNGOs. The savings and loans 
companies borrowed from the market to finance their operations. The credit unions 
used the compulsory deposits and savings of their clients as the capital for 
operations. The rural banks were set up by the Government with a clear mandate to 
provide credit and savings to the rural community. Their initial capital was by 
government but had to operate to be self-sufficient. The Susu companies were sole 
proprietors with personal or family capital. 
71 
 
The FNGOs had more branches but tended to be urban centred. The Savings and 
loans companies were also to a large extent urban in nature, tended to be located near 
large markets. This they intimated was to facilitate easy lodgments of loan 
repayments and savings by the traders. All the institutions used a form of loan 
agreement documents as the basis for loan disbursements to clients. The fortunes of 
all the institutions depended on the kind of relationship that existed between them 
and their clients. Cordiality with clients is the word that runs through all the 
institutions interviewed. 
4.5: Business Strategy 
 
To be successful in microfinance, it is important to adopt strategies and innovations 
that will ensure longevity and profitability. Microfinance presents a series of exciting 
possibilities for extending markets, reducing poverty and fostering social change. 
Many of the insights from the microfinance experience can be examined fruitfully 
through factors such as screening mechanism, group collateral, default rates, peer 
monitoring, meetings, enforcement of repayments and financial product innovations 
(See Appendix D). 
 
4.5.1: FNGO Business Strategy 
 
All the Chief Executives of the FNGOs interviewed employed various screening 
mechanisms to select good clients for loan disbursements. They perceived this 
assignment as very critical since their inability to weed out „bad‟ clients would result 
in increased loan portfolio at risk. While most of them relied on the investigative 
work of the field officers, others went further to involve the community who 
supplied them with information on their kith and kin. Again, they all agreed that the 
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field work must be compared with information supplied on the various application 
forms submitted by the clients 
All the FNGOs interviewed advanced loans to groups and used the group as 
collateral, so that in the event of a default by one client the group would collectively 
share and pay. This in essence put a measure of responsibility on every group 
member to ensure effective peer monitoring. All the Chief Executives stated that peer 
monitoring was effective because the groups were community based and as such they 
know each other, coupled with the regular meetings and interactions 
Regular meetings of the clients with the service providers in attendance, was seen as 
an integral part of the whole business strategy. Three (60%) of those interviewed said 
they had weekly meetings with the remaining meeting once and twice a month. 
To ensure that default rates are kept to the barest minimum, one Chief Executive 
indicated that they use education and training. Two (40%) said they used the groups 
to exert pressure on defaulters till they pay up. One adopted the strategy of regular 
follow-ups, with another saying that they insist on clients adhering to the terms of the 
agreement. In the event that a default occurs, three (60%) indicated that the onus lies 
on the group to make good the amount. One would resort to a legal means as the last 
attempt. One also stated that the group as a whole would lose the chance of getting a 
future loan. 
Almost all the financial products of the FNGOs were branded in local names which 
readily convey a message of what that product does. According to one Chief 
Executive it was a business strategy to identify themselves with the local folks who 
were mostly illiterates or semi illiterates. 
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4.5.2: Savings & Loans Business Strategy 
 
Two (67%) of the Savings and loans companies screened their prospective clients 
through their loan officers who are trained to do so. In addition to this screening, the 
clients‟ application forms are subjected to a further scrutiny to ensure that only 
„good‟ clients are considered. The third Chief Executive stated that even before they 
come to screening, the client must have saved money with them for at least six 
months. Thereafter, the credit officers would visit the client‟s home and workplace to 
cross-check other relevant information earlier provided on the application forms. 
Two (67%) of the savings and loans companies perceived the group liability concept 
as the most effective means of ensuring repayments by groups. The third, which is 
the largest in terms of branches and clients, however differed on this subject. They 
indicated that they did not believe in sharing responsibility of a loan among several 
people. 
Regular meetings with clients was seen as very crucial and this was a way to 
constantly remind clients of their loan repayment obligations. All the Chief 
Executives of these companies had meetings ranging from weekly to bi-weekly. 
 
 
4.5.3: Credit Unions Business Strategy 
 
The Chief Executive officer of one of the Credit Unions declared that they do not 
have a screening mechanism but instead they use education to change the mind-set of 
members to behave responsibly. Screening mechanism was not an issue for the other 
Chief Executive as the clients were known members of staff and therefore did not 
need any screening. 
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All the Credit Union Associations were not into group lending and their meetings 
were monthly and yearly. As a method of minimizing default rates, one Chief 
Executive indicated that they try to enforce the rules to the letter. This may include 
phone calls and demand letters. The other Chief Executive emphasized that because 
they are staff members of the university they withhold any benefit due the defaulter 
which is done with the assistance of the Registry. 
 Peer pressure was not applicable in both cases for CUA. Financial products were 
mainly savings and loans for their clients. 
 
4.5.4: Rural Banks Business Strategy 
 
As a measure of screening, the rural banks require a new client to be introduced by 
an existing old client. This was a form of guarantee by the old client to the extent that 
the new client can be trusted to behave like him. Again due to the community-based 
nature of rural banks, one bank preferred to use the community and people to identify 
the good and the bad clients.  
The two banks had divergent views on using the group as collateral. They also 
differed on meetings as one indicated that meetings could be held as often as 
possible, the other indicated that they hold meetings every quarter. Regular visits and 
monitoring were means of minimizing default rates. As a last resort both Chief 
Executives would hand over a defaulter to the law enforcement agencies. However, 
one stated that they would have issued three demand notices before. Peer monitoring 
was a method they did not consider. They all had the same financial products as 
loans, savings and overdraft facility 
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4.5.5: Susu Companies Business Strategy 
 
The Susu companies check the background of a client, family standing and even 
where they live as a screening measure. There are no group loans and therefore no 
group collateral. Meetings are held weekly for the bigger of the two while the other 
employs regular visits. The use of guarantors is common to both companies. One 
company would use the police to enforce compliance by a defaulter while the other 
would prefer to use persuasion. Peer monitoring was irrelevant in their case. One 
distinguishing feature is that the bigger of the two Susu companies was involved in 
micro leasing, which was an innovative concept. 
 
4.5.6: Section Summary 
 
Screening of clients is crucial in microfinance and this was evident in all the 
interviews with the Chief Executives as an effective tool in safeguarding the liquid 
assets of the companies. For all the institutions who were engaged in group lending, 
they used the group itself as collateral, and as a result enforced peer monitoring 
leading to low default rates. Those who were not into group lending, demanded 
guarantors as a surety. 
Meetings and regularly visiting clients were seen as a critical business strategy and 
these were employed by most of the institutions. At the risk of complete default, the 
rural banks, Susu companies and the savings and loans companies would resort to 
legal means to retrieve the monies advanced to a client. 
Most of the institutions interviewed had branded financial products in local dialects 
to make it appealing and easier to understand by the many illiterate and semi-
illiterates they dealt with. 
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4.6: Environment/Governance 
 
The following imperatives have been used to scan the environment and governance 
of microfinance: emergency loans, job creation, competition, Board of Directors, 
loan recovery and regulatory framework (See Appendix E). 
 
4.6.1: FNGO Environment/Governance 
 
Four (80%) of the financial non-governmental organizations interviewed were of the 
opinion that giving emergency loans to clients was necessary. They argued that 
everyone goes through tough times and emergencies at a point in one‟s life and 
therefore meeting that need was necessary. The only one that differed on this issue 
did not assign any reason. All the FNGOs interviewed did not create jobs directly for 
their clients, but indirectly through the giving of loans and education. 
All (100%) of the FNGOs agreed that they face severe competition especially from 
the big commercial banks who are now invading the microfinance sector. According 
to them the threat is due to the fact that the big banks some of which are 
multinationals have bigger capital base and can afford to charge very low interest 
rates and still be able to cover their operational costs and be profitable. In view of the 
foregoing, one institution has decided to target the poorest of the poor where they 
think the big banks will shun. 
All the FNGOs had board of directors and except for one, all had female 
representations. Regarding personnel constraints (80%) of the Chief Executives 
interviewed perceived the big banks as a threat as they keep poaching their staff with 
attractive offers which they cannot match. 
Loan recovery was also seen as a big issue for these institutions as (80%) attested to 
that fact. The difficulty according to one was due to the fact that they dealt with 
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farmers, which is considered a risky due to the uncertainty about the weather. The 
state of the economy has a direct bearing on loan recovery, one chief executive 
noted. 
The regulatory framework, according to two (40%) Chief Executives were restrictive 
because it does not allow them to take saving deposits. Two (40%) indicated that the 
regulatory framework as it stands now was favourable and one (20%) was 
indifferent. 
 
 
4.6.2: Savings & Loans Environment/Governance 
 
Two (67%) of the Chief Executives interviewed do not give emergency loans to 
clients. They all created jobs indirectly for their client through the provision of loans. 
Like the FNGOs, all the Chief Executives of the Savings and Loans Companies 
pointed to the banks as the source of the competition they are facing. They all had 
Board of Directors with females as well. Again, like the FNGOs the personnel 
constraints had to do with low remuneration compared with the banks and as such 
are not able to retain them for long. 
All the Chief Executives interviewed did not have a problem with loan recovery. 
Mixed reasons were given by two Chief Executives in response to the regulatory 
framework. One saw the increase in the minimum capital requirement for the 
formation of a bank recently introduced by the Central bank as restrictive because 
they have planned transforming themselves into a bank. Another saw the universal 
banking law given to banks as unfair since it allows them to venture into areas such 
as microfinance which had been the preserve of microfinance institutions. 
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4.6.3: Credit Unions Environment/Governance 
 
Emergency loans were seen as normal loans given to clients by Credit Union 
Associations. They agreed to create jobs indirectly through the provision of loans.  
Like all the other Chief Executives interviewed, the source of their competition is the 
big banks coming into microfinance. They all had Board of Directors with women 
represented. While did not seem to have personnel constraints, the other had a 
difficulty in attracting high calibre staff. 
Loan recovery was relatively easy for the credit unions due to the fact that the clients 
were members of staff employed by the organization. They were also unanimous in 
pointing to the regulatory framework covering CUAs as outmoded and needed a 
review to move in line with current trends. 
 
4.6.4: Rural Banks Environment/Governance 
 
Rural Banks were not averse to granting emergency loans to clients and also stated 
that they have created jobs indirectly. The presence of the big multinational banks 
operating in the microfinance sector was seen as a threat to the existence of credit 
union associations, all the Chief Executives perceived. Their Board of Directors had 
a low female representation. Their personnel constraints had to do with how to train 
and retain qualified personnel. All the rural banks did not have difficulty with loan 
recovery and the regulatory framework governing their operations.  
 
4.6.5: Susu Companies Environment/Governance 
 
Both Susu companies saw the emergency loans as normal and did not think they had 
created jobs directly or indirectly. Whilst one had Board of Directors with one 
female representation the other did not have a board of directors at all. Again all the 
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Susu companies did not have personnel constraints and so also was their loan 
recovery mechanism. 
One Chief Executive perceived the absence of code of ethics for all participants in 
the microfinance sector as a big challenge. The other was concerned about the 
quantum of tax they pay since they are based on assessment, which to him was 
arbitrary. 
4.7: Success 
 
Yaron (1994) in a study of rural finance institutions which engage in microcredit 
activities in Indonesia and Bangladesh used financial self-sustainability and 
substantial outreach to measure success (see 3.3.5) 
Sharma and Zeller (1997), Navajas et al. (2000) have generally agreed to the above 
criteria as being very effective in determining the success or otherwise of MFIs (see 
3.3.5). Institutional development, that is engaging in activities that on the surface are 
not directly linked to the first duty of credit allocation such as training of clients in 
entrepreneurial development skills and social development have also been found to 
make MFIs a success. Variables to be discussed include; new clients, loan 
processing, record keeping, savings/discounts, internal/external audits, staff 
remuneration and staff turnover (See Appendix F). 
 
 
4.7.1: FNGO Success 
 
During the exploratory research most of the respondents were unwilling to disclose 
numbers of new clients with most giving approximations. The reason according to 
most of them is due to dropouts of clients. Two (20%) indicated that a maximum of 
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one week was enough for processing a client‟s loan request. Two (20%) also 
indicated that they needed two weeks to process a loan request with one indicating 
that they use eight weeks for orientation during which they assess their clients in 
various ways 
The use of computer software for record keeping was common as they all agreed that 
this was a critical issue which is at the centre of their operations. Savings is one of 
the pillars of microfinance but all the FNGOs were not into it but some granted 
discounts on early repayment.  
All the FNGOs had both internal and external audit functions. On the issue of staff 
remuneration, all the respondents indicated that it was good. Two (60%) of the 
respondents indicated that their staff turnover was low and performance was also 
good.  While one stated that turnover was average the other also indicated it was 
mixed. 
 
4.7.2: Savings and Loans Success 
 
Two (67%) of the respondents were categorical in saying that they did not have 
figures available while the other indicated that they have a target of twelve new 
clients per officer per month. Loan processing was quicker with the Savings and 
Loans companies with two (67%) indicating that an average of three days was 
needed to process an applicant‟s loan request. 
The use of computer software was employed by all the respondents. Savings was 
central to the operations of all the respondents here. They also had both internal and 
external audit functions. With regards to staff remunerations they stated that it was 
good at least within the industry. Two (67%) of the respondents agreed that staff 
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turnover was relatively stable but high in the other who disclosed that their loan 
officers are easily poached by other competitors. 
 
4.7.3: Credit Union Association Success 
 
Credit Unions are worked-based organizations and therefore the number of new 
clients who join in is based on how many new employees come in. Since they are 
work-based, loan processing becomes easier and quicker since employees are already 
known staff members and no time is spent on investigating their background. Record 
keeping is very important and savings is very key to their operations. Indeed 
members qualify for loans only after saving for a period of time. 
Both internal and external audit are utilized. Staff remuneration is good. With 
regards to staff remuneration one Chief Executive had this to say “Our staff turnover 
is low among the older staff but high among the youth. You see, the young ones are 
very ambitious and are eager to get money quickly, so they move if some company 
come dangling a few more cedis in front of them”. 
 
4.7.4: Rural Bank Success 
 
Again the Rural Banks could not be specific with figures on new clients. While one 
Executive said they would need two weeks to process a loan request, the other gave a 
three day processing period. Record keeping was by the use of computer software. 
They use savings as a basis for advancing loans to clients. Internal and external audit 
was used to ensure smooth operation. Staff remuneration was perceived to be 
average by both Executives. While turnover was low in one, it was high in the other. 
However performance was perceived to be good in both instances. 
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4.7.5: Susu Success 
 
The Executives here also were not specific with numbers of clients. One Susu 
Company would take about two hours to three days to process loan requests. The 
other would take one month to process loan request. The use of computer software to 
keep record of clients was common to both. Clients were encouraged to save with the 
company before qualifying for loans. While one had both internal and external audit 
functions the other said he does both the internal and external audit functions himself 
through monitoring. According to both Chief Executives, staff remuneration was 
good which translated into good performance and low staff turnover. 
 
4.7.6 Section Summary 
 
Twelve (86%) of the fourteen microfinance institutions interviewed granted 
emergency loans to clients and they all believed they had created jobs indirectly. All 
the Chief Executives interviewed perceived the entry of the big multinational banks 
as their biggest threat in terms of competition. Thirteen (93%) of all the institutions 
interviewed had Board of Directors with fair female representation. Threat of losing 
their high caliber staff to the multinational banks was the main concern of ten (71%) 
of the Chief Executives interviewed. Nine (64%) of all the Chief Executives 
interviewed did not have much problem with their loan recovery. To a large extent 
the difficulty in loan recovery was peculiar to the FNGOs. 
Six (43%) of the microfinance institutions interviewed indicated that they did not 
have any difficulty with the regulatory framework as it stands now. Concerns were 
rather mixed. 
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4.8: Section Summary and Conclusion 
 
FNGOs were mostly foreign owned with foreign capital. Their motivation is the 
eradication of poverty especially in the rural areas. However, most of the FNGOs 
were located in the urban centres. They tended to deal more with traders as against 
farmers whose activity is considered very risky. This has helped the FNGOs to 
maintain substantial outreach and generated regular revenue whilst reducing 
operational costs. 
Interest rate management and savings mobilization problems which have been 
pointed out as causes of lack of sustainability and eventual failure of such financial 
schemes appear to have been well managed by almost all the institutions interviewed. 
The lender-borrower relationship also appears to have been handled well with all the 
institutions indicating that they have cordial relationship with the clients. Using the 
group as collateral was seen as a very effective means of ensuring repayments. 
However, some of the FNGOs and the S&L companies would use legal means as a 
last resort to demand repayment. 
Moral hazard which is mainly problems of repayment and default and adverse 
selection which has to do with the issue of screening out those likely to default still 
appear problematic. Since borrowers will differ in default likelihood it becomes 
difficult and expensive to determine the level of risk for each borrower. Again it 
must be acknowledged that ensuring that borrowers engaged in activities that 
facilitate repayment was a problem. The findings from the exploratory research were 
very insightful and useful. This played a critical role in constructing the research 
model as well as the development of the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
5.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at providing an understanding of how the research framework is to 
be investigated.  The chapter begins by further expanding the research problem and 
issues, and linking them to their corresponding hypotheses. Following that, the 
conceptual model of microfinance is introduced with the operational definition of 
each variable addressed in Appendix G. Finally, the relevant research questions are 
restated and hypotheses developed. 
 
5.1.1: The Research Model 
 
The main objective of the research is to develop an explanatory framework that will 
lead to a better understanding of the performance of microfinance institutions with 
emphasis on sustainability and success by examining the influence of factors internal 
and external in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), especially Sub-Sahara Africa by 
using data from Ghana.  
The main research question is: What are the significant factors that affect the 
sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Sub-Sahara Africa? An 
answer to this question requires an investigation into factors that are perceived to 
impact on the performance of microfinance institutions and the development of sub-
research questions. The factors that impact on sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions are grouped as follows: Institutional Characteristics, 
Agency costs, Business strategy, Environment/Governance and Success. The sub-
research questions have been developed under their various sub-headings which are 
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outlined below with their corresponding hypotheses. These hypotheses were further 
explored and justified in section 5. 2 to 5.6 with the concept model. 
Q.1) Which are the major institutional characteristics that impact on sustainability 
of microfinance institutions? 
This specific question investigates how major characteristics of the microfinance 
institution such as ownership, geographical spread, motivation, clientele type, 
funding and methods of gathering information impact on an institution‟s drive to 
become sustainable. This question is investigated through the hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 
1d, 1e, and1f.  
Q2) What are the issues of sustainability and agency costs that impact significantly 
on an MFI?  
Question two, which relates to hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e examines which of 
the various factors has the most impact on sustainability of MFI. 
Q3) Which of the business strategies adopted has a significant influence on 
sustainability of microfinance institution?  
Question 3 examines which of the various business strategies has the most impact on 
sustainability of an MFI. This is examined through hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e and 
3f.   
Q4) Which environmental/ governance factors have the most impact on sustainability 
of an MFI? 
Question 4 considers the impact of environmental and governance issues on 
sustainability and an MFI. This is examined in hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f and 
4g. 
Q5) Which success factors have the most impact on MFIs? 
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Question 5 examines the impact of success factors on MFIs. This is examined in 
hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, 5g, 
 
5.1.2: Defining the Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
 
This section introduces and defines the conceptual model, which has been developed 
based on the literature review and in-depth interviews with the Chief Executives/ 
Relationship Managers of microfinance institutions. This model will be tested, 
examined and discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Prior to developing the model, it was essential to develop the underlying theory 
based on both the extant literature and the qualitative data that was gathered through 
the interviews with the Chief Executives. This approach provides for a more robust 
and rigorous approach to research (Gilmore and Carson 1996; Perry, Riege and 
Brown 1998). 
Figure 5.0 below details the conceptual sustainability model of an MFI. The 
remainder of this section provides the variables within the conceptual model and 
their respective hypotheses as developed through the combination of both the 
qualitative data and the literature. 
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   Figure 5.0: Conceptual Sustainability and Success Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of the institutional characteristics of microfinance is generally 
documented (Armandariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, Zeller and Meyer 2002). It 
is, however, important to know the impact that each of the varied characteristics has 
on sustainability and success of microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps which 
of these characteristics have significant impact on microfinance and whether this 
impact is positive or negative? This therefore leads to the first sub-research question:  
 
Which are the major institutional characteristics that impact on sustainability? 
To answer this sub-question effectively, and making reference to the exploratory 
research, the institutional characteristics have been divided into six main themes: 
ownership, geographical spread, motivation, clientele, funding and information 
gathering.  
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5.2: Institutional Characteristics 
5.2.1: Ownership 
 
Owners of businesses are highly geared to market opportunities and they tend to give 
priority to profit maximization. Again, they pride in their ownership of efficient and 
sometimes quite complex organizational structures. 
The exploratory research revealed five broad categories of ownership; foreign, local, 
foreign and local partnership, government and single ownership. Whilst some of 
these institutions are owner-managed, others have professional (non-owner) 
managers. What remains unknown is whether the type of ownership in a 
microfinance institution influences sustainability and success. This therefore leads to 
the hypothesis that;  
H 1a: If the ownership of a microfinance institution in Ghana is foreign, then 
sustainability will significantly increase. 
 
5.2.2: Geographical Spread. 
 
From the exploratory research, the sampled microfinance institutions can be 
categorized into two groups; large and small. Because microfinance institutions are 
not properly regulated and there are problems associated with defining firm size, the 
categorization was based on the number of regional presence. Geographical spread, 
proposed as an important characteristic to gain performance effects in sustainability 
and success can be regarded as a proxy for resources where larger firms usually 
possess more product lines and higher lending capacity together with institutional 
resources. From this therefore it is hypothesised that; 
H 1b: If microfinance institutions commit more funds to lending then 
sustainability will significantly increase. 
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5.2.3: Executives’ Motivation 
 
The founders of microfinance shared a vision. Their vision was to supply formal 
financial services to poor people shunned by banks because their savings were tiny, 
their loan demand was small and they lacked loan collateral. When asked about his 
motivation for setting up a microfinance institution, one Chief Executive Officer like 
all the others had this to say; 
“I was once a consultant for the Government Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1 
and 2) and during our research we realized that microfinance really goes a long way 
in alleviating poverty. We realized that the banked population of Ghana is 20% and 
the non-banked 80%. And we also realized that if the non-banked is 80% and 
microfinance is something that can reach out to them on the field and not wait for 
them to come, we took advantage of that to go to the field to the people who really 
need savings and loans.”10 
The exploratory research showed that almost all the Chief Executives were motivated 
by the fundamental principle underlying the microfinance movement, which is 
poverty alleviation and empowerment through the provision of tiny loans especially 
among the rural poor. 
The hypothesis lays emphasis on the level of commitment to grow the poor and 
alleviate poverty. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H 1c: If Executives’ motivation to grow and empower the poor is high then 
sustainability will significantly increase. 
 
 
10 Remarks of one Chief Executive 
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5.2.4: Clientele Type 
For many observers, microfinance is a collection of banking practices built around 
providing small loans to the rural poor who are mostly farmers, fishermen, traders 
and artisans. According to Von Pischke (1991) cited in Zeller and Meyer (2002), 
small farmers were the primary concern in the 1960s and 1970s; the poor emerged as 
the focus in the 1980s and 1990s. Matching access to or supply of financial services 
with demand has been a consistent challenge for financial institutions attempting to 
serve clientele groups outside the frontier of formal finance. What is important for 
this research is to identify which clientele type impact significantly on sustainability 
of MFIs and whether this is positive or negative.  From the foregoing the hypothesis 
to be tested is: 
H1d: If there is increased relationship between MFIs and traders then their 
sustainability will increase significantly. 
Figure 5.1      Clientele type 
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clients whose businesses were less risky compared to poor rural farmers and 
fishermen who depended mostly on unpredictable weather patterns. 
                                 
5.2.5:  Funding 
 
From the exploratory research, it was discovered that the start-up capital for the 
MFIs were; foreign capital, local capital borrowings, family capital, members 
savings and government. To a large extent MFIs with large capital base are able to 
provide loans with long-term maturities. The lack of access to long-term credit for 
capital investments by the MFIs hampered their outreach and depth of their outreach. 
From this therefore the hypothesis to be tested is: 
H 1e: If funding for MFIs increase, then their sustainability will significantly 
increase. 
 
5.2.6: Information Gathering 
 
Information on clients is very essential in microfinance if agency problems are to be 
avoided or minimized. According to Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
agency problem refers to the lender‟s inability to observe the borrower‟s 
characteristics such as project riskiness, borrower‟s efforts or to observe her profits. 
These information problems create inefficiencies in the market. 
The information problem arises at three distinct stages. First prior to extending a 
loan, the lender may have little or no reliable information about the quality of the 
borrower. Sometimes a bit of scouting around by a loan officer may yield the 
required information, but too often the necessary background research on borrowers 
is prohibitively costly. Better information can prevent the lender from mistakenly 
extending a loan to a “low quality” borrower without adequately accounting for the 
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risk involved.  Secondly, once the loan has been granted, the lender does not entirely 
know how the borrower will use the resources. Will the borrower work hard to 
ensure that the investments are successful? Or will the borrower work less hard than 
he or she would if the project was entirely self-financed? Third, once investment 
returns have been realized, the lender may not be able to verify the magnitude of the 
returns. It will then be tempting for the borrower to claim to have had bad luck and 
ask for a reprieve in paying back the loan when in fact the investment was highly 
profitable. 
From the above it is hypothesised that: 
H 1f: If Executives obtain good quality information on clients, then sustainability 
of MFIs will increase. 
 
5.3.0: Agency Costs 
  
A substantial proportion of the problems faced by MFIs emanate largely from poor 
management of clients. Examples of such problems include the monitoring of clients, 
client relationships, and the increased reliance on subsidized loans in the provision of 
microfinance. Ultimately, the sustainability and success of MFIs hinges on the 
management of agency issues both at the borrowers and institutional level. The 
process of delivering small credit is fraught with difficulties. It is therefore important 
to examine how MFIs are managing agency costs, their clients and staff to sustain 
credit extension. The following factors were examined during the exploratory 
research; sources of income, subsidy dependence, number of branches, contractual 
agreements and relationship with clients. What is important for this research is to 
identify which of these factors impact significantly on sustainability and whether this 
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impact is positive or negative? This therefore leads to the second sub-research 
question: 
Which agency cost factors impact significantly and positively on sustainability of 
MFIs? 
 
5.3.1: Sources of Income 
 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) argue that lenders should design their loan contracts such 
that they extract enough information covering problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. The design here could be in the form of an interest rate arrangement or 
loan size. The interest rate then assumes a dual function: as the price and an 
instrument for regulating the risk compositions. 
According to Schreiner (2000), an MFI that is unable to raise enough revenue will 
collapse quickly after donor withdrawal. Even in the midst of permanent subsidy, 
increased revenue generation by an MFI will help increase outreach and expand its 
operation to its advantage. The exploratory research revealed sources of income as 
on-lending interest, interest on treasury bills, commissions and fees. What remains 
unknown is the extent to which they impact on sustainability and success of MFIs. 
From the above the hypothesis is: 
H 2a: If sources of income for MFIs increase, then sustainability will also 
increase. 
 
5.3.2: Subsidy Dependence 
 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), it is commonly believed that institutional 
innovation and microfinance expansion will continue to rely on public intervention 
and financial support. In fact, most, if not all, MFIs that reach large numbers of 
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female and male clients below the poverty line require state or donor transfers to 
subsidize their costs. At least, the most successful ones that have achieved financial 
sustainability have required investment by the state or donors in the past. 
Zeller and Meyer (2002) again argue that although financial self-sufficiency should 
be the objective of MFIs, public subsidization may be justified if it is determined that 
this is the most cost-efficient method to reduce poverty. Again Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005) state that much of the microfinance movement 
continues to take advantage of subsidies some from donors, some from governments 
and some from charities and concerned individuals. It is argued that a programme 
without subsidies must pass along all costs to clients in one way or other. There is a 
school of thought in microfinance which says that subsidies must go to the institution 
and not the borrower.  The exploratory research revealed a mix bag. Our interest in 
this area is the extent to which subsidies impact on the performance of MFIs.  
The hypothesis therefore is: 
H 2b: If subsidy dependence among MFIs is high then sustainability will also 
increase. 
 
 
5.3.3: Number of Branches 
 
Microfinance is about extending financial services to the large unbanked poor 
population who mostly are located in the rural areas and the urban poor. How 
microfinance providers are able to reach and extend their services to the poor is seen 
as critical by many authors in this field of study. Our exploratory research revealed 
that FNGOs had the highest number of branches followed by the Savings and Loans, 
Credit Union Associations, the Rural Banks and the Susu companies in that order. 
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What is not certain is whether the number of branches will automatically translate 
into better performance. 
 The hypothesis therefore is: 
H 2c: If MFIs increase their branches, then their sustainability will increase. 
 
5.3.4:  Contractual Agreements 
 
All the Chief Executives interviewed during the exploratory research, indicated that 
clients were made to fill, sign or thumb-print prepared legal documents which then 
become a contractual agreement forming the basis for lending. This document spells 
out the duties and responsibilities of both parties with consequent implication upon 
the client if he or she violates the terms of the agreement. What is important in this 
regard is whether rigid enforcement of contractual agreements would necessarily 
lead to better performance. 
It is therefore hypothesised as follows: 
H 2d: Enforcement of contractual agreement rigidly would lead to increased 
sustainability of MFI’s. 
 
5.3.5: Relationship with Clients 
 
It is said that microfinance is based to a large extent on trust and tact. In other words, 
the lender-borrower relationship is critical for the growth of the institution and must 
be handled with the utmost professionalism. 
One Chief Executive remarked during the interview; 
„‟ I would say our relations with our clients are based on trust and on the quality of 
service. What is important for us is to treat ordinary people very well . After all they 
give us the business‟‟. 11 
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What needs to be known is the extent to which the lender borrower relationship 
impacts on the performance of MFIs. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H 2e: If lender-borrower relationship improves then sustainability of MFI’s will 
increase. 
 
5.4: Business Strategy 
 
In assessing the impact of strategy on MFIs, the main focus will be centred on 
management actions taken once the institution is in operation in order to influence its 
environment. This is what Smallbone et al (1993) referred to as „managed for 
growth.‟ According to Smallbone et al., there is no single type of strategy which is 
associated with growth. 
The third sub-research question being asked is: 
Which business strategies adopted have a significant influence on sustainability of 
MFIs? 
 
 
5.4.1: Screening  
 
One of the very effective checking mechanisms in microfinance is the issue of 
screening clients before loan disbursements are made. The rationale behind this 
method is to weed out people who are likely to default in repayment of loans 
disbursed. Literature in microfinance is replete with issues of screening out “good” 
clients (adverse selection) as put forward by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and many 
other authors. 
According to Gosh and Ray (1997), progressive lending also enables the lender to 
“test” borrowers with small loans at the start in order to screen out worst prospects 
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before expanding the loan scale. To what extent is this screening mechanism 
effective in ensuring that microfinance institutions achieve their stated objectives? 
This is the question that must be answered within the context of performance of 
MFIs. 
It is hypothesised: 
H 3a: If screening mechanisms are made more effective, it will lead to a significant 
increase in sustainability of MFIs. 
 
5.4.2: Group Collateral 
 
Group lending refers specifically to arrangements by individuals without collateral 
who get together and form groups with the aim of obtaining loans from a lender. The 
special feature is that the loan are made individually to group members, but all in the 
group face consequences if any member runs into serious repayment difficulties. In 
other words, the group becomes the collateral.  It is sometimes called group 
responsibility or joint liability. To what extent does group collateral impact on the 
performance of MFIs. 
The hypothesis put forward is: 
H 3b: If group collateral is highly enforced, then sustainability of MFIs is 
increased. 
 
5.4.3: Meetings 
 
Regular client meetings especially where members are within the same locality is a 
critical factor in the delivery of microfinance to the poor. Non-attendance at meetings 
is seen as a coming default except for verifiable excuses such as ill-health and the 
like. Again, by meeting regularly credit officers get to know their clients well by 
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seeing them face-to-face on a regular basis. This can provide loan officers with early 
warnings about emerging problems so they can clamp down more quickly when 
needed. Personalized relationships and regular opportunities for monitoring are thus 
established. 
It is  hypothesised as follows: 
H 3c: If clients’ meetings are highly enforced, then sustainability of MFIs will 
significantly increase. 
 
5.4.4: Handling Defaulters 
 
Various methods were put forward for handling defaulters by the Chief Executives. 
As a last resort most Chief Executives would resort to legal means to ensure 
repayments from clients. 
We test the hypothesis: 
H 3d: If Executives intensify their handling of defaulters then sustainability will 
increase.  
 
5.4.5: Peer Monitoring 
 
Peer monitoring is related to group lending where all members of the group 
collectively become responsible for any act of default by a member. Peer monitoring 
becomes a natural consequence since no member would like to be responsible for 
any member‟s act of omission. However, for peer monitoring to succeed, group 
members must be within distance of one another, which is better in a rural setting. 
How does peer monitoring affect operations of MFIs? 
It is hypothesised that: 
99 
 
H 3e: If Executives ensure that peer monitoring is intensified, then sustainability 
will also increase. 
 
5.4.6: Financial Products 
 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), striving for financial sustainability forces 
MFIs to be sensitive to client demand and induces them to improve products, 
operations and outreach. Better financial products in turn, generate greater economic 
benefits for clients and thus greater impact. 
During the exploratory research interview, it became apparent that all the financial 
products were branded in local dialects to bring forcefully to the fore the intention of 
what it is supposed to deliver. These financial products were also developed in 
apparent response to the needs of the locals. What is important with regard to the 
above is the extent to which innovations in financial products significantly impact on 
performance of MFIs. 
It is hypothesised as follows: 
H 3f: If innovations in financial products increase, then sustainability of MFIs 
will increase. 
 
5.5.: Environment and Governance 
 
Governance issues refers to the regulatory framework governing the operations of 
MFIs and the Environmental issues relate to the wider community in which they 
operate and how they impact on their operations. Issues to be considered here are; 
emergency loans, job creation, competition, Board of Directors, personnel 
constraints, loan recovery and the regulatory framework. 
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As noted by Staschen (2003) regulatory frameworks can be stipulated on different 
levels of regulation. Broadly, Staschen groups these levels under primary and 
secondary legislation. He defined the primary legislation as laws or acts of 
Parliament that defines the general standards and principles that financial institutions 
must meet. Secondary legislation or statutory regulations are promulgated under such 
laws and acts typically by prescribing specific benchmarks and procedures that need 
to be adapted more often. 
The fourth sub-research question being asked is: 
Which Environmental and Governance issues adopted have significant impact on 
sustainability of MFIs? 
 
5.5.1: Emergency Loans 
 
During the exploratory research interview with the Chief Executives, Credit Unions 
and Susu companies were the group that did not hesitate to give emergency loans. 
The argument was that they were only demanding part of their accumulated savings 
and to them it was still a normal loan. Many authors in microfinance contend that 
one of the failures of the traditional banks that MFIs came to correct is closeness to 
the community who are mostly poor and illiterate. In other words bringing financial 
services or banking to the doorstep of ordinary people was seen as responding to 
their numerous needs such as emergency loans was seen as one. 
The hypothesis posed is: 
H 4a: If Executives increase their response to emergency loans, then sustainability 
of MFIs will increase. 
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5.5.2: Job Creation 
 
One of the contentious issues in microfinance is the direct creation of jobs by 
providers of microfinance. The debate seem to suggest that microfinance institutions 
must move away from only the provision of funds and create jobs directly, employ 
people who are incapable of self-employment and thereby empowering them. From 
the exploratory research interview conducted, all the respondents indicated that they 
have created jobs indirectly through the provision of loans to clients who in turn 
created jobs.  
Would direct job creation increase sustainability and success of MFIs? This therefore 
leads to the hypothesis that: 
H 4b: If MFIs create jobs directly, then sustainability will increase. 
 
5.5.3: Competition 
 
Economists usually view competition as a good thing, and most theoretical models 
assume that there is perfect competition. Some authors especially in microfinance 
argue that strong competition can undermine dynamic incentives. Dynamic 
incentives may weaken when alternative lenders enter the market (assuming that the 
defaulter has a chance to borrow from them instead). 
Problems with competition have emerged everywhere but most notably in two 
countries where microfinance was first to take hold: Bolivia and Bangladesh. 
McIntosh and Wydick (2002), report on problems of competition in Uganda, Kenya, 
Guatemala, El-Salvador and Nicaragua. The Bolivian crisis took root when 
aggressive providers of consumer credit entered the market. In Ghana, it appears the 
big financial institutions see microfinance as the answer to the future and are all 
entering, some with big foreign partners such as ACCION. What it means to the 
102 
 
small microfinance institutions is that they cannot match the lower interest rates 
charged by the big institutions. Again, the average loan sizes offered by the big 
banks cannot be matched by the smaller ones. One Chief Executive remarked during 
the exploratory research interview; 
 “We face competition from many MFIs and especially the Commercial Banks and 
because of that some of the clients are doing multiple borrowing”12 Another 
remarked;  
“The emergence of the big banks is a source of worry. You see because they have 
strong capital base their risk could be lower and therefore some of our clients are 
moving there”.13 
Is competition desirable in Microfinance? This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H 4c: Increased competition in microfinance will lead to increased sustainability. 
 
 
 
5.5.4: Board of Directors 
 
The importance of every Board of Directors is seen in the broad policy objectives 
they give to their institutions. It is said that a strong and effective Board translates 
into both efficiency and effectiveness of organizational objectives. Except for one 
Susu company (sole proprietor) all the 13 other MFIs had Board of Directors. 
 Does the presence of Board of Directors ensure good performance of MFIs? This 
leads to the hypothesis that: 
H 4d: If Board of Directors are present in MFIs, then sustainability will increase. 
 
 
12 A remark by one Chief Executive during the exploratory research 
13 An observation of one Chief Executive during the exploratory research 
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5.5.5: Personnel Constraints 
 
During the exploratory research interview most of the Chief Executives expressed 
concern about their inability to retain or attract qualified personnel due to the 
presence of the big financial institutions who could afford better remuneration. The 
focus in this regard had to do with their field officers who were seen as the pivots on 
which microfinance delivery revolves. The hypothesis posed is: 
H 4e: If MFIs employ and retain highly qualified staff, then their sustainability 
will increase. 
 
5.5.6: Loan Recovery 
 
The survival of MFIs depends on how they are able to increase their outreach, 
recover loans and cover their operational costs. However, loan recovery is the 
difficulty faced by most MFIs. What bearing has loan recovery on the performance 
of MFIs? 
It is hypothesised as follows: 
H 4f: If loan recovery increases for MFIs, then sustainability will increase. 
 
5.5.7: Regulatory Framework 
 
Ledgerwood (2000) categorizes the levels of regulation as financial and prudential. 
Financial regulation refers to the body of principles, rules, standards and compliance 
procedures that apply to financial institutions. Financial supervision involves the 
examination and monitoring of organizations for compliance with financial 
regulation.  
Prudential regulation and supervision according to Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega 
(1995) are designed to; avoid a banking crisis and maintain the integrity of the 
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payments system, protect depositors and encourage financial sector competition and 
efficiency.  
During the exploratory research interview, one Chief Executive had this to say “We 
are governed by the Cooperative Decree; that is NLCD 252 of 1968. It is outdated 
and restricts you to 5% dividend payment and the going interest rate on treasury 
bills is 35%.We cannot charge above 12% interest on loans and if the banks are 
charging 54%, how can we generate reasonable income and pay competitive 
interest”?14 
From the foregoing, the critical issue is the extent to which the Regulatory 
Framework impacts on MFIs. 
The hypothesis posed is: 
H 4g: If the Regulatory Framework is improved, it will increase sustainability of 
MFIs significantly. 
5.6 Success 
 
Success in microfinance refers to measures which, when adopted will significantly 
improve the life and operations of the institution. Many authors have different 
opinions on what constitutes success. Yaron (1994), Jain (1996), and Sharma et al 
(1997) are of the view that the success of Grameen Bank and MFIs in general lies in 
the adoption of strategic credit policies. Some authors see institutional development, 
that is engaging in activities that on the surface are not directly linked to the first 
duty of credit allocation such as training of clients in entrepreneurial development 
skills and social development have also been found to make MFIs a success.  
 
14 A remark by one Chief Executive during the exploratory research 
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 Issues to be considered here are; loan processing, record keeping, savings/ discounts, 
internal/external audit, staff remuneration, staff turnover and performance. 
The fifth sub-research question being asked is: 
Which success factors significantly impact on operations of MFIs? 
 
5.6.1 More Clients 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), when the microfinance movement started, the 
focus was on improving the outreach of microfinance institutions to the poor, that is 
on serving more of the poor (breadth of outreach) and more of the poorest of the poor 
(depth of outreach). It is believed that the more clients that an MFI has the more 
sustainable it will be, since they will take more loans which will translate into more 
on-lending interest to be earned by the MFI. 
The hypothesis to be tested is: 
H5a: If the MFI’s acquire more new clients, then success will significantly 
increase. 
 
5.6.2 Loan Processing 
 
How long an MFI takes to process loans for its clients is very important and has a 
bearing on efficiency and effectiveness and confidence that clients ultimately will 
have in the institution. Again, the number of officers who would be involved in the 
operation from the beginning to the time of the loan disbursement affects the success 
of the institution, but to what extent? 
The hypothesis is: 
H 5b: If loan processing is efficiently and effectively managed, then success of 
MFIs will increase. 
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5.6.3 Record Keeping 
 
Keeping records of clients, which enables the MFIs to monitor them effectively is 
clearly very important and central to the achievement of success. What is not known 
is the degree to which record keeping affects the operations of MFIs. 
The hypothesis is: 
H 5c: If record keeping is effective, then success of MFIs increases. 
 
 
5.6.4 Savings/Discounts 
 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), some microfinance institutions require their 
clients to show good faith by accumulating savings before seeking a loan, whereas 
others entirely neglect the importance of savings for the poor. The famous Grameen 
Bank created savings accounts for all its customers with a fixed fraction of the loan 
disbursed and funds in those accounts could only be withdrawn upon leaving the 
programme. In principle, the compulsory savings programme was meant to help 
clients build up assets over time and develop the discipline of savings (Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2005). However, many authors see these involuntary 
savings accounts as a way for the banks and the institutions to acquire relatively 
cheap capital and to secure a form of collateral from borrowers. Some MFIs give 
discounts to clients for early repayments and some do not. From the foregoing the 
question to ask is: 
To what extent is savings/discounts critical to the operations of MFIs? 
The hypothesis posed is: 
H 5d: If savings increase in MFIs, then success will also increase significantly. 
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5.6.5 Internal/External Audits 
 
The institution of internal and external audits ensure that the laid down rules of the 
organization are adhered to with the ultimate result that the organization becomes 
profitable. In microfinance, sustainability and success can be linked to how effective 
and efficient the internal and external audit function is. What is unknown is the 
extent to which this function impacts on MFIs. 
The hypothesis is: 
H 5e: If the internal and external audit divisions function properly, then success 
will increase. 
 
5.6.6: Staff Remuneration 
 
During the exploratory research, one Chief Executive remarked “In terms of salaries, 
I can say that we are not the best within the industry, nor are the worst. We 
complement the remunerations with good training for our staff but this also 
adversely affects us ultimately. Our staff members are constantly being poached by 
other big firms with very attractive offers. You know our operations to a large extent 
depends on our staff” 
The hypothesis is: 
H 5f: If staff remuneration is high, then success will increase. 
 
5.6.7: Staff Turnover/Performance 
 
A high staff turnover may be indicative of staff dissatisfaction with their conditions 
of service and the contrary would hold true for low turnover. How does this impact 
on success of MFIs? 
The hypothesis is: 
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H 5g: If staff turnover is low, then success will also increase. 
5.7: Summary and Conclusion 
 
The chapter seeks to offer an explanation of sustainability and success of MFIs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The proposed model grouped factors into five categories as: 
institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy and 
governance/environment and success. Various research hypotheses have been 
developed based on the existing literature and findings from the exploratory research. 
These hypotheses are expected to assist in answering the main research question and 
sub-research questions. The combination of the above factors, it is expected, would 
help identify key issues relating to success of MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Summary Table for the Chapter 
    1. The research problem will be investigated through five specific research  
        question. 
    2. The literature review and Executives interview were used to develop the 
conceptual model, operational definitions of each construct and the research 
hypotheses. 
3.  The five research questions will be carried forward along with the conceptual 
sustainability and success model to investigate the research problem. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Research Methodology, Design and Procedures 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters the theoretical background underpinning the performance of 
microfinance institutions was developed through a review of existing literature (see 
Chapter 4). Qualitative interviews were also conducted, which aimed at providing 
further understanding of issues relating to the performance of microfinance 
institutions with reference to the financial sector in Ghana (see Chapter 5). The two 
procedures together led to the development of the research hypotheses (see Chapter 
5). In this chapter, the research methodology, process and approach that will allow 
for the testing of the research hypotheses is presented. In particular the research 
paradigm applied was discussed as well as the discussion of problems of research 
design in LDCs (Sub- Saharan Africa), data source, sampling procedures and non-
response analysis, questionnaire development and the statistical methods used to 
analyze the survey data obtained. 
 
6.1.1. Research Paradigms 
 
Research is conducted in the spirit of enquiry, which relies on facts, experiences, 
data, concepts and constructs, hypotheses, principles and laws. Philosophers of 
science and methodologists have been engaged in a long-standing epistemological 
debate about how best to conduct research, with two fundamentally different and 
competing schools of thought or inquiry (Amaratunga et al., 2000). Logical 
positivism uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive 
generalizations. Positivism searches for causal explanations and fundamental laws 
and generally reduces the whole debate to the simplest possible form in order to 
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facilitate analysis (Easterby-Smith, 1991; Remenyi et al., 1998). Phenomenological 
(interpretive science) inquiry uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to 
inductively and holistically understand human experience in context-specific 
settings. This approach tries to understand and explain a phenomenon, rather than 
search for external causes or fundamental laws (Easterby-Smith, 1991, Remenyi et 
al., 1998). 
Despite the above epistemological debate, Amaratunga et al., (2002) argued that in 
research design, the issue is not whether one has uniformly adhered to prescribed 
canons of either logical positivism or phenomenology but whether one has made 
sensible method decisions, given the purpose of the study, the questions being 
investigated and the resources available. The paradigm of choices recognize that 
different methods are appropriate for different situations (Amaratunga et al., 2002).  
 
Table 6.1: Two Research Paradigms 
Approach            Concepts                 Methods 
Positivism Social structure / Social 
facts 
Quantitative/Hypothesis &Theory 
testing 
Phenomenology Social construction, 
Meanings 
Qualitative, Hypothesis/ Theory 
generation 
Source: Silverman (1998), page 123. 
 
Table 6.1 sets out an overview of the two main paradigms. Data is interpreted 
differently by those working in different paradigms (Hill and McGowan, 1999). 
Gummeson, (1991) defines paradigm as a world view representing people‟s value 
judgments, norms, standards, frames of reference, perspectives, ideologies, myths, 
and theories.  
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Table 6.2 Qualitative and Quantitative paradigms 
      Theme                                 Strength                      Weaknesses 
Positivist 
(Quantitative  
paradigm) 
They can provide wide coverage of the 
range of situations. 
 
They can be fast and economical where 
statistics are aggregated from large 
samples, they may be of considerable 
relevance to policy decisions. 
The methods used tend to be 
rather inflexible and artificial. 
They are not very effective in 
understanding processes or 
significance that people attach to 
actions. 
 
They are not very helpful in 
generating theories because they 
focus on what is, or what has 
been. 
 
They make it hard for policy 
makers to infer what changes and 
actions should take place in the 
future. 
Phenomenological 
(Qualitative 
paradigm) 
Data-gathering methods seen more as 
natural than artificial 
 
Ability to look at change processes over 
time. 
 
Ability to understand people‟s meaning. 
 
Ability to adjust to new issues and ideas 
as they emerge. 
 
They contribute to theory generation. 
Data collection can be tedious and 
require more resources. 
Analysis and interpretation of 
data may be more difficult. 
Harder to control the pace, 
progress and end-points of 
research process. 
Policy makers may give low 
credibility to results from 
qualitative approach. 
Amaratunga et al (2002). 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2. Positivism 
 
Positivism uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive 
generalizations and advocates for independence of the observer from the subject 
being observed (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Smith 2002; Gill and Johnson, 1991). It 
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assumes that science quantitatively measures independent facts about a single 
apprehensible reality; data and its analysis are seen to be value-free (Healy and 
Perry, 2000; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Positivist epistemology tries to explain and 
predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elements and has its roots from natural science 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
 
6.1.3 Phenomenology 
 
Phenomenological or interpretative approaches, in rejecting the positivist‟s over-
deterministic orientation towards an understanding of human action and behavior, 
argue that, unlike animals or physical objects, human beings are able to attach 
meaning to the events and phenomena that surround them. From these they are able 
to make interpretations and perceptions, select courses of meaningful action which 
they are able to reflect upon and monitor (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
Phenomenological inquiry therefore uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to 
inductively and holistically understand human experience in context-specific 
settings, aimed at understanding and explaining a phenomenon, rather than search for 
external causes or fundamental laws (Amaratunga et al., 2002).  
Strauss and Corbin (1990) argue for the use of qualitative methodology in situations 
where little is known about a phenomenon or to gain more in-depth understanding of 
an issue which is difficult to convey in quantitative terms. Researchers are therefore 
advised to adopt qualitative approach that reduces the distance between them and the 
researched subjects but not the positivist approach that seeks value free research (Gill 
and Johnson 1991; Shaw, 1999; Hill and McGowan, 1999). Amaratunga et al., 
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(2002) argue that qualitative data which places emphasis on people‟s „lived 
experience‟ are fundamentally well suited for locating the meanings people place on 
the events, processes and structures of their lives: perceptions, assumptions, pre-
judgments, presumptions, presuppositions and for connecting meanings to social 
world around them. Eisner (1985) suggests that researchers should recognize the 
individuality, personality and attributes of the individual involved in the research 
process and argue strongly for recognition of the value and role of people to research. 
 
 
6.1.4 Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
 
The two research approaches of qualitative and quantitative have certain independent 
weaknesses. In order to overcome these separate weaknesses, many researchers 
advocate for the use of combined (qualitative and quantitative) research methods 
(Rossman and Wilson, 1984, Gummesson, 2001; Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
Gibb (1992) and Kirby (1995) suggest the use of stepwise „stage‟ approach that 
involves an initial exploratory qualitative research aimed at developing initial insight 
or understanding into a subject‟s activities to be followed by quantitative research 
intended to identify the specific practices of the firm. Kirby (1995) suggests that each 
research stage builds upon what has been learned in previous stages, in making an 
incremental contribution to the established knowledge base, thus allowing 
researchers to provide an in-depth and focused analysis of firm activities. 
Kirby (1995) concludes that the debate is not about either a qualitative or quantitative 
approach, but developing a research design which is appropriate for the issue under 
investigation. It is agreed that with a combined methodology the weaknesses of each 
methodology can be overcome while maintaining the strength of each paradigm 
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(Curran and Blackburn, 2001; Rossman and Wilson, 1984; Amaratunga et al., 2002). 
The researchers who argue in favour of methodological pluralism contend that the 
debate between these paradigms does not necessarily reflect a fundamental conflict, 
but a reflection of different interests that are reconcilable (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
 
Siu and Kirby (1999), however, are of the opinion that the major limitation with the 
stage approach is that, the research error in one stage may be transmitted or even 
multiplied in the subsequent stages. They therefore recommend a rigorous 
application of the stage approach to eliminate the above problem. Curran and 
Blackburn (2001) and Burrell and Morgan (1979) on the other hand argue that on 
both epistemological and methodological levels, combining different methodologies 
does not completely eliminate weaknesses associated with a single methodological 
approach. They further argue that philosophically the two paradigms remain 
fundamentally different and cannot be simply combined. 
 
 
6.1.5 Problems of Research Design in LDCs 
 
The discussions of problems of research design in Less Developed Countries and for 
that matter Sub-Saharan Africa is pertinent because this research was carried out in 
Ghana which is in Sub-Sahara Africa. The problems of research design in LDCs are 
manifested in several areas, such as the research approach, the degree to which the 
problem is crystallized, the breadth and depth of the study (qualitative versus 
quantitative), the time frame, identification of concepts and their measurement, the 
researcher‟s control of variables, sampling and data collection. 
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According to Samir et al (1997), researchers in LDCs tend to concentrate on 
normative approach. They are usually not concerned with the descriptive approach 
and virtually ignore the exploratory studies even though what is really needed in 
developing countries is an understanding of the factors that shape effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
Samir et al., (1997) acknowledge the extreme difficulty in bringing about change in 
the complex research environment of LDCs and therefore made relevant suggestions 
which are examined below: 
 Decision-driven research should be the aim of research that is the value of the 
research conducted in LDCs should be based on the extent to which it can help 
managers/policy makers make decisions. 
  The approaches used for grounded theory could be appropriate, for grounded 
theory aims at discovery of relevant theory from systematically obtained data. This 
approach could provide relevant information for prediction, explanations, 
interpretations and applications in particular settings. Grounded theory is based on 
qualitative research, comparative analysis, systematic choices and case studies. 
 Comparative analysis is also needed. There has been a call for an understanding 
of management practices in different LDCs as they are, in other words describing 
what is going on before prescribing anything. After all, the normal process of theory 
building is to describe, to generalize and then to prescribe. 
 There is also a need for longitudinal studies in addition to cross-sectional 
ones so as to avoid normative prescriptions. Therefore, exploratory and descriptive 
studies which have been limited in LDCs need to receive much more attention. 
 Concepts definitions and measurement need to be geared to local conditions. A 
concept, that is a group of characteristics and meanings that are often associated with 
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certain events, conditions and situations differ greatly from culture to culture and 
from situation to situation. Therefore researchers need to identify the important 
categories and concepts and the operational definitions that fit the particular concept. 
The grounded-theory approach can be extremely useful in this endeavour.  With 
respect to the availability of data and funds, policy makers can play a very important 
role. Priority needs to be placed on relaxing the rules and regulations governing 
accessibility to information. Moreover, an information system that enables 
researchers to identify prior research is needed. This understanding will be greatly 
facilitated by computer technology. Moreover, bureaucrats need to be educated about 
the importance of accurate, consistent and up-to-date information. 
 
 
6.1.6 The Selected Research Methodology 
The research was based on both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. A two 
stage approach was used. First, an exploratory qualitative interview was conducted 
by interviewing 14 executives of sampled microfinance institutions with focus on 
how they are handling  the performance issues of agency, moral hazard and adverse 
selection. This was followed by a self-administered survey involving 130 
microfinance institutions. 
The decision to conduct the exploratory interviews was based on the following 
reasons: 
 Sustainability, of microfinance institutions though widely studied in the 
developed countries, Asia and Latin American countries; the same cannot be said of 
sub-Saharan Africa in general and Ghana in particular. Therefore there are less 
comprehensive theories on microfinance institutions in Ghana. 
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 It is the considered view that theories and findings built and obtained in the 
developed countries and elsewhere may not be applicable in Ghana. The exploratory 
study was therefore aimed at understanding the operations of microfinance 
institutions from the perspective of executives. 
 The exploratory study is to deepen the understanding of factors that lead to 
sustainability and success. Issues that came up at the exploratory interviews were 
incorporated into the research hypotheses, the framework and the survey 
questionnaires. It also assisted in the interpretation of the quantitative results and 
provided a basis for explaining the findings. 
The quantitative survey method was used for the following reasons: 
 To allow for the inclusion of a large number of microfinance institutions, so as to 
increase the generalizability of the research findings. 
 The multiplicity of factors that affect the sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions and the extent of their interaction can be properly studied 
through the application of multivariate statistical techniques. 
 
The second application of the agency theory looked at how the management of a 
microfinance institution as the principal dealt with its staff-agents. In this second 
instance, following Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) an examination was 
made of how managers are able to provide incentives to enable staff to optimize the 
microfinance institution‟s objectives.  
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6.2. Data Source 
 
Data for this study is collected from two sources; the financial reports (secondary) 
and structured questionnaires and interviews (primary) to elicit institutional 
characteristics and modes of handling the performance variables. Operating manuals 
where they were available and useful were used to examine their mode of day to day 
operations of the selected microfinance institutions. The survey data was 
complemented with information gathered through the qualitative phase. As such, the 
basis for the primary data used for the entire study was obtained from an exploratory 
stage and a qualitative survey stage. 
 
6.2.1 Sampling Frame and Sample Size 
 
The sampling frame included managing directors/ financial managers from 
microfinance institutions in seven out of the ten regions of Ghana; Greater Accra, 
Eastern, Central, Western, Ashanti, Northern and Volta regions. A sampling frame 
consists of all potential elements and respondents that are intended to be sampled 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). It is therefore important to create a sampling frame 
that adequately reflects the desired response rates in order to achieve an adequate 
sample for analysis. This requires two specific considerations: The first is adequacy 
of sample size for generalizability and second adequacy of sample size for statistical 
testing (Hair et al., 1998; Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). 
 
 
6.2.2: Sampling Procedure 
 
The method for defining and creating the most appropriate sampling technique is a 
significant part of the research design (Lehmann, Gupta & Steckel, 1998). As one of 
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the objectives of this research was to describe the factors that affect sustainability 
and success of MFIs, it was determined that the most appropriate sampling method to 
utilize was a „two phased‟ stratified random sampling technique (Churchill, 2000). 
The stratum development began by assessing the regional distribution. From there 
the microfinance institutions located in the regions were determined. The next stage 
involved the aggregation of coverage by examining the regions with the high number 
of MFIs. The selection of Greater Accra, Central, Western, Eastern, Ashanti, 
Northern and Volta regions gave 130 MFIs, representing 74.4% (see Table 3.0, 
excluding the BDSP and Apex Bodies). The importance of achieving a high coverage 
is to ensure that the intensity of activities is captured to allow for the creation of a 
proportionate representation of the population within the research (Henry 1990; 
Frankfort-Nachimias & Nachimias, 1996). Limiting the coverage to all except Upper 
East, Upper West and Brong Ahafo was equally influenced by time and limited 
financial resources available for this research.  
A greater heterogeneity is required to allow for group analysis which also called for 
bigger sample size. A non-response rate is generally high for researches in LDCs, it 
was therefore considered prudent to have larger sample size to ensure that adequate 
number of responses is obtained for effective analysis (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.3 Sample Frame Analysis 
Institution Qualitative interview 
Number of 
Executives 
Survey Total 
Financial NGO 5 84 89 
Savings & Loans 
Co. 
3 9 12 
Credit Union 
Assoc. 
2 3 5 
Rural Banks 2 18 20 
Susu Companies 2 2 4 
Total 14 116 130 
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6.3. Data Collection Method 
 
To obtain a high response rate, it is important that the method to be chosen would be 
one capable of offering that.  Telephone interviews, though less expensive and time 
consuming was used on few occasions because it is felt that respondents may be 
more reluctant to provide confidential or sensitive information on telephone. 
Self-administered postal questionnaire though considered cheaper, less time 
consuming and capable of reaching a large geographical area, it was not used for this 
study. This was because it was not expected to yield a high response rate. The postal 
system in Ghana is less developed and therefore problems such as non-delivery and 
late deliveries were likely to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of self-
administered postal survey. The use of the courier system is also too expensive. 
Face to face interview method was mostly used. Respondents were first called by 
phone and briefed about the research. Their consent was sought for their participation 
and the face to face interviews conducted. There were instances where respondents 
though agreed to complete questionnaires, reneged. The face to face interview was 
not only expected to yield the highest response rate but also to ensure that the 
appropriate personnel answered the questionnaires. 
Some researchers have advocated for incentives to be given to respondents as a way 
of increasing response rate (Watson, 2001). In view of tight budgetary constraints 
and with no external support no such incentives were offered. What were offered 
were the results of the research, for respondents who expressed interest. After the 
interviews, calls were made to thank all participants. 
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6.3.1 Data Analysis 
 
In analyzing the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Ghana a 
number of methodological approaches were adopted. A model of operational 
sustainability is estimated to determine the factors influencing operational 
sustainability. Subsidy Dependence Indices (SDI) and Operational Self-Sufficiency 
(OSS) were also computed and analyzed for each type of MFI over the period under 
study to ascertain their subsidy dependence and trends in operational sustainability. 
A two-stage approach was used in analyzing the data for the study. The first stage  
where sustainability was measured at the nominal level (yes=1, and  no=0) which led 
to the use of the logistic regression and the chi-square test. The second stage was 
where sustainability was measured by attaching values to the responses of selected 
variables that related to the five major factors of Institutional characteristics, agency 
costs, business strategy, environment/governance and success. The scores were then 
aggregated to produce interval level variable leading to the use of ANOVA and 
MANOVA.  
1. The microfinance institutions were examined by type to reveal their specific 
approaches to dealing with the agency issues in microfinance. In this light the agency 
theory was applied at two levels: 
2. The first dealt with the traditional lender-borrower dynamics and following 
Banerjee et. al., (1994) and Armendariz (1999) an examination was made of the 
incentives, monitoring and enforcement structures of selected lending schemes to 
ascertain their effectiveness in resolving the agency problem.  
The risk perceptions faced by the various microfinance institutions were also 
examined with the view to linking these to the institutional risk management modes 
and the associated lending costs. In this regard it was determined if measures such as 
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progressive lending based on prompt repayment, frequent repayment schedules and 
compulsory savings (Nissanke, 2002) were being utilized. The nature of sanctions, 
be it legal enforcement or collateral asset for defaulters amongst various institutions 
were also  examined to see how these are reducing the cost of loan default and 
therefore mitigating the moral hazard and adverse selection problem and helping in 
screening out likely defaulters. 
 
6.4 Unit of Analysis 
 
The study is aimed at examining the factors that impact on sustainability and success 
of microfinance institutions. For the purposes of this study and the measurement of 
sustainability activities therefore, the unit of analysis was the institution. This is 
supported by the argument that it is the institution which can be seen to start and end, 
create jobs and bring economic growth (Bridge et al, 2003). 
Using the institution as the unit of analysis can be clearly supported in a situation 
where there is complete separation of ownership from management. However, the 
difficulty arises in many small institutions as the owners exert a considerable amount 
of influence on these institutions‟ operations and therefore the institution has similar 
characteristics of the owner/manager (Bridge et al, 2003). The study was therefore 
designed among other things to focus on the characteristics of the institutions. 
The survey covered five sub-sectors within the microfinance industry in Ghana 
namely; the Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs), Savings and 
Loans Companies (S & L), Credit Union Associations (CUAs), Rural Banks (RBs) 
and the Susu companies. 
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6.5: The Period of Study 
 
Sustainability denotes time and therefore sustainability of MFIs is highly dependent 
on time such that the period of study is an important matter to consider when 
researching. The period chosen for the study i.e. 2003 to 2007 was considered to be 
the most recent for which data was likely to be available. The period also witnessed a 
relatively stable macroeconomic environment in Ghana making it an appropriate 
time to study the factors that affect sustainability of MFIs. 
 
6.6 The Questionnaire and Measures 
 
According to Wiklund (2001) it is prudent to use measurement scales which have 
been validated by previous research, rather than developing new ones as far as they 
exist. More importantly using existing variables that have been tested allows direct 
comparison of research results. In the light of the above, many of the questionnaires 
and measurements were based on previous studies (Barkham et al., 1996). 
Though formal questionnaire is considered as the most appropriate for this second 
stage of the research, it is not without limitations. It has been argued that executive 
responses to a survey provide personal perception about the subject matter being 
studied. The most frequently highlighted problem is that responses can clearly be 
influenced by individual differences and personal judgment which may be at 
variance with real situation on the ground (Gill and Johnson, 1991, Baah-Nuakoh, 
2003; Brown et al, 2004). 
It can also be argued that data collected from multiple respondents within the same 
firm have more validity than data based on the perception of one person. It was 
therefore the objective of this research to include branch managers and relationship 
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executives of microfinance institutions whose chief executives have been 
interviewed at the exploratory stage in the qualitative research. 
The questionnaire which took an average of 45 minutes to complete was divided into 
five main sections (full version of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix H): 
(a) Institutional characteristics 
(b) Agency costs 
(c) Business strategy 
(d) Governance/ environment 
(e) Success 
The details of how concepts and variables were measured are as follows: 
(A) Institutional Background and Characteristics 
This section of the questionnaire requested information about the background 
characteristics of the institution, motivation for setting it up, clientele base, sources 
of income and how they generally gather information from clients. 
(B) Agency Costs 
In this section data was collected on MFIs relationship with clients, contractual 
agreements with clients and the nature of such agreement. Information was also 
sought on the number of branches across the country, the extent to which they are 
dependent on subsidies and if so, when they plan to exit. 
(C) Business Strategy 
This section requested information on screening mechanisms, the use of groups as 
collateral for loans, the level of interaction between clients and the lending 
institution. Again questions about how the institution handles defaulters and general 
enforcement of strategies were posed. 
(D) Governance/Environment 
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This section solicited information on constraints if any on the regulatory framework, 
innovations in financial products, emergency loans and direct job creation for clients. 
Critical in this section was the issue of competition and the nature of such 
competition. Personnel constraints and difficulty of loan recovery was also asked. 
(E) Success 
This last section requested information on number of new clients, loan processing, 
record keeping, savings/discounts, internal/external audits, staff remuneration and 
staff turnover/performance. 
 
6.7 Pre-testing of Questionnaire 
 
The initial survey was piloted on a selected group of fourteen Executive Directors in 
Accra, five (5) from the Financial Non-Governmental Organization, three (3) from 
Savings and Loans, two (2) from Credit Union Association, two (2) Rural Bank and 
two (2) from Susu Companies. This was done to ensure that all the five sectors were 
fully represented in testing the questionnaire. The initial questionnaire was sent to 
respondent three days before individual meetings were held with them. This offered 
the respondents enough time to appropriately review and comment on all aspects of 
the questionnaire. The separate meetings took an average time of forty five minutes 
and were all conducted within forty days. Comments were solicited and appropriate 
changes to the questionnaire were subsequently effected. 
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6.8: Response Rate 
 
The survey was undertaken within a period of three months.  A total of 130 
respondents were contacted out of which one hundred and fourteen (114) responded. 
A respondent rate of 87.7% was achieved. Ten (10) respondents (7.7%) were 
contacted and followed up with no response. Further six (6) respondents representing 
4.6% of the sample respondents were contacted but were not followed up. Though 
there is no universal acceptance as to what constitutes good response rate, an 87.7% 
response rate is normally regarded as good for analysis (Aidis, 2003). Menon et al 
(1999) also report that the average response rate involving higher management 
survey is between 15 to 20%. 
 
6.9 Sampling and Non-Sampling Errors 
 
This section discusses some of the errors that can potentially affect the results of the 
survey research under the headings sampling and non-sampling errors. 
(a) Sampling Error: Due to small size of the sample frame, a decision was taken to 
include most institutions within it. Therefore random sampling procedure was not 
used. Thus random sampling error which occurs when a particular selected sample is 
not a perfect representation of the population (Slowinski, 1988) was not evident in 
the survey conducted. 
(b) Non-Response Error: Non-response error which may result from inability to 
collect complete data on all firms in the sample frame can affect this study in two 
different ways. First, a decrease in the sample size or in the amount of information 
collected in respect of a particular question may result in a larger standard error. 
Second it introduces a bias to the extent that non-respondents differ from respondents 
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within the sample (Slowinski, 1998). The face-to-face interview method used to 
administer the survey questionnaire ensured that item non-response was reduced. 
Quick follow ups were made to obtain data that were not readily available at the time 
of the interview. Questionnaires were fully completed except for some respondents, 
in the areas where qualitative responses were required. Respondents were not too 
willing to answer open-ended questions. 
Unit non-response which occurs when there is no complete response from a 
prospective respondent was considered as a major challenge to the quality of data to 
be obtained for this research. Procedures made to reduce the rate of non-response 
have been detailed under the caption „data collection method‟. 
 
 
Table 6.4: Response/Non-Response Analysis 
Sector Sampled Contacted Responded Contacted 
No 
Response 
Contacted 
not 
followed 
up 
Non 
Response 
FNGO 89 89 81 4 4 8 
S&L 12 12 10 2 0 2 
CUA 5 5 4 1 0 1 
RURAL BANK 20 20 15 3 2 5 
SUSU Co. 4 4 4 0 0 0 
No of Executives 130 130 114 10 6 16 
Percentage of 
Sample 
 100 87.7 7.7 4.6 12.3 
 
As shown in Table 6.4 out of the 10 Executives contacted but who did not respond, 4 
representing 40% were a total rejection of being part of the survey. In all cases 
attempts were made to convince refusals to take part, which included making 
personal appeals by calling on them after refusal and also by sending e-mails. All 
these did not yield the desired results. 
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Table 6.5 Analysis of Executives Contacted Without Response 
Sector 
 
Refusal Absent Call back after  
 
5 -10 Times 
Total 
FNGO 2 1 1 4 
Savings & 
Loans 
1 1 0 2 
Credit Union 
Assoc. 
0 0 1 1 
Rural Banks 0 2 1 3 
SUSU 0 0 0 0 
No.of Institutions 3 4 3 10 
Percentage 30 40 30 100 
 
 
 
6.10 Analysis of Non-response Error 
 
As stated earlier, the lack of accurate and sufficient data on institutions in Least 
Developed Countries impacts negatively on the ability to analyze the extent of non-
response bias. The nature of non-response is also such that values for non-
respondents on all survey measures may not be available (Statistical Policy, 2001). 
This limits the quality of analysis that can be carried out. Nonetheless, the non-
response error analysis was carried out by comparing certain characteristics of 
respondents and non-respondents. Table 6.5 shows the distribution of respondents 
and non-respondents by sector. It can be seen that there is a relatively fair percentage 
distribution of respondents among the sectors. 
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Table 6.6: Analysis of Respondents/ Non-Respondents by sector 
Sector Responses Non-Responses Total 
 No of Executives % No of 
Executives 
% No of 
Executives 
% 
FNGOs 81 71.0 8 50 89 68.5 
Savings & 
Loans Co. 
10 8.8 2 12.5 12 9.2 
Credit Union 
Assoc. 
4 3.5 1 6.3 5 3.8 
Rural Banks 15 13.2 5 31.2 20 15.4 
SUSU 4 3.5 0 0 4 3.1 
No of 
Executives 
114 - 16 - 130 - 
Percentage  100  100 - 100 
 
6.11 Characteristics of Respondents 
 
In this section the characteristics of the 114 respondents are examined as a way of 
testing the rigor of the sampling method used and the robustness of the data 
collected. In particular basic descriptive statistics on the respondents are provided. 
The objective to include only independent microfinance institutions in this research 
was fully achieved. 
The ownership structure of respondent Institutions is dominated by foreign investors 
which form 58.8%, followed by local capital of 25.4% and a blend of both of 15.8% 
of local capital. This scenario is explained by the fact that typical microfinance 
involves heavy capital requirements which makes it difficult for many individuals in 
developing economies to meet. 
In this section the data analysis method used to analyze the survey data is discussed. 
The discussion in particular focuses on the justification of method chosen, the 
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associated weaknesses and the assumptions underlying the methods. SPSS statistical 
software package was used for the data analysis. 
 
6.12 The Selection of Statistical Method 
 
The main statistical tools used were the chi-square test of independence and 
correlations for the hypotheses since the levels of measurement of the variables were 
mainly nominal and ordinal. The hypotheses tested were carried out at either 95% or 
99% significance levels 
Various statistical techniques, One-Way ANOVA, correlations and regression and 
chi-square test of independence cross tabulations. MANOVA were used for the 
hypothesis testing depending on the levels of measurement of the variables. The 
hypotheses testing were carried out at 95% significance level. Thus a test result was 
considered significant when the p-value (significant value) associated with the 
computed test value was less than 0.05 (p<0.05) for 95% significance level. 
The results of the study were both univariate and multivariate data analysis. Bivariate 
methods such as Spearman‟s correlation coefficient which deals with the analysis of 
the variables measured on an ordinal scale simultaneously to ascertain their 
relationship (Bryman, 2001) were also used. Cross-tabulation with X
2
-test was also 
used to ascertain and test the relationship between two variables measured on a 
combination of nominal and ordinal scales. For quantitative analysis of the data, the 
factors were aggregated to provide interval data for the use of parametric tests such 
as the ANOVA and regression. 
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Single factor analysis (One-Way ANOVA) and multiple factor analysis (MANOVA) 
were used. The One-Way ANOVA was used to test for significant differences in the 
SDI and OSS if any between the various categories of the independent variables 
(drop-out rate, cost per borrower, loan size, staff productivity); and the MANOVA 
was used to ascertain whether the independent variables interact to produce 
significant levels of sustainability by microfinance institutions. The reason for 
combining both sophisticated and simple statistical methods is to resolve the 
problems associated with complex analysis that is difficult to understand by both 
researchers and non-researchers and simple models that focus on the most important 
relations and neglect the others (Wiklund, 2001). A review of literature on 
sustainability of MFIs suggests that many researchers rely on multivariate statistical 
techniques to understand factors that lead to sustainability (Zeller and Meyer, 2002). 
 
6.13 Reliability and Validity 
 
Reliability and validity of the research results were given a high attention. Reliability 
is the consistency of a set of measurements of the same instrument, often used to 
describe a test. This can either be whether the measurements of the same instrument 
give or are likely to give the same measurement. An experiment is reliable if it yields 
consistent results of the same measure. It is unreliable if repeated measurements give 
different results. Reliability is inversely related to random error. Reliability does not 
imply validity.
 The most common internal consistency measure is Cronbach‟s alpha, 
which is usually interpreted as the mean of all possible split-half coefficients. 
Cronbach‟s alpha is a generalization of a form of estimating internal consistency1. 
The Alpha will generally increase when the correlations between the items increase. 
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For this reason the coefficient is also called the internal consistency or the internal 
consistency reliability of the test.  Alpha is an unbiased estimator of reliability if and 
only if the components are essentially equivalent (Lord and Novick ,1968). 
Internal consistency is usually measured with Cronbach‟s alpha, a static calculated 
from the pairwise correlations between items. Internal consistency ranges between 
zero and one. A commonly accepted rule of thumb is that an alpha of 0.6-0.7 
indicates acceptable reliability, and 0.8 or higher indicates good reliability. High 
reliabilities (0.95 or higher) are not necessarily desirable, as this indicates that the 
items may be entirely redundant. The goal in designing a reliable instrument is for 
scores on similar items to be related (internally consistent) but for each to contribute 
some unique information as well. 
 In table 6.7 the various forms of reliability and validity and how they have been 
dealt with in this thesis are shown. 
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Table 6.7 Elements of Reliability and Validity 
Objective Elements Activity 
Reliability Data Source 1) Primary data used. 
2) Face-to-face interviews with Chief 
Executives 
3) Questionnaire was pre-tested. 
Reliability Measures 1) Measurements were based on previous 
researches. 
2) Assumptions underlying the statistical 
methods were met. 
3) There is no missing value relating to 
percentage growth in the data. 
Cronbach‟s Alpha found to be within 
acceptable limit of 0 .7 to 0.8  (Cronbach‟s 
Alpha within data .721). 
Validity Face Validity: 
 That construct 
conforms to common 
understanding. 
1) Literature review was carried out to 
understand concepts and constructs. 
2) Measurements, concepts and constructs 
were developed based on previous 
researches. 
3) Questionnaires were developed and pre-
tested with five Executive Directors. 
4) Data was collected through face-to-face 
interview to ensure that as far as possible 
Executive Directors had the same 
understanding of concepts, measurements 
and constructs. 
 
Validity Content Validity: 
That construct cover all 
relevant facets of the 
concept 
1) Literature review provided an 
understanding of constructs. 
2) Constructs were discussed with Executive 
Directors through qualitative interviews and 
pre-testing of questionnaire. 
Validity Criterion Validity: 
Results are in 
consonance with theory 
and previous results 
Previous validity measures were used to 
determine the concurrent validity. 
Validity Predictive Validity: 
That a measure predicts 
another measure as 
predicted in theory. 
The results largely in conformity with the 
hypothesis (See Chapter 7) 
Adapted from Maula, 2001 page 128 
6.14 Operational Sustainability Model 
 
The determinants of operational sustainability are modeled by adopting the model 
used by Woller (2003). The model is stated as follows: 
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                    Yit  = ßX it + uit                                                                                                        
Yit  = a measure of operational self sufficiency for MFI i for period t, Xit  is a vector 
of explanatory variables including MFI characteristics such as depth of outreach, 
dropout rate and staff productivity measures for MFI i=1…14 in period 
t=2003…2007, uit = error. 
The operational self-sufficiency index is the ratio of total operational income to 
interest expense, loan, loan loss provision and administrative expense. This measure 
shows how the institution is able to cover its operational costs (See Appendix M).  
Other variables identified by Morduch (1999), Christen (2000) and Schreiner (2002) 
as affecting the sustainability of microfinance are administrative expenses, cost per 
borrower, loan officer productivity, portfolio at risk, average loans, active borrowers 
and dropout rate of clients. 
According to Adjasi and Coleman (2007), administrative expense ratio is the ratio of 
total administrative expenditure to total loans. It is the expenditure per loan output 
and measures the amount of resources committed to producing a loan output. There 
are also some staff productivity variables used in judging MFIs. The cost per 
borrower is the ratio of total administrative expenses and in-kind donations to the 
average number of active borrowers. This is a measure of the value of inputs required 
to produce a given level of output, as measured by loan per borrower. A higher ratio 
shows that more money and in-kind contributions are needed to produce a given 
number of loans per borrowers. The loan officer productivity ratio is the ratio of total 
active borrowers to loan officers and measures the number of loan officers required 
to produce a given level of output as measured by borrowers. A higher ratio is an 
indication that fewer loan officers are required to manage a given number of 
borrowers. The quality of loan portfolio is also captured by the portfolio-at-risk. This 
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is measured as the ratio of the outstanding balance of loans exceeding 90 days to the 
total loan portfolio. Outreach variables also include the number of borrowers which 
is an indicator of both breadth of outreach and scale and the average loan size is 
defined as the average gross loan portfolio divided by the number of active 
borrowers. The dropout rate which is the number of clients who have dropped out 
divided by total clients and it measures the worth of output and the level of client 
dissatisfaction. 
The explanatory variables for the operational self-sufficiency model are defined as 
administrative expense ratio, the dropout rate, cost per borrower, portfolio yield, loan 
staff productivity, average loan size, portfolio at risk, and active borrowers. Other 
variables are also considered by Woller (2003). The theoretical motivation for 
modeling these variables as determinants of operational self-sufficiency is based on 
the following hypothesized a-priori expectations between these variables and 
operational self-sufficiency. 
A higher administrative expense ratio indicates that the MFI incurs extra cost in 
producing an output loan. An increase in this ratio will have negative effects on 
attainment of operational self sufficiency. Similarly, an increase in the cost per 
borrower also depicts more financial resources to produce a given number of 
borrowers. Thus the cost per borrower is hypothesized to be inversely related to 
operational self-sufficiency. The portfolio-at-risk (PAR) is also a cost indicator and 
also signifies the quality of loans. A high portfolio at risk signifies a high possibility 
of the risk of incurring bad loans. It also shows deterioration in the quality of loan 
service. Thus, increases in this variable, pushes up the cost incurred by the MFI and 
results in an adverse effect on operational self-sufficiency. Real portfolio yield, the 
real return on loan portfolio (a proxy for real interest charged) is also expected to be 
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positively correlated with operational self-sufficiency. Regarding loan officer 
productivity ratio, a higher ratio implies that fewer loan officers are required to 
produce a given number of borrowers. The loan officer productivity ratio is therefore 
positively related to operational self-sufficiency. With respect to the number of 
active borrowers, it is expected that an increase in this number results economies of 
scale in spreading fixed costs across a large number of borrowers, thereby reducing 
operational costs and increasing profitability. Thus the number of borrowers is 
positively correlated with operational sustainability. Finally it is hypothesized that he 
smaller the average loan size the greater the depth of outreach, hence average loan 
size is inversely associated with operational self-sufficiency. 
 
6.15: Subsidy Dependence Index 
 
Following Yaron (1994) and Khandker and Khan (1995) the subsidy dependence 
index is computed as follows: 
   SDI = 
NS                                                
               LPxi 
 
NS   = Net Subsidy 
SDI = Subsidy Dependence Index 
LP   = Average loan portfolio 
I      = Average annual on-lending interest rate paid on that portfolio. 
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This ratio helps measure the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest 
rate required to eliminate subsidy in a given year while keeping its return on equity 
to the approximate non-concessionary borrowing cost.  An SDI of zero implies full 
self-sustainability, meaning that profit is equal to the social cost of operation. A 
positive index would show that economic costs exceed profit; here the on-lending 
interest must be increased by the amount of SDI to eliminate the amount of net 
subsidy. All the results are captured below under data analysis (Table 6.8). 
An analysis of the data collected on agency costs (see Appendix H, no. 22) would be 
made to establish the understanding of the Subsidy Dependence index (SDI) and the 
Operational Self Sufficiency model (OSS) and the borrower-lender dynamics in 
microfinance. 
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Table 6.8: SDI, outreach, staff and administrative productivity and loan quality 
indicators across using the 14 exploratory sampled Microfinance institutions. 
(Panel means 2003-2007) 
  
      Variable FNGO 
     1 
FNGO  
     2 
FNGO  
     3 
FNGO 
     4 
FNGO  
     5 
 S & L 
    1 
S & L           
2 
Outreach Breadth 
1.Borrowers 
 
2. Active 
 
3. Women 
 
4. Total Loans  
   (GH Cedis) 
 
 
14,025 
    
 2,560 
 
 12,988 
 
 214,510 
 
 
 
      522 
 
      452 
 
      376 
 
315,000 
 
 
   1,096 
 
      859 
 
      566 
 
289,000 
 
 
565 
 
 508 
 
  384 
 
453,000 
 
 
 
   1,866 
 
      910 
 
   1,447 
 
 153,000 
 
 
   12,000 
 
     5,500 
 
      4,800 
 
1,233,200 
 
 
 
  6,500 
 
    8,254 
 
    5,225 
 
866,000 
 
Outreach depth 
1. Average Loans 
(GH cedis) 
 
91,831 
 
366.39 
 
530.39 
 
235.65 
 
805.70 
 
143.35 
 
966.30 
Outreach worth 
Dropout rate (ratio) 
 
0.191 
 
0.184 
 
0.202 
 
0.157 
 
0.136 
 
0.065 
 
0.072 
Screening 
Total Admin 
expense (GH cedis) 
 
128,706 
 
173,250 
 
147,390 
 
280,861 
 
73,440 
 
604,268 
 
450,320 
Enforcement/Risk 
1. Total bad debts  
cedis) 
 
2. Portfolio at 
risk(ratio) 
 
3. Loan officers 
 
 
29,743 
 
 
  0.053 
 
 
      8 
 
17,383 
 
 
0.112 
 
 
2 
 
14,961 
 
 
0.124 
 
 
2 
 
24,527 
 
 
0.064 
 
 
3 
 
8,187 
 
 
0.031 
 
 
8 
 
19,350 
 
 
0.032 
 
 
10 
 
31,220 
 
 
0.031 
 
 
8 
Staff productivity 
1. Loan officer 
Productivity 
2. Cost per 
borrower  
 
320 
 
50.275 
 
226 
 
383.30 
 
429.5 
 
171.58 
 
169.33 
 
552.88 
 
113.75 
 
80.70 
 
550 
 
109.87 
 
1031.75 
 
54.56 
Administrative 
Efficiency 
Administrative 
expense (ratio) 
 
 
 
0.60 
 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
 
0.51 
 
 
 
0.62 
 
 
 
0.48 
 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
 
0.52 
Interest charged 
1. Interest 
 
2. Interest premium 
 
3. Real Portfolio 
yield 
 
      % 
  27.2 
 
 13.74 
 
0.649 
 
   % 
  22.1 
 
8.64 
 
0.889 
    % 
   25 
 
11.54 
 
0.962 
 
     % 
   22.7 
 
  9.24 
 
1.583 
 
    % 
  21.6 
 
 8.14 
 
1.237 
 
     % 
  36.0 
 
  22.54 
 
0.996 
    % 
  36.0 
 
 22.54 
 
2.356 
 
Sustainability ratios 
1. OSS 
2. SDI 
 
0.346 
0.1914 
 
0.350 
0.1102 
 
2.137 
  0.1082 
 
1.642 
0.0832 
 
1.755 
0.3348 
 
3.331 
0.0398 
 
2.945 
 0 
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Interest premium=interest charged- Treasury bill rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable   S & L 
    
     3 
CREDIT 
UNION  
      1        
CREDIT 
UNION 
      2 
RURAL 
BANK 
     1 
RURAL 
BANK 
     2 
SUSU 
    
    1 
SUSU  
    
    2 
Outreach 
Breadth 
1.Borrowers 
2. Active 
3. Women 
4. Total Loans 
(GH  cedis) 
 
  16025 
  11560 
    6500 
1,145,100 
 
3522 
3522 
2376 
141,500 
 
1086 
1086 
665 
558,000 
 
2595 
508 
384 
645,300 
 
 
1688 
910 
447 
505,300 
 
325 
305 
210 
90,000 
 
213 
170 
150 
165,350 
 
Outreach depth 
1. Average 
Loans (GH 
cedis) 
 
2,500 
 
3,366.39 
 
6,000 
 
2,550 
 
3,000 
 
1000 
 
1,250 
Outreach worth 
Dropout rate 
(ratio) 
 
0.061 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.168 
 
0.163 
 
0.361 
 
0.231 
Screening 
Total Admin 
expense (GH of 
cedis) 
 
824,472 
 
39,620 
 
111,600 
 
225,855 
 
293,071 
 
13,800 
 
29,763 
Enforcement/ 
         Risk 
1. Total bad 
debts (GH 
cedis) 
 
2. Portfolio at 
risk(ratio) 
 
3. Loan officers 
 
 
29,441 
 
 
  0.064 
 
 
      6 
 
383 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
2 
 
296.52 
 
 
0.0021 
 
 
2 
 
7,527 
 
 
0.038 
 
 
3 
 
12,187 
 
 
0.133 
 
 
4 
 
350 
 
 
0.035 
 
 
2 
 
120 
 
 
0.030 
 
 
2 
Staff 
productivity 
1. Loan officer 
Productivity 
2. Cost per 
borrower  
 
1,927 
 
71.32 
 
1761 
 
11.25 
 
543 
 
102.76 
 
169.33 
 
444.59 
 
227.5 
 
322.06 
 
302.5 
 
45.25 
 
85 
 
175.08 
Administrative 
Efficiency 
Administrative 
expense (ratio) 
 
 
 
0.72 
 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
 
0.58 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
 
0.18 
Interest 
charged 
1. Interest 
 
2. Interest 
premium 
 
3. Real 
Portfolio yield 
 
    % 
   48 
 
   34.54 
 
3.388 
      % 
   19.5 
 
   6.04 
 
1.135 
      % 
   19.5 
 
   6.04 
 
1.564 
     % 
   22.7 
 
   9.24 
 
1.467 
     % 
   22.7 
 
   9.24 
 
1.894 
     % 
    24.0 
 
  10.54 
 
2.232 
    % 
   24.0 
 
   10.54 
 
2.112 
Sustainability 
ratios 
 
1. OSS 
 
2. SDI 
 
 
2.581 
 
0.069 
 
 
3.115 
 
0 
 
 
4.481 
 
0 
 
 
3.138 
 
0.058 
 
 
1.878 
 
0.093 
 
 
2.247 
 
0 
 
 
2.754 
 
0 
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6.2 Empirical Results 
 
6.2.1 Institutional Management of borrowers, Staff, Cost and Subsidy 
Dependence. 
This ratio helps measure the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest 
rate required to eliminate subsidy in a given year while keeping its return on equity 
to the approximate borrowing cost.  
 The 14 MFIs used in the exploratory study were examined according to sectors to 
find their specific approaches to dealing with the agency problem and the extent of 
their reliance on subsidies for their operations. 
 
 
6.2.2 Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs) 
The FNGOs come second in terms of outreach among the MFIs, with FNGO 1 
having the highest number of women as clients at 12,988. It has an average total loan 
of 285,000 Ghana cedis with an average loan size of 300 Ghana cedis. Dropout rate 
average 19%, but seem to be increasing for the FNGOs a sign that they are unable to 
retain and sustain clients. Women, however seem to be favoured here as they have 
the highest number. It is believed that they have shown a good track record of 
repayment in rural localities. 
The SDI estimates for the FNGOs appear high (33.48%) over the period. This means 
they have to increase their yield on loans to be able to exit subsidy dependency. The 
FNGOs use group lending method. Screening of clients is done through interviews 
and the completion of forms. On the average it takes up to one month to process a 
loan application. Like the others, FNGOs demand collateral as a guarantee before 
loans are disbursed. By law clients cannot save with FNGOs and this limits their 
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ability to accumulate funds for depth and breadth of outreach. This may account for 
the high level of subsidy dependence among FNGOs and also the fact that they 
normally start as philanthropic organizations and are perceived as such. 
Consequently loan recovery among FNGOs appears to be low due to this perception. 
It also appears that most of the FNGOs are unable to get deeply involved in 
managing its groups and this seem to translate into poor group networks and loose 
peer monitoring amongst groups. Agency issues appear not to be handled well which 
is evident in the high level of staff turnover. 
 
 
6.2.3 Savings and Loans Institutions (S&L) 
All the S&L institutions approach their clients in very informal ways, the most 
common being personal visits by loan officers to elicit as much information as 
possible. In this way it minimizes the risk of dealing with potential bad clients.  They 
have the highest number of clients and also total loans disbursed to clients. 
Information gathering however varies from branch to branch and depends on specific 
needs of clients. Most of them use a combination of interviews, completion of forms 
during such personal visits as its screening mechanism. They have a unique lending 
programme where clients who have good track record of repayment are placed in a 
higher category compared to other groups. The procedure for extending a loan 
consists mainly of regular cash flow, a guarantor from the locality, attendance of 
business orientation meetings and training programmes. It takes two to four weeks on 
average to process a loan. 
Most of the Savings and Loans institutions demand collateral in the form of physical 
assets and they also use collateral substitutes such as compulsory savings, loan 
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guarantor and referees as prerequisites to benefitting from loan services. This locks 
in the borrower and makes the borrower responsible. 
Regular interaction with borrowers, especially group borrowers is vital for this group 
of MFIs. Their meetings range from one to four times in a month. The duration of 
meeting is between twenty minutes and two hours. In such meetings general advisory 
services are offered with respect to record keeping, capital management and 
investment advisory. The essence is to help borrowers optimize their use of credit 
offered so they are in a position to repay quickly and also earn higher loan facilities. 
Borrowers from certain sectors like agriculture are sometimes dealt with differently. 
For instance farmers with perishable products are given specific assistance in farm 
management and in some cases directly get involved in seeking markets for such 
clients. In dealing with cases of defaults, potential default and long overdue 
repayments, the savings and loans institutions use threats and legal sanctions mostly. 
Some go to the extent of seizing assets of defaulters.  They also use the group 
monitoring system where each individual is monitored at each point in time by the 
group members. 
Institutional capacity building is among the principles of success for the savings and 
loans institutions. In this regard they see the provision of incentives to staff as key to 
the success of service delivery and institutional success. Their staffs undergo regular 
training both in Ghana and overseas. Thus, they appear to have a well motivated staff 
which is committed to efficient service delivery. One of their difficulties in this 
regard is the threat from the big multinational banks that keep luring their staff with 
bigger offers by way of remunerations. 
Due to the volume of their transactions all the S&L institutions have regular internal 
and external auditing exercise as a means of checking financial controls. They are 
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also engaged in other revenue generating activities such as investing in treasury bills. 
The regulatory framework as observed by the savings and loans institutions is in the 
area of the minimum capital required before one could transform into a bank. 
The data from the exploratory study indicates that all the savings and loans 
institutions appear to be doing very well as their on-lending interest rate appear to be 
higher than others in the industry thereby generating increased revenue and covering 
their costs. Not surprisingly subsidy dependence is either non-existent (zero) or very 
low (0.069). What this implies is that all other things constant the savings and loans 
institute has to increase actual yield by 6.9% to eliminate subsidy dependency if its 
portfolio size does not change. Operational self-sufficiency was very high (3.331) 
implying a sustained ability to cover more than 100% of operation cost. Clearly, the 
savings and loans institutions stand out as successful and sustained MFIs based on 
these indicators. 
 
 
6.2.4 Credit Union Associations (CUAs) 
The Credit Union Associations are mostly a part of an organization with the workers 
as the clients, and therefore one qualifies to be client and to be able to access loans 
on the basis of being a staff of the organization. What this means is that there are no 
strict and formal interviews or screening of clients since they are known members of 
the organization. Consequently all the borrowers are active members of the 
microfinance scheme with a record of low dropout rates averaging 1.5%. This 
situation translates into low levels of bad debts and portfolio at risk. No collaterals 
are demanded. 
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One feature of CUAs is the emphasis placed on savings for a period of time before 
one can qualify for a loan which is two and half times the savings. Loan repayments 
are done concurrently with the regular savings. Due to the centralized nature of 
operations, total cost per borrower is very low thereby impacting on administrative 
expenses as well. It appears the CUAs charge a uniform interest rate of 19.5% per 
annum. 
The CUAs do not depend on subsidies and are operationally self sufficient. For 
example CUA1 and CUA 2 have OSS index of 3.115 and 4.481 respectively, 
implying that they are able to recover their costs three times and four times over. 
Clearly this picture depicts MFIs which are sustainable and successful. 
 
 
6.2.5 Rural Banks 
These are institutions that were set up with a focus of bringing banking to the 
doorsteps of the rural poor and those marginalized by the traditional banking system. 
Therefore, micro financing was largely part of their mandate. Their clientele cut 
across all forms of businesses. Due to the localized nature of their operations they 
give relatively small loans to avoid difficulties with repayments. Loans are disbursed 
to clients who are introduced by an already existing customer who guarantees for the 
client. Sometimes some background checks are conducted from within the 
community where the client resides. This approach however does not seem to impact 
on loan recovery as the Rural Banks experience relatively high bad debts and 
portfolio at risk. Interest charged is uniform at 22.7% per annum. The rural banks 
receive subsidies from the Central Government though their operational self 
sufficiency index is good. 
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6.2.6: Susu  
The Susu operators do not appear to be regulated and are also able to attract 
borrowers through less costly procedures. Indeed the regulatory environment seems 
to favour Susu operators to the disadvantage of other MFIs. For example, they do not 
have any formal laws regulating their operations and therefore cannot tell where their 
mandate ends. This situation has caused most clients to lose their savings as the 
collectors vanish with their savings. They normally demand collateral in the form of 
physical movable property, or you need to be introduced by a known client who will 
be your guarantor. 
Their clients are mostly market women who borrow small loans to enable them buy 
and sell wares in the market. Because there is competition by other operators in the 
same market, their client base average 300 with a high dropout rate of about 30% on 
the average. However, their portfolio at risk is low with negligible bad debts due to 
the small loans disbursed. There appears to be uniformity in the interest rates charged 
due to the fact that they are all operating in the same market and an action by one 
competitor will be counteracted by all the others. There is perfect competition in the 
market place. The Susu operators do not operate on subsidies and from Table (6.7) it 
is clear that the Susu institutions are operationally self sufficient. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the details of the research methodology process that was 
relevant for the research work. The epistemological debate on the fundamentally 
different and competing schools of thought or inquiry paradigms, i.e. positivism 
which uses quantitative method for causal explanations and phenomenology method 
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which uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to understand human experiences 
were discussed. The reason for selecting the research method of combining 
positivism and phenomenology was also highlighted. 
The reason for favouring face–to–face interview as against other data collection 
methods has been stated. Sampling and non-sampling errors and the decision to 
include institutions both young and old within the sample frame for the purpose of 
the survey have been discussed. Models of Operational Self Sustainability (OSS) and 
Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) were used to explain sustainability or otherwise of 
MFI‟s. 
The subsequent chapters will discuss the research findings along with our 
interpretations and comparison with existing findings. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The next six chapters focus on the analysis of the data which was gathered from the 
field with the research instrument–questionnaire as well was the interviews held with 
the Chief Executive Officers of selected MFI‟s. This chapter deals with the general 
background of the MFI‟s followed by detailed analysis of the institutional 
characteristics, business strategy, agency cost, and environmental factors and their 
impact on the sustainability and success of the MFI‟s in the subsequent chapters. The 
results have been presented in tables showing frequencies and percentages of the 
responses given by the MFI‟s.  
 
The main statistical tools used were the chi-square test of independence and 
correlations for the hypotheses since the levels of measurement of the variables were 
mainly nominal and or ordinal. For the secondary data, trend analysis was carried out 
and the regression model was used to establish a relationship between operational 
self-sufficiency (OSS) of the predictors namely administrative expenses (AE), 
dropout rate (DOR), cost per borrower (CPB), real portfolio yield (RPY), loan officer 
productivity (LOP), average loan (AL), portfolio at risk (PAR) and active borrowers 
(AB). In addition, One-Way ANOVA was used to ascertain if there were differences 
in the operational self sufficiency and subsidy dependence index of the MFI‟s. The 
hypotheses tested were carried out at 95% significance levels (0.05). The chapters 
include the discussion of the findings of the study in the light of the literature 
reviewed as well as the empirical evidence from the interviews held with some Chief 
Executive Officers of the MFI‟s. 
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7.2: Background of the MFI’s  
 
A total of 114 MFI‟s responded to the questionnaires. Whilst some were established 
over three decades ago that is as far back as 1982, the recently established one was 
two years ago - in the year 2006. About a third (38.0%) were established within the 
last decade (1999-2009), 40.0% were established within the last two decades whilst 
22.0% have been in existence for the past three decades. In effect most of the 
FNGO‟s were established within the last decade. The MFIs covered were from 7 out 
of the 10 regions of Ghana – namely Greater Accra, Central, Western, Eastern, 
Ashanti, Northern, and Volta. In all 130 MFIs were sampled out of which 114 
responded. 
 
7.3 Types of Microfinance 
 
The respondents to our questionnaires were mostly Chief Executives and 81 
(71.05%) were Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs), while the least 
number 4 (3.51%) were in the Susu and Credit Union Institutions.  Respondents were 
also categorized into urban and rural with 55 (48.25%) representing typical rural 
institutions and the remaining 59 (51.75%) being urban. The above statistics lend 
credence to the fact that even though microfinance is about alleviating poverty 
especially in the rural settings, there are equally poor people in the urban areas who 
are mostly migrants in search of jobs. Again it also confirms the fact that most MFIs 
try to seek a balance between poverty alleviation of the poor who are mostly in the 
rural areas and how to make their operations sustainable especially by looking at 
quick returns on their investment (see Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1: Microfinance Institutions by Type 
Regions     FNGOs Savings & 
Loans 
Credit 
Unions 
Rural Banks     Susu 
Companies 
Total 
Greater 
Accra 
25 4 1 1 2 33 
Central 6 - 1 2 1 10 
Western 6 2 - 2 - 10 
Eastern 8 - 1 3 - 12 
Ashanti 7 3 1 3 1 15 
Northern 17 - - 2 - 19 
Volta 12 1 - 2 - 15 
Total 81(71.05%) 10(8.77%) 4(3.51%) 15(13.16%) 4(3.51%) 114 
 
The type of ownership of the MFIs were made of 67 (58.8%) foreign owned, 29 
(25.4%) locally owned and a few that is 18 (15.8%) that were owned by both foreign 
and local investors as shown in Table 7.2. 
 
7.2: Ownership of the MFI’s 
Ownership Frequency Percentage 
Foreign  
67 58.8  
Local 
29 25.4 
Both foreign and local 
18 15.8 
Total 
114 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Source of funding by type of MFI 
 
 
MFI‟S 
Source of Funds  
 
Total 
 
Donors Donor and 
Personal 
(Government) 
Personal/ 
Members 
Contributions 
Members 
Contribution/ 
Market 
Borrowing 
FNGOs 81 (71%) - - - 81 (71%) 
Savings & 
Loans 
6 (5.3%) 1 (0.8%) - 3 (2.7%) 10 (8.8%) 
Credit 
unions 
1 (0.8%) - 3 (2.7%) - 4 (3.5%) 
Rural 
Banks 
- 9 (7.9%) - 6 (5.3%) 15 (13.2%) 
Susu 
companies 
- - 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.7%) 4 (3.5%) 
Total 88(77.1%) 10(8.7%) 4(3.5%) 12(10.7%) 114 (100%) 
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It can be observed that the majority (71%) of the FNGOs were donor supported, 
savings and loans MFI‟s were also mainly donor supported, credit unions were 
mainly funded by personal/member contributions, rural banks were mainly donor and 
government supported whilst Susu companies main source of funding were member 
contribution/market borrowing.  
 
 
7.4 Subsidy Dependence Index and Operational Self Sufficiency of the MFI’s 
The data for the study revealed that generally the average SDI of the MFI‟s increased 
sharply from 0.1745 in the year 2003 to about 0.3751 in 2004. It decreased steadily 
thereafter to 0.2687 in 2005 and then to 0.1683 in the year 2007 (Fig. 7.1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 7.1: SDI of the MFI’s (2003-2007) 
 
 
 
 
The average annual rate of decrease was just about 0.019. This indicates that the net 
subsidy of the MFI‟s has been decreasing at a rate of about 1.9%. This situation is 
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worrying and does not augur well for the long term sustainability of the micro 
finance industry in Ghana as the MFIs would depend on subsidies for a long time to 
come. Only about 12.7% of the changes in the SDI could be attributed (explained) 
to the change in the economy. Indications are that much of the changes in the SDI 
could not be attributed or explained by the changes in the economic years. 
 
 
Fig. 7.2: SDI of the MFI’s by type  (2003-2007) 
 
 
The results in Fig. 7.2 revealed that the SDI of the FNGO‟s increased drastically 
from 0.1794 in 2003 to an all time high of 0.4651 for the period under review. The 
SDI of the FNGO‟s, however, decreased sharply thereafter to 0.2678 in 2005, 
decreasing further but steadily to 0.1794 by the year 2007. The average annual 
increase in the SDI of the FNGO‟s was only 0.026 (2.6%). This was followed by 
the RB, which recorded marginal increase in SDI from 0.1978 in 2003, to 0.2159 in 
2007, giving an average annual increase of 0.004 (0.40%) . The SDI for the S&L 
decreased from 0.1432 in 2003 to 0.1028 in 2007. The average annual rate of 
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decrease was 0.004 (0.04%). Further analysis of the mean SDI by type of MFI 
revealed significant differences in the SDI of the FNGO‟s, S&L and RB. The mean 
SDI‟s of 0.2577, 0.1366, and 0.1885 were recorded by the FNGO‟s, S&L and the 
RB respectively (Table 7.4).  
 
Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics of SDI by type of MFI 
Type of MFI Mean Standard deviation Standard Error 
FNGO 0.2577 0.0153 0.0009 
S&L 0.1366 0.0477 0.0075 
RB 0.1885 0.0660 0.0076 
 
The One-Way ANOVA test results yielded F=527.303, df = 2,352 and p<0.05 
(Table 7.5). This shows that the differences in the mean SDI of the MFI‟s were 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 7.5: One-Way ANOVA for mean differences in SDI by type of MFI’s 
Source of variation 
Sum  of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
Sig.  
(p-
value) 
Between groups 1.399 2 0.699 527.30 
 
 
0.000 
 
 Within groups 0.467 352 0.001 
Total 1.865 354 
  
 
n.s. = not significant , p<0.05 = difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
 
The post-hoc test for pairwise comparisons confirmed that the mean SDI of the 
FNGO‟s (0.2577) was significantly higher than that of the RB (0.1885) and S&L 
(0.1366). Also, the SDI of the RB (0.1885) was significantly higher than that of the 
S&L (0.1366).  
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Table 7.6: Post-hoc test for pairwise comparisons of mean differences in SDI  
Type of MFI FNGO‟s S&L RB 
FNGO‟s - p<0.05 p<0.05 
S&L - - p<0.05 
RB - - - 
n.s. = not significant , p<0.05 = difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
7.5 Multivariate Regression Model  
Multiple regression is a statistical technique that allows for the prediction of a 
dependent variable on the basis of its scores on several independent variables. 
Multiple regression also allows for the testing of theories (or models) about precisely 
which of the independent variables significantly influences the dependent variable. R 
is a measure of the correlation between the observed value and the predicted value of 
the criterion variable. R Square (R2) is the square of this measure of correlation and 
indicates the amount of variation in the dependent variable which is accounted for by 
the model. This Adjusted R Square value gives the most useful measure of the 
model, the higher the R-square the better the model. The regression model can be 
expressed as 
y= K + ax1 + bx2 + cx3 + ……..  
where, y= dependent variable, K = constant, x1, x2, x3, … are the independent 
variables, and the a, b, c, …. are the regression coefficient (beta) of the independent 
variables  
 
The beta value is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable influences the 
criterion variable. It is the regression coefficient of the independent variables. Thus, 
the higher the beta value the greater the impact of the predictor variable on the 
criterion variable.  
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On the operational self-sufficiency (OSS) of the MFI‟s, the regression model was 
significant in establishing a relationship between the OSS and the predictors 
(F=5.661, df=8, 97 and p<0.05).  A regression co-efficient of 0.321 and an R-square 
of 0.103 (10.3%) were obtained. This means that only 10.3% of the variation in the 
OSS can be explained by changes in the predictors namely administrative expenses 
(AE), dropout rate (DOR), cost per borrower(CPB), loan officer productivity (LOP), 
average loans (AL), portfolio at risk (PAR), average loans (AL) and active borrowers 
(AB).  
 
Table 7.7: Regression coefficients of the predictors of OSS  
Model Variables Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Sig.  
Constant 0.892 0.044 20.118 0.000 
Admin Expenses (AE) 0.103 0.059 1.746 0.082 
Dropout rate (DOR) 0.287 0.145 1.976 0.049 
Cost per borrower 
(CPB) 
-
0.0000000000311 0.000 0.122 0.903 
Loan Officer 
Productivity (LOP) 0.000000857 0.000 0.298 0.766 
Average Loans (AL) 0.0000022 0.000 3.672 0.000 
Portfolio at risk (PAR) -0.049 0.080 0.620 0.535 
Active borrowers 
(AB) 0.000000760 0.000 0.695 0.488 
Dependent variable :OSS 
    ** Other variables which are considered as possible determinants of OSS have been dropped due to 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
The test results in Table 7.7 show that only dropout rate (DOR) and average loans 
(AL) were significantly (p<0.05) predictive of OSS. The relationship between OSS 
and cost per borrower (CPB); and portfolio at risk (PAR) were found to be negative. 
Thus increasing CPB and PAR lowers the OSS of the MFI‟s by 3.110010 (3.11E8%) 
and 4.9% respectively. Though there were positive relationships between OSS and 
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LOP; DOR; AB and AE; the relationships were not significant at the 0.05 level 
(p>0.05).  
 
The results in Table 7.7 further show a negative relationship between OSS and CPB,  
and PAR, however, these were not significant at the 0.05 level (p>0.05). Contrary to 
expectation, the DOR recorded a positive, even though not significant, relationship 
with OSS. In other words, the DOR may not necessarily be indicative of borrower 
dissatisfaction, but rather rigid enforcement of repayments schedules, high interest 
rates or ineffective monitoring of clients.  
 
Table 7.8: Descriptive statistics of OSS by type of MFI 
Type of MFI Mean Standard deviation Standard Error 
FNGO 1.0367 0.0755 0.0049 
S&L 1.2094 0.0047 0.0008 
RB 0.9846 0.2722 0.0314 
 
The result in Table 7.8 shows that the S&L recorded the highest OSS of 1.2094, 
followed by the FNGO‟s (1.0367) and the RB (0.9846). 
 
Table 7.9: One-Way ANOVA for mean differences in OSS by type of MFI’s 
Source of 
variation 
 
Sum  of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. (p-value) 
Between groups 1.372 2 0.686 
35.29 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
Within groups 6.843 352 0.019 
Total 8.215 354 
 n.s. = not significant , p<0.05 = difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
The One-Way ANOVA results (Table 7.9) for the test of mean differences revealed 
that there were significant differences in the mean OSS of the MFI‟s (F=35.29, df=2, 
352 and p<0.05). Thus, the OSS of at least two of the groups of the MFI‟s differed 
significantly. Further to this, the post-hoc test for multiple comparisons (using the 
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Least Square Deviation–LSD) was used to ascertain which sets of two groups of 
MFI‟s differed significantly in their OSS (Table 7.10). 
 
 
Table 7.10: Post-hoc test for pairwise comparisons of mean difference in the 
OSS  
Type of MFI FNGO‟s S&L RB 
FNGO‟s - p<0.05 p<0.05 
S&L - - p<0.05 
RB - - - 
n.s. = not significant , p<0.05 = difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
It can be observed (Table 7.8) that the mean differences for the pair of groups were 
all significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the OSS of the S&L (1.209) was significantly 
higher than that of the FNGO‟s (1.037) and the RB (0.985). Also, the difference in 
the OSS of the FNGO‟s (1.037) and the RB (0.985) was found to be significant at the 
0.05 level. Therefore the hypothesis that there will be significant differences in the 
OSS of the MFI‟s in Ghana was supported. 
 
 
7.5.1  Regression Analysis of sustainability and performance of MFI’s and the 
five factors.  
A regression analysis was used to establish and test the significance of the 
relationships between  sustainability, and performance of the MFI‟s; and the five 
factors of sustainability/success namely institutional characteristics (IC), agency cost 
(AC), business strategy (BS), environment and governance (EG) and level of success 
(S). The regression model also helped to ascertain which of the factors significantly 
predicted sustainability and success of the MFI‟s. 
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7.5.2 Logistic Regression for Sustainability  
A Wald chi
2
=49.668, Prob> chi
2
=0.000 p<0.05 was recorded for the relationship 
between the sustainability of the MFI‟s and the factors of sustainability. 
 
Table 7.11: Test results of regression model for sustainability/factors 
Model Summary
38.770a .155 .388
Step
1
-2 Log
likelihood
Cox & Snell
R Square
Nagelkerke
R Square
Est imat ion terminated at iterat ion number 8 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
a. 
 
 
Also, an R
2 
=0.388 (38.8%) was recorded and this corresponds with a high regression 
coefficient of r=0.622 (62%) (Table 7.11). In effect 38.8% of the changes in the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s can be explained by and attributed to the factors of 
sustainability namely institutional characteristics (IC), agency cost (AC), business 
strategy (BS), environment and governance (EG) and level of success (S).  
 
The test of significance for the regression model yielded chi
2 
(5) =19.163, 
Prob>chi
2
=0.002 (Table 7.12). This means that at the 0.05 level, the regression 
model was significant in establishing a formal relationship between the sustainability 
of the MFI‟s and the factors of sustainability.  
 
Table 7.12: Test results of regression model for relationship between 
sustainability and its factors 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
19.163 5 .002
19.163 5 .002
19.163 5 .002
Step
Block
Model
Step 1
Chi-square df Sig.
 
 
From the results in Table 7.13, the regression model for the sustainability of the 
MFI‟s can be derived as: 
Sustainability =1.692-1.651(IC)-0.570(AC)+0.916(BS)+1.027(EG)+1.179(Success) 
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Table 7.13: Regression Coefficients between sustainability and its factors 
-1.651 .769 4.609 1 .032 .192
-.570 .628 .824 1 .364 .565
.916 .478 3.670 1 .055 2.498
1.027 .575 3.187 1 .074 2.794
1.179 .492 5.747 1 .017 3.250
1.692 3.158 .287 1 .592 5.429
IC
AC
BS
Eg
Success
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: IC, AC, BS, EG, Success.a. 
 
 
The results further indicate that two out of the five sustainability factors namely 
Institutional Characteristics (IC) and Success were significantly predictive of the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s in Ghana since their t-statistics were significant at the 
0.05% level. 
 
7.5.3 Logistic Regression for Performance of the MFI’s  
The data for the study also revealed a significant relationship between the 
performance of the MFI‟s and the five factors (Wald chi2=46.53, Prob> chi2=0.000 
p<0.05). 
 
Table 7.14: Test results of regression model for relationship between 
performance and its  factors 
Model Summary
111.505a .335 .447
Step
1
-2 Log
likelihood
Cox & Snell
R Square
Nagelkerke
R Square
Est imat ion terminated at iterat ion number 6 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
a. 
 
 
Also, an R
2 
(Nagelkerke) =0.447 (44.70%) was recorded and this corresponds with a 
high regression coefficient of r=0.6685 (66.85%) (Table 7.14). Thus, 66.85% of the 
changes in the performance of the MFI‟s can be explained by all or some of the five 
factors namely institutional characteristics (IC), agency cost (AC), business strategy 
(BS), environment and governance (EG) and level of success (S).  
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The test of significance for the regression model yielded chi
2 
(8) = 22.42, 
Prob>chi
2
=0.004. This means that at the 0.05 level, the regression model was 
significant in establishing a formal relationship between the performance of the 
MFI‟s and the five factors. The regression model for the performance of the MFI‟s 
from the results in Table 7.15 can be derived as: 
Performance =-6.218+0.069 (IC)+1.782(AC)+0.044(BS)+0.646(EG)-
0.361(Success) 
 
Table 7.15: Regression Coefficients  between performance and its factors 
.069 .238 .084 1 .772 1.072
1.782 .385 21.470 1 .000 5.940
.044 .255 .029 1 .864 1.045
.646 .279 5.359 1 .021 1.909
-.361 .195 3.408 1 .065 .697
-6.218 2.002 9.646 1 .002 .002
IC
AC
BS
EG
Success
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: IC, AC, BS, EG and Successa. 
 
 
The results further indicate that two out of the five factors namely agency cost (AC) 
and environment and governance (EG) were significantly (p<0.05) predictive of the 
performance of the MFI‟s in Ghana since their t-statistics were significant at the 
0.05% level. 
 
 
7.5.4 Regression Model without Institutional characteristics 
When institutional characteristics was dropped, the regression model yielded, 
sustainability = 0.715 +1.216(AC) + 0.906(BS) + 1.328(EG) + 0.940(Success). The t-
statistic was significant at the 0.05 level. This means even without the institutional 
characteristic (IC) factor, all the other factors namely AC, BS, EG and Success 
combined to significantly predict the sustainability of the MFI‟s (see Model 1 in 
Table 7.16). 
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Table 7.16: Summary of Regression Coefficients for sustainability and its factors 
(Multiple factor analysis) 
 
Model 
Constant/ 
Varaibles 
Unstandardised 
coefficeint 
Standardised 
coefficeint 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
B Std Error Beta 
 
1 
 
(IC 
excluded) 
Constant 0.715 0.296  2.414 0.017 
AC 1.216 0.058 0.318 20.832 0.000 
BS 0.906 0.032 0.431 27.935 0.000 
EG 1.328 0.057 0.314 23.352 0.000 
Success 0.940 0.040 0.330 23.799 0.000 
 
2 
 
(AC 
excluded) 
Constant 0.843 0.464  1.818 0.072 
IC 1.516 0.140 0.232 10.852 0.000 
BS 1.282 0.045 0.610 28.818 0.000 
EG 0.745 0.098 0.176 7.640 0.000 
Success 1.202 0.059 0.422 20.502 0.000 
 
3 
(BS 
excluded) 
Constant 1.017 0.860  1.183 0.239 
IC 0.236 0.263 0.036 0.898 0.371 
AC 1.955 0.151 0.512 12.990 0.000 
EG 1.717 0.172 0.406 10.000 0.000 
Success 1.036 0.114 0.364 9.123 0.000 
 
4 
(EG 
excluded) 
Constant 1.840 0.412  4.463 0.000 
IC 1.713 0.124 0.263 13.859 0.000 
AC 0.769 0.089 0.201 8.683 0.000 
BS 1.192 0.046 0.567 25.882 0.000 
Success 1.150 0.057 0.404 20.152 0.000 
 
5 
(Success 
excluded) 
Constant 2.431 0.692  3.515 0.001 
IC 0.655 0.227 0.100 2.881 0.005 
AC 1.487 0.141 0.389 10.540 0.000 
BS 1.026 0.081 0.488 12.710 0.000 
EG 1.397 0.151 0.331 9.242 0.000 
** Dependent variable:Sustainability 
 
7.5.5 Regression Model without the agency cost factor 
The data for the study produced a regression model; sustainability = 0.843 +1.516(IC) + 
1.282(BS) + 0.745(EG) + 1.202(Success) when agency cost was dropped. The t-statistic 
was significant at the 0.05 level. This means that when agency cost was effectively 
controlled, the combined effect of IC, BS, EG and Success was significant in 
predicting the sustainability of the MFI‟s (see Model 2 in Table 7.16). 
 
7.5.6 Regression Model without the business strategy factor 
When business strategy was dropped, the other four factors namely IC, AC, EG and 
Success combined to significantly predict the sustainability of the MFI‟s at the 0.05 
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level.  The regression model derived from the coefficients is, sustainability = 1.017 
+ 0.236(IC) + 1.955(AC) + 1.717(EG) and 1.036(Success). (See Model 3 in Table 
7.16)  The t-statistics were all significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
 
7.5.7 Regression Model without the environment and governance factor  
The environmental/govenance factor was also dropped, and the regression model 
yielded, Sustainability = 1.840 + 1.713(IC) + 0.769(AC) + 1.192(BS) + 
1.150(Success). The t-statistics for all four factors were significant at the 0.05 level. 
Thus, at the 95% signficance level,  even without environmental/governance factor, 
the IC, AC, BS and Success factors combined to significantly predict the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s. (see Model 4 in Table 7.16). 
 
 
7.5.8 Regression Model without the success factor 
When the success factor was dropped, the regression model obtained was, 
sustainability = 2.431 + 0.655(IC) + 1.487(AC) + 1.026(BS) + 1.397(EG). The t-
statistics were all significant at the 0.05 level (see Model 5 in Table 6.16). Thus, even 
without the success factor, the other four factors namely IC, AC, BS and EG 
combined to significantly predict the sustainability of the MFI‟s. 
 
 
7.6 Single Factor Analysis  
The Pearson‟s Correlation Coefficients was used to show the strength of the 
relationship between the factors of sustainability and the sustainability of the MFI‟s 
and also between pairs of the factors.  
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The results in Table 7.17, revealed positive relationships between sustainability and 
four out of the five factors of sustainability used for the study. The relationship was 
strongest between sustainability and success (0.246), followed by sustainability and 
agency cost (0.224), then sustainability and business strategy (0.179), and 
sustainability and environment/governance (0.117), (see Table 7.17).  However, 
there was a negative relationship between sustainability and institutional 
characteristics (-0.171). All these relationships were significant at the 0.05 level. The 
results further show the relationship between pairs of the independent factors. 
Though some of the correlations amongst the independent factor variables were 
significant, multicollinearity (or collinearity) was not an issue since the correlations 
were not extremely high and did not in any way affect the relative contribution of 
each predictor variable to the success of the model. 
 Table 7.17: Correlation Coefficients for sustainability factors   
 IC AC BS EG Success Sustainability 
IC              Pearson 
Correlation 
                 Sig. (p-value) 
                 N 
 -0.141 
0.135 
114 
0.202 
0.032 
114 
0.069 
0.468 
114 
-0.031 
0.747 
114 
-0.171 
0.009 
114 
AC            Pearson 
Correlation 
                 Sig. (p-value) 
                 N 
  0.274 
0.003 
114 
0.077 
0.413 
114 
0.384 
0.000 
114 
0.224 
0.067 
114 
BS             Pearson 
Correlation 
                 Sig. (p-value) 
                 N 
   0.222 
0.018 
114 
0.025 
0.794 
114 
0.179 
0.057 
114 
EG            Pearson 
Correlation 
                 Sig. (p-value) 
                 N 
    -0.139 
0.140 
114 
0.117 
0.214 
114 
Success    Pearson Correlation 
                  Sig. (p-value) 
                  N 
     0.246 
0.008 
114 
 
 
In addition to the correlation, a regression analysis was carried out to establish a 
model or a formal relationship between each individual factor of sustainability and 
the sustainability of the MFI‟s and also determine the significance of the relationship. 
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Table 7.18: Summary of Regression Coefficients for sustainability and its factors 
(single factor analysis) 
 
Model 
Constant/ 
Varaibles 
Unstandardised 
coefficeint 
Standardised 
coefficeint 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
B Std 
Error 
Beta 
1 Constant 17.417 1.266  13.753 0.000 
IC 2.250 0.579 0.345 3.888 0.000 
2 Constant 12.008 0.975  12.312 0.000 
AC 2.741 0.251 0.718 10.907 0.000 
3 Constant 11.227 0.796  14.102 0.000 
BS 1.697 0.117 0.807 14.475 0.000 
4 Constant 10.792 1.498  7.205 0.000 
EG 2.498 0.322 0.591 7.756 0.000 
5 Constant 11.604 1.143  10.148 0.000 
Success 1.912 0.200 0.671 9.574 0.000 
** Dependent variable:Sustainability 
 
 
7.6.1 Regression Coefficients for sustainability and institutional characteristic 
only  
For institutional characteristic, the regression model yielded, sustainability 
=17.417+2.250(IC); and the t-statistic of 3.888 was significant at the 0.05 level. This 
means that institutional characteristic (IC) factor alone was significantly predictive of 
the sustainability of the MFI‟s. Thus, the more the MFI‟s lived by the tenets of 
microfinance that is reaching out to the pro-poor, the more sustainable they were 
(Table 7.18). 
 
 
7.6.2 Regression Coefficients for sustainability and agency cost only 
 
The model for agency cost is, sustainability = 12.008 + 2.741(AC); and the t-statistic 
was 10.907 and p<0.05. This means that at the 0.05 level, agency cost (AC) alone 
was significantly predictive of the sustainability of the MFI‟s. Thus, the more the 
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MFI‟s took measures to minimize the effects of agency cost, the more sustainable 
they were (see Model 2 in Table 7.18). 
 
 
7.6.3  Regression Coefficients for sustainability and business strategy factor 
only 
 
For business strategy, the regression model is, sustainability =11.227 + 1.697(BS). 
The test of significance yielded a t-statistic of 14.475 and p<0.05 level (see Model 3 
in Table 7.18). This means that business strategy as a single factor was significantly 
predictive of the sustainability of the MFI‟s. Thus, the more the MFI‟s adopted 
effective and standard or widely accepted microfinance strategies, the more 
sustainable they are. 
 
 
7.6.4  Regression Coefficients for sustainability and environment/governance 
factor 
The model for environment/governance is, sustainability = 10.792 + 2.498(EG);    
and the t-statistic was significant at the 0.05 level (t=7.756, p<0.05). This means that 
environment/governance factor alone was equally significant in predicting the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s (see Model 4 in Table 7.18). Thus, the more the 
regulatory and environmental conditions promoted microfinance operations in 
Ghana, the more sustainable the MFI‟s were. 
 
 
7.6.5  Regression Coefficients for sustainability and success factor only 
The regression model for sustainability based of the success factor alone was also 
established as, sustainability = 11.604 +1.912(Success).  The t-statistic observed was 
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9.574 and p<0.05. This means that at the 0.05 level, the success factor alone was 
significantly predictive of the sustainability of the MFI‟s (see Model 5 in Table 
7.18). Thus, the more successful the MFI‟s were, the more sustainable they were. 
 
                                                                        
7.7.0 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for sustainability of MFI’s 
One-Way ANOVA was used to test for differences in the sustainability of the MFI‟s 
by type of MFI, ownership of the MFI and source of funds for the MFI. 
 
 
 
 
7.7.1 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for sustainability of MFI by type  
 
The result in Table 7.19 shows that the S&L companies obtained the highest score of 
25.30 on sustainability, followed by RB‟s with a score of 21.87, then Susu 
companies with 21.75, and FNGO‟s with 21.73. CU was the least sustainable with a 
score of 21.00.  
Table 7.19: Statistics of sustainability by type of MFI 
Type of      
MFI N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
FNGO 81 21.73 4.78 0.53 
S&L 10 25.30 4.24 1.34 
RB 15 21.87 5.92 1.53 
Susu 4 21.75 5.32 2.66 
CU 4 21.00 6.06 3.03 
Total 114 22.04 4.97 0.47 
 
The differences in the mean scores were, however, not significant at the 0.05 level 
since the One-Way ANOVA test for mean differences yielded F=1.214, df=4, 109, 
and p>0.05 (Table 7.20). This means that there were no differences in the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s. In other words the differences in the sustainability of the 
MFI‟s were due to chance. 
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Table 7.20: One-Way ANOVA for sustainability by type of MFI 
Source of variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
119.25 
2676.61 
2795.86 
4 
109 
113 
29.81 
21.56 
 
1.214 
 
 
0.309 
 
 
7.7.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for sustainability of MFI by source of 
funds 
It was also observed that the MFI‟s that were funded by personal and member 
contributions obtained the highest score of 24.75 on sustainability. This was followed 
by those that were funded by donors (22.24), member contributions and market 
borrowing (21.00), and then donor and personal contributions (20.40) as shown in 
Table 7.21.  
 
Table 7.21: Statistics of sustainability of MFI’s by source of funding 
Source of funding N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Donor 88 22.24 4.90 0.52 
Donor & personal 10 20.40 5.44 1.72 
Personal & Member 
contribution 4 24.75 4.27 2.14 
Member contribution & Market 
borrowing 12 21.00 5.33 1.54 
Total 114 22.04 4.97 0.47 
 
 
The results of the test for mean differences yielded F=0.979, df=3,110 and p>0.05 
(Table 7.22). This means that at the 0.05 level, the sustainability of the MFI‟s was 
not significantly different for the MFI‟s with respect to source of funding. 
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Table 7.22: One-Way ANOVA for sustainability by type of Ownership 
Source of variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
72.72 
2723.14 
2795.86 
3 
110 
113 
24.24 
24.76 
 
0.979 
 
 
0.405 
 
 
 
7.7.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for sustainability of MFI by type of 
Ownership 
 
The results in Table 7.23 show that MFI‟s that were owned both local and foreign 
(23.28) investors obtained higher scores on sustainability. Contrary to expectations,   
even the wholly locally-owned MFI‟s (23.14) scored higher on sustainability than the 
wholly foreign owned MFI‟s (21.22).  
 
Table 7.23: Statistics of sustainability by type of Ownership 
Type of MFI ownership N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
Local 29 23.14 4.62 0.86 
Foreign 67 21.22 5.26 0.64 
Both 18 23.28 3.95 0.93 
Total 114 22.04 4.97 0.47 
 
 
The test for mean differences, was, however, not significant (F=2.12, df=2, 111, and 
p>0.05) as shown in Table 7.24. Thus at the 0.05 level, the sustainability of the 
MFI‟s with respect to type of ownership was not significant. 
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Table 7.24: One-Way ANOVA for sustainability by type of Ownership 
Source of variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
107.16 
2688.70 
2795.86 
2 
111 
113 
53.58 
24.22 
 
2.212 
 
 
0.114 
 
 
 
7.8 Multivariate analysis (MANOVA) of sustainability of MFI’s by factors of 
sustainability 
 
Using the multivariate test for mean differences (MANOVA), differences within 
groups (independent groups) as well as the interactive effects of more than a group in 
producing significant variations in the sustainability of the MFI‟s were carried out at 
the 0.05 level (Table 7.25). 
 
Table 7.25: MANOVA summary table for sustainability of MFI’s by type, 
source of funding and ownership 
Source of variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Within type of MFI 146.19 4 36.55 1.50 0.2070 
Within source of funding 34.21 3 11.40 0.47 0.7043 
Within type of ownership 93.87 2 46.93 1.93 0.1505 
Type of MFI versus source 
of funding 70.94 2 35.47 1.46 0.2373 
Type of MFI  versus 
ownership 53.91 4 13.48 0.55 0.6960 
Source of funding versus 
ownership 0.64 1 0.64 0.03 0.8718 
Type of MFI versus source 
of funding versus 
ownership 0.00 0 * * * 
Error (Sustainability) 2307.68 95 24.29 
  Total (Sustainability) 2795.86 113 
   * Not enough groups 
 
 
7.8.1 MANOVA of Type of MFI 
 
The main effect of type of MFI was not significant at the 0.05 level (F=1.50, df = 
4,113, and p>0.05) as shown in Table 7.25. Thus even though the S&L companies 
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obtained a higher score on sustainability than the FNGO‟s, RB, CU and the Susu 
companies, the differences in the mean scores were due to chance (see Table 7.16). 
Therefore at the 95% significance level, there were no differences in the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s with respect to type of MFI. 
 
 
7.8.2 MANOVA of Source of Funding 
 
Also the main effect of source of funding was not significant at the 0.05 level 
(F=0.47, df = 3,113, and p>0.05) (Table 7.25). Thus although the MFI‟s that were 
funded by personal and member contributions obtained a higher score on 
sustainability than those funded by donor; personal and donor; member contributions 
and market borrowings; the differences in the mean scores were not significant (see 
Table 7.21). Therefore at the 95% significance level, there were no differences in the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s with respect to source of funding. 
 
 
7.8.3 MANOVA of Type of Ownership 
 
The main effect of type of ownership did not show any significant differences at the 
0.05 level (F=1.93, df=2,113, and p>0.05) as shown Table 7.25. It was observed that 
contrary to expectations, the wholly locally-owned MFI‟s scored higher on 
sustainability than the wholly foreign-owned MFI‟s and those owned by both local 
and foreign investors but the differences were due to chance (see Table 7.25). 
Therefore at the 95% significance level, there were no differences in the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s with respect to type of ownership. 
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7.8.4 MANOVA of Type of MFI and source of funding 
 
The interactive effect of type of MFI and source of funding did not produce any 
significant differences in the sustainability of the MFI (F=1.46, df=2,113, and 
p>0.05) as shown in Table 7.25.  
 
7.8.5 MANOVA of Type of MFI and type of ownership 
 
Also, the interactive effect of type of MFI and type of ownership did not produce any 
significant differences in the sustainability of the MFI (F=0.55, df=4,113, and 
p>0.05) as shown in Table 7.25.  
 
 
7.8.6 MANOVA of source of funding and ownership 
 
The result in Table 7.25 also shows that the interactive effect of source of funding 
and ownership did not produce any significant differences in the sustainability of the 
MFI (F=0.03, df = 1,113, and p>0.05).  
 
 
7.8.7 MANOVA of type of MFI, source of funding and type of ownership  
It was not possible to ascertain the interactive effect of all three independent 
variables namely type of MFI, source of funding and type of ownership at the same 
time (Table 7.25). This was because there were not enough data for computations of 
means, standard deviations, sum of squares and ultimately the F-statistics for some of 
the levels of groupings of these variables.  This would have been possible if the 
sample had enough representations of the types of MFI‟s (such as credit unions, 
savings and loans, and rural banks), and source of funding. 
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7.9: Confirmation of Research Model 
 
A regression analysis was used to establish and test the significance of the 
relationships between  sustainability, and performance of the MFI‟s; and the five 
factors of sustainability/success namely institutional characteristics (IC), agency cost 
(AC), business strategy (BS), environment and governance (EG) and level of success 
(S). The regression model also helped to ascertain which of the factors significantly 
predicted sustainability and success of the MFI‟s. 
The data for the study revealed a significant relationship between the performance of 
the MFI‟s and the five factors (Wald chi2=46.53, Prob> chi2=0.000 p<0.05). Also, an 
R
2 
(Nagelkerke) =0.447 (44.70%) was recorded and this corresponds with a high 
regression coefficient of r=0.6685 (66.85%) (Table 7.14). Thus, 66.85% of the 
changes in the performance of the MFI‟s can be explained by all or some of the five 
factors namely institutional characteristics (IC), agency cost (AC), business strategy 
(BS), environment and governance (EG) and level of success (S). The test of 
significance for the regression model yielded chi
2 
(8) = 22.42, Prob>chi
2
=0.004. This 
means that at the 0.05 level, the regression model was significant in establishing a 
formal relationship between the performance of the MFI‟s and the five factors. 
Without institutional characteristics and agency costs variable, the t-statistics was 
significant at the 0.05 level. This means that even without institutional characteristics 
and agency costs the other factors combined to significantly predict sustainability of 
MFIs. It is significant to note that when the remaining variables kept dropping one 
after the other, the three other variables combined significantly to predict 
sustainability (see section 7.5.5, 7.5.6, 7.5.7, 7.5.8). 
 The results in Table 7.17, revealed positive relationships between sustainability and 
three out of the five factors of sustainability used for the study. All these 
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relationships were significant at the 0.05 level. The results further show the 
relationship between pairs of the independent factors. Though some of the 
correlations amongst the independent factor variables were significant, 
multicollinearity (or collinearity) was not an issue since the regressions were not 
extremely high and did not in any way affect the relative contribution of each 
predictor variable to the success of the model. 
Fig 7.3 shows the research model which details the inter-relationship observed 
between the dependent variable (sustainability) and independent variables 
(institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, 
environment/governance and success). The positive relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variables and the positive inter-relationships between 
the dependent variables is a proof of the research model. The nature of the line 
indicates the strength of the relationship between the variables. The study therefore 
confirms the research model to a considerable extent. 
 
 
 
             Fig 7.3: The research model as observed from the findings 
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7.10  Summary 
The chapter discussed findings of the study in the light of the literature reviewed as 
well as the empirical evidence and the facts gathered through our qualitative 
interviews conducted. The Subsidy Dependence Index showed a decreasing trend, 
though at a slow rate. This is an indication that most of the MFIs will continue to rely 
on subsidies for a long time to come. The Multiple factor analysis established that the 
regression model was significant in establishing a relationship between the 
dependent variable, Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and the predictors. Using 
single factor analysis, the regression model was used to establish a formal 
relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. 
The use of ANOVA revealed that there were not significant differences in the 
sustainability of the type of MFI. Regarding the source of funds and type of 
ownership, it revealed that even though there were differences in the level of 
sustainability of MFIs, they were not significant. The use of MANOVA confirmed 
that at the 95% significance level, sustainability of the Savings and Loans institutions 
was higher than the rest, they were not significant. MANOVA of source of funding 
and ownership also revealed no significant differences. The research model was to a 
large extent confirmed. 
LEGEND 
(ns) means hypothesis not supported                  (s) means hypothesis was supported 
 
▬▬▬ Relationship was significant              Relationship was not significant
  
            Shows the path of the hypotheses 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF MFI’S 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focused on the institutional characteristics of the MFI‟s. The chapter has 
been organized into two. The first section deals with the characteristics of the 
institutions; ownership, more funding, motivation for setting up, clientele base, 
sources of income and information gathering.  The second section looks at the results 
of the hypotheses and the impact of the institutional characteristics on the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s.  
 
8.2 Descriptive Analysis of Institutional Characteristics of the MFI’s 
 
The descriptive analysis covers the various institutional characteristics of the MFI‟s, 
namely ownership,  increased funding, executives‟ motivation, clientele type, and 
information gathering; and how these impact on micro financing by the MFI‟s. 
 
 
8.2.1 Ownership of MFI’s 
 
The type of ownership of the MFI‟s were made of 67 (58.8%) foreign owned, 29 
(25.4%) locally owned, and few, that is 18 (15.8%) that were owned by both foreign 
and local investors as shown in Table 8.1.  
 Out of the 81 FNGOs sampled, 66 (81.48%) were foreign owned, 3 (3.70%) were 
local entrepreneurs and 12 representing 14.83% were both foreign and locally 
owned. There were 10 sampled Savings and Loans Institutions and only 1(10%) was 
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totally foreign owned, with 3 (30%) locally owned and the remaining 6 (60%) had 
both local and foreign ownership. 
The Credit Unions, the Rural Banks and the Susu companies were all locally owned 
emphasizing the regulatory limitation of foreigners entering the sector of micro 
financing. 
 
Table 8.1: Ownership of the MFI’s 
Ownership Frequency Percentage 
Foreign  
67 58.8  
Local 
29 25.4 
Both foreign and local 
18 15.8 
Total 
114 100.0 
 
8.2.2  Geographical spread 
 
Geographical spread was based on the number of regional presence and a proxy for 
resources in terms of number of financial products and lending capacity where larger 
firms usually possess more products and higher lending capacity together with 
institutional resources. 
 
On regional presence, when the MFI‟s were asked whether they had branches across 
the country, 22 (91.7%) answered in the affirmative as against only 2 (8.3%) who 
stated otherwise. Thus the majority of the MFI‟s had branches or other outlets across 
the country. 
 
The results in Table 8.2 shows the geographical spread or the regional presence of 
the MFIs sampled. 
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Table 8.2: Geographical Spread of the MFI’s 
Regions Number of MFIs Percentage 
Greater Accra 33 28.9 
Central 10 8.8 
Western 10 8.8 
Eastern 12 10.5 
Ashanti 15 13.2 
Northern 19 16.7 
Volta 15 13.2 
Total 114 100.0 
 
The most representation of the MFIs was from the Greater Accra region (28.9%) 
while the least representations were from Central and Western regions with 8.8% 
each. Generally, the MFI‟s covered towns and cities in 7 out of the 10 regions of 
Ghana – namely Greater Accra, Eastern, Volta, Ashanti, Northern, Brong Ahafo, and 
Western regions and the majority had branches across the country. This was 
confirmed in our qualitative interview by the Chief Executive Officer of one of the 
FNGOs as stated below: 
„‟ We (referring to the MFI) are currently operating in 10 districts of Ghana but in 5 regions    to be 
specific, but  we have a fund springing up in the whole of the Eastern region which will become 
operational very soon.‟‟             
 
 
8.2.3  MFI’s motivation for setting up 
 
The data on whether or not the MFI‟s executives motivation for setting up was to 
grow and empower the poor, revealed that whilst 76% of the MFIS‟s executives were 
indeed motivated to establish the institution because of the desire to grow and 
empower the poor, 14.0% were not and the remaining 10% cited business and 
training as the major motivating factor for establishing the institutions. Thus, the 
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level of motivation to grow and empower the poor among the MFI”s sampled was 
somewhat average. One Chief Executive stated that: 
„‟ We were set up to transform the economically active into sustainable livelihood. That is the key 
objective but we have Christian mission alongside. However the Christian consideration does not 
override business assessment and thinking‟‟  
Another Chief Executive stated that:  
„„We want to encourage the habit of savings among the poor so they can accumulate funds and get out 
of poverty. So savings is the key objective and secondly to give out loans, credit out of the savings 
they have accumulated. So we give out loans for all purposes, business, education, housing, health and 
you would not believe it; people think Africans need money to establish businesses, no. 30% of the 
loans we give go into education, 25% into business, 20% into housing and 15% into agriculture and 
the balance go into death, burial and other social functions. So people just decide to think for the poor 
people, that they are looking for money to establish businesses, but the poor needs more than just 
establishing businesses. They do not need loanable funds, they need financial services.‟‟ 
 
Table 8.3: Reasons for establishing MFI’s 
Reason for establishment Frequency Percentage 
Business development 16 14.0 
Economic empowerment of rural dwellers 54 48 
To help women 32 28 
Provide training in SME 12 10 
Total 114 100 
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8.2.4 Clientele type 
 
The results in Table 8.4 show that close to half of the MFI‟s had traders and farmers 
as their clients. 
 
Table 8.4: Type of Clients of the MFI’s 
Type of Clients Rural Urban Total 
Farmers 
9 (15.3%) - 9 (7.9% 
Farmers and traders 
22 (37.3%) 13 (23.6%) 35 (30.7%) 
Farmers, traders & artisans 
8 (13.6%) - 8 (7.0%) 
All types of clients 
10 (16.9%) - 10 (8.8%) 
Traders 
1 (1.7%) 28 (50.9%) 29 (25.4%) 
Traders and artisans 
- 10 (18.2%) 10 (8.8%) 
School youth savings clubs 
- 2 (3.6%) 2 (1.8%) 
Government  Employees/other 
salaried workers 
9 (15.3%) 2 (3.6%) 11 (9.6%) 
Total 59 (100%) 55 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
The clients of the MFI‟s were made up of a high representation of urban traders 
(50.9%) with the least representation being rural traders (1.7%). It can also be 
observed that generally the MFI‟s had more rural clients (59) than urban clients (55) 
and the dominant clientele were traders who alone accounted for about a quarter 
(25.4%). 
One of the pillars of microfinance is poverty alleviation among the rural poor. 
According to Schreiner and Colombet (2001) microfinance is an attempt to improve 
access to small deposits and small loans for poor households neglected by banks. 
Therefore, microfinance involves the provision of financial services such as savings, 
loans and insurance to poor people living in both urban and rural settings who are 
unable to obtain such services from the formal sector.  The apparent preference of 
traders by MFIs and also their visible presence in the urban areas (48.25%) as 
opposed to the rural areas (51.75%) could be due to their sensitivity of risk and 
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repayments difficulties. The urban clients are perceived to be of high risk. This was 
echoed by one of the Chief Executives during the qualitative interview stage when he 
said: 
„‟You see over the years we have come to realize that the rural terrain is difficult to manage 
in terms of cash mobilization and repayments due to the extreme poverty prevailing there. 
Again in the rural areas their main business is farming which also depends on the weather 
which cannot be predicted with certainty. So we try to balance this risk with other ventures 
we consider less risky‟‟ 
 
8.2.5  Access to alternative sources of funding of MFI’s  
 
Funding is critical to the activities of micro finance; and it is therefore necessary that 
MFIs have access to other sources of finance well after their startup for 
sustainability. The researchers therefore asked the MFI‟s whether they had access to 
alternative sources of funds. In response whilst 85 (74.6%) affirmed that they had 
other sources of funds, 29 (25.4%) stated that they had no alternate sources of 
funding. Thus the majority of the MFIs had access to alternative sources of finance 
apart from their startup capital. Apart from the Savings and Loans, the Susu 
institutions and a few FNGOs all responded that they do benefit from overseas grants 
and sometimes from government sources.  
 
8.2.6  MFI’s Information Gathering 
Table 8.5: Volume of information on clients  
Volume of 
information 
Frequency Percent 
Just Enough 25 21.9 
Enough 67 58.8 
A lot 22 19.3 
Total 
114 
100.0 
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It appears the MFIs had adequate information about their clients.  In response to the 
question as to how much information the MFIs had about their clients, 58.8% 
indicated enough, 19.3% intimated that they had a lot of information whilst 21.9% 
stated they had enough information about their clients.  Thus, the majority of the 
MFIs had adequate information about their clients.    
 
Table 8.6: Source of information on clients  
Source of information Frequency Percent 
Personal volunteering 
5 
4.0 
Visit to clients and group members 
100 
88.0 
Other sources (opinion leaders, etc) 
9 
8.0 
Total 
114 100 
 
On how they obtained information about their clients, 100 (88.0%) of the MFI‟s 
indicated that they do so through visit and from the group members which the clients 
belong.  Only 5 (4.0%) stated that they obtained information on their clients through 
personal volunteering by the clients (Table 8.7).Thus the use of group collaterals 
guaranteed the MFI‟s access to adequate information about their clients.  This is how 
one Chief Executive Officer responded to the question of how they obtain 
information about their clients: 
„‟ As part of the feasibility studies, we sometimes go to market queens, chiefs, opinion leaders and 
the clients themselves. When we talk to them they are able to come up with some few tips or they 
may even direct you to somebody who will have certain information about certain people.‟‟ 
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8.3 Hypotheses testing on impact of institutional characteristics on 
Sustainability of MFI 
 
In order to ascertain the importance of institutional characteristics as reported by 
Meyer (2002) and Armandariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), the research question 
posed was, what were the major characteristics of the firm that impact on 
sustainability and success of MFIs? For the purpose of detailed analysis, institutional 
characteristics were decomposed into six major factors namely ownership, 
geographical spread, motivation of the MFI, clientele type, alternative funding and 
quality of information gathering. As a result of this, six hypotheses were postulated 
and tested on institutional characteristics and the sustainability of the MFI‟s. 
 
8.3.1  Type of ownership and Sustainability of MFI’s 
 
The type of ownership of MFI‟s may impact on their sustainability in diverse ways, 
but more positively especially where the ownership is foreign and from a developed 
rather than from a developing country. The foreign owned MFI‟s may bring to bear 
the benefits of highly skilled personnel, access to and regular inflow of large capital, 
technology, among others compared to a wholly owned local MFI. It was therefore 
hypothesized that: 
H (1a) If the ownership of a microfinance institution in sub-Saharan Africa is 
foreign, then sustainability factors will significantly increase. 
 
Table 8.7: Type of MFI ownership and sustainability of MFI 
 
Type of MFI ownership 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total 
Yes No  
Local 26 (24.5%) 3 (37.5%) 29 (25.4%) 
Foreign 63 (59.4%) 4 (50.0%) 67 (58.8%) 
Both 17 (16.0%) 1 (12.5%) 18 (15.8%) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114(100%) 
X
2
=0.664 , df=2, p=0.718 
182 
 
The results in Table 8.8 shows no significant (X
2
=0.664, df=2, p>0.05) relationship 
between type of MFI ownership and sustainability. It was observed that more MFI‟s 
that were foreign owned (59.4%) were more likely to remain in business than their 
counterparts that were locally owned (24.5%). In contrast, among the MFIs that were 
not likely to remain in business, 50.0% were foreign owned whilst 37.5% were 
locally owned. In effect, sustainability of the MFIs was not significantly dependent 
on the type of ownership. Therefore at the 0.05 level, the hypothesis that if the 
ownership of a microfinance institution in sub-Saharan Africa is foreign, then 
sustainability factors will significantly increase was not supported.   
 
 
8.3.2  Increased lending by MFI’s and sustainability  
 
The impact of increased lending by the MFI on the sustainability and success was 
also investigated. Increased lending was used as a measure of the MFIs ability to 
boost their income. In line with this it was hypothesized that: 
H(1b): If microfinance institutions commit more funds to lending then sustainability 
factors will significantly increase. 
 
 
 
Table 8.8: Propensity to commit more funds to lending and sustainability of MFI 
 
Propensity to commit more funds to 
lending 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 88 (83.0%) 8 (100%) 95 (84.1%) 
No 18 (17.0%) - 18 (15.9%) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
X
2
=1.631, df=1, p=0.202 
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The results in Table 8.8 show the propensity of MFI‟s to commit more funds to 
lending and their possible sustainability. It can be observed that the majority (83.0%) 
of the MFI‟s with propensity to commit more funds to lending were more likely to 
remain in business.  Contrary to expectation, all the MFIs who were perceived as not 
sustainable (8) were ready to commit more funds to lending; probably due to the 
increasing bad debts. The tests result revealed no significant relationship between the 
propensity to commit more funds to lending and the sustainability of the MFI (X
2 
= 
1.631, df = 1, p> 0.05). Therefore at 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if 
microfinance institutions commit more funds to lending then sustainability factors 
will significantly increase was not supported. 
 
 
8.3.3  Motivation of the MFI’s and sustainability  
 
The fundamental principle underlying the establishment of microfinance is poverty 
alleviation and economic empowerment through the provision of small loans 
especially among rural dwellers. The study therefore investigated the reason for 
establishing the MFI‟s and it was hypothesized that: 
H (1c): If the motivation of the MFI is to grow and empower the poor is high then            
sustainability activities will significantly increase. 
 
The results in Table 8.9 show the relationship between the motivation of the MFI to 
grow and empower the poor and the sustainability of the MFI.  
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Table 8.9: Motivation to grow and empower the poor and sustainability of MFI 
 
Motivation for setting up MFI 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Business development 16 (15.1%) - 16 (14.0%) 
Poverty alleviation 54 (50.9%) - 54 (47.4%) 
To help women 24 (22.6%) 8 (100%) 32 (28.1%) 
Provide training in SME 12 (11.3%) - 12 (10.5%) 
Total  106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
X
2
=22.05, df=3, p=0.05 
 
It can be observed that whilst the majority (50.9%) of the MFI‟s who were motivated 
to grow and empower the poor were perceived as sustainable, and those MFI‟s who 
were not motivated to grow and empower the poor were perceived as not sustainable. 
Eight (8) MFIs were perceived as not sustainable but were motivated to grow and 
empower women. The chi-square test yielded   X
2 
=22.05, df=3, p<0.05. This means 
that there was a significant relationship between the motivation of the MFI to grow 
and empower the poor and the sustainability of the MFI. Thus, those MFI‟s who 
were motivated to grow and empower the poor were not likely to collapse. Therefore 
at the 0.05 level, the hypothesis that if the motivation of the MFI is to grow and 
empower the poor is high then sustainability activities will significantly increase was 
supported.  
 
 
8.3.4  Clientele type and Sustainability of MFI’s 
 
The sustainability and success of MFI‟s to some extent depends on the ability of the 
clients to pay back their loans. As a result MFI‟s prefer clients whose economic 
activities were less risky and predictable.  It is therefore not surprising that the 
majority of MFI‟s is pro-urban rather than pro-rural; and also prefer urban traders 
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to clients (such as farmers) whose economic activities are unpredictable and 
depended on natural environmental or weather conditions. It was therefore 
hypothesized that: 
H (1d): If MFI‟s lending to traders is high then sustainability factors will 
significantly increase. 
 
 
 
Table 8.10: Clientele type and sustainability of MFI 
 
Type of clients 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Farmers 9 (8.5%)  9 (7.9%) 
Farmers and traders 28 (26.4%) 8 (100%) 36 (31.6%) 
Farmers, traders & artisans 8 (7.5%) - 8 (7.0%) 
All 10 (9.4%) - 10 (8.8%) 
Traders 29 (27.4%) - 29 (25.4%) 
Traders and artisans 10 (9.4%) - 10 (8.8%) 
School youth savings clubs 2 (1.9%) - 2 (1.8%) 
Government  Employees/other 
salaried workers 
10 (9.4 %.) - 10 (8.8%) 
Total  106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
X
2
=21.12, df=7, p=0.012 
Lending to traders alone accounted for over a quarter (25.4%) of the responses on the 
clientele type of the MFIs. The results in Table 8.10 further show that a little over 
half of the MFIs who were perceived as sustainable were those who lend to traders 
(27.4%). There were eight (8) MFIs who were perceived as not sustainable and who 
had farmers and traders as their clientele.  A cursory look at the results also shows 
that traders were the dominant clientele of the MFIs. The test results revealed that 
sustainability was significantly (X
2
=21.12, df=7, p=0.012) tied to the clientele type 
(specifically traders). Therefore at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if 
MFI‟s lending to urban traders is high then sustainability factors will significantly 
increase was supported. 
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8.3.5  Alternative source of finance and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
In developing countries, access to capital and funding for business operation has long 
remained a crucial factor to the performance and sustainability of businesses. And for 
an MFI, access to large capital base, will obviously impact positively on the level 
and depth of outreach. In line with this it was hypothesized that:  
H (1e): If MFI‟s have access to alternative source of finance, then their 
sustainability will significantly increase. 
 
 
 
Table 8.11: Access to alternative source of finance and sustainability of MFI 
 
Access to alternative source of 
finance  
Sustainability of MFI   
Total Yes No 
Yes  77 (72.6%) 8 (100%) 85 (74.6%) 
No 29 (27.4%) - 29 (25.4%) 
Total  106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
X
2
=2.94, df=1, p=0.087 
The results in Table 8.11 show that 72.6% of the MFIs who had access to alternative 
source of finance were perceived as sustainable. Also, all the MFIs who had 
alternative sources of funds and yet believed that they were not sustainable (8); was 
probably due to uncertainty about their continuous donor funding. The test results 
revealed that sustainability of MFI was not significantly dependent on access to 
alternative sources of finance (X
2
=2.94, df=1, p=0.087). Thus, at the 95% significant 
level, the hypothesis that if funding of MFI‟s increase, then their sustainability will 
significantly increase was not supported. 
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8.3.6  Information Gathering and Sustainability of MFI’s 
 
The quality of information gathered by MFI‟s on their clientele help in determining 
borrower characteristics, risk projection, loan monitoring and verification of the level 
of returns on credit facilities granted to the clients. The information gathering 
processes and verification procedures of MFI‟s are therefore very crucial since it is 
the first and main source of contact between the MFI‟s and their clients. Though it 
behoves on the client to provide very detailed information about themselves when 
accessing credit facilities, it is equally important that the MFI‟s have very robust 
procedures or mechanisms for verifying the information provided by their clients. In 
line with this, it was hypothesized that: 
H (1f) If MFI‟s obtain enough information about their clients, then sustainability 
factors will increase. 
 
Table 8.12: Adequacy of clients’ information and sustainability of MFI 
 
Adequacy of clients‟ information 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Just enough  17 (16.0%) 8 (100%) 25 (21.9%) 
Enough 67 (63.2%) - 67 (58.8%) 
A lot 22 (20.8%) - 22 (19.3%) 
Total  106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
X
2
=30.63, df=2, p=0.000 
Clearly, the majority (63.2%) of the MFIs who obtained enough information about 
their clients were perceived as sustainable. Also the entire MFIs (8,100%) who 
obtained just enough information about their clients were perceived as not 
sustainable (Table 8.12). The test results revealed that sustainability was significantly 
dependent on adequacy of client‟s information (X2 =30.63, df=2, p=0.000). Therefore 
at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if MFI‟s obtain enough information 
about their clients, then sustainability factors will increase was supported. 
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  8.4  : Summary for Hypotheses on Institutional Characteristics  
 
Hypotheses 
Impact on  
sustainability 
of MFI 
Test 
Results 
H (1a) If the ownership of a micro financial 
institution in sub-Saharan Africa is foreign, then 
sustainability factors will significantly increase. 
 
Positive 
 
Not 
significant 
H (1b) If microfinance institutions commit more 
funds to lending then sustainability factors will 
significantly increase. 
 
Positive 
 
Not 
significant 
H (1c) If the motivation of the MFI is to grow 
and empower the poor is high than sustainability 
activities will significantly increase. 
 
Positive 
 
significant 
H (1d): If MFI‟s lending to traders is high then 
sustainability factors will significantly increase. 
 
Positive 
 
significant 
H (1e): If MFI‟s have access to alternative 
sources of funds, then their sustainability will 
significantly increase. 
 
Positive 
 
Not 
significant 
H (1f) If MFI‟s obtain enough information on 
clients, then sustainability factors will increase. 
 
Positive 
  
significant 
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter covered descriptive analysis of the following characteristics of 
institutions engaged in microfinance: ownership, more funding, motivation for 
setting up, lending, alternative funding and information gathering. The various 
hypotheses relating to institutional characteristics were also tested and a summary of 
the result tabulated under section 8.4. 
On ownership of MFIs, it became evident that ownership type was not extremely 
important in the sustainability of MFIs. On whether committing more funds will 
ensure sustainability while 88 (83.0%) agreed that it will lead to sustainability, 18 
(17.0%) said it will not necessary lead to sustainability. Most of the Executives 
considered poverty alleviation as their primary motive and also affirmed that they 
were sustainable. 
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The single most dominant clientele were traders (27.4%) and even though all the 
MFIs agreed it was a more favoured area and critical for sustainability. On alternate 
sources of finance, though critical to the operations of MFIs, was considered as not 
too critical to the sustainability of MFIs, so also was information on clients. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
AGENCY COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF MFI’S 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focused on the analysis of data on agency cost of the MFIs. This covers 
the MFI‟s contractual agreements with clients and the nature of the agreement, and 
the number of branches across the country. It also looks at the results of the 
hypotheses on the impact of agency cost on the sustainability of the MFI‟s.  
 
9.2 Descriptive Analysis of Agency Costs of the MFI’S 
 
The descriptive analysis covers the various sources of income or financing relied 
upon by the MFI‟s, subsidy dependence, depth and breadth of operations in terms of 
number of branches, contractual agreements, screening and the twin issues of 
screening and selection (that is dealing with moral hazard and adverse selection), and 
enforcement (that is dealing with repayment and default rates).  
 
 
9.2.1 Other Sources of Income  
 
When asked whether they engaged in other income generating activity such as 
investments, apart from their core activity, 85 (74.6%) answered in the affirmative 
(Table 9.1). They explained that due to the need to meet statutory liquidity 
requirements, and the need to pay competitive interests on members‟ savings and 
shares, they engage in other income investment activities to increase their income. 
On the other hand 29 (25.4%) of the MFI‟s indicated that they do not engage in other 
income generating activities, because they want to concentrate on their core business 
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and focus on what they do better as organizations whose mission is to help to reduce 
poverty. 
 
Quizzed as to whether engaging in other income generating activities and creating 
job opportunities were strategies to reduce risks, 90.9% as against 9.1% answered in 
the affirmative. Thus, the majority of the MFI‟s who engage in other income 
generating activities do so as a measure reduce risk. 
 
Table 9.1: Alternative sources of Income 
Other Sources of income Frequency Percentage 
Yes 85 74.6 
No 29 25.4 
Sometimes - - 
Total 114 100.0 
 
 
The confirmation of generating more income apart from the on-lending rate are, 
captured in two quotes below by two Chief Executives during the exploratory 
research: 
 
„‟Yes apart from on-lending interest we also get commissions and fees. We earn interest from the 
deposits we mobilize from our clients and the public for our bank. You see apart from the fact that 
they are sponsoring us we earn commission on the funds we mobilize for them‟‟. 
 
„‟ Sometimes we also look at business ventures that are very lucrative. When the people come to us to 
take money to do business, in course of interviewing and interacting with them , we get to know areas 
that are good for business and we either go in also or we collaborate with them to invest more‟‟ 
Quizzed as to whether engaging in other income generating activities and creating 
job opportunities were strategies to reduce risks, 90.9% as against 9.1% answered in 
the affirmative. Thus, the majority of the MFI‟s who engage in other income 
generating activities do so as a measure to reduce risk. 
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9.2.2  Investments in Financial Securities 
 
Responding to a question on the investments in financial securities, only 43 (37.7%) 
of the MFIs indicated that they engaged in investments such as treasury bills. The 
data on the rate of investments (Table 9.2) indicated that the majority (68.3%) of 
those MFIs who invested in treasury bills did so very often (every 3 months on the 
average). 
 
  Table 9.2: Investment in Financial Securities 
Response Frequency Percentage 
Yes 28 68.3 
No 8 19.5 
Sometimes 5 12.2 
Total 43 100.0 
 
On the other hand, the majority of the MFIs that is 71 (62.3%) stated that they did 
not invest in financial activities. Thus, investment in financial securities were not a 
priority of the majority of the MFI‟s as a means of raising extra income to support 
their micro financing activities. Those MFIs who invested in financing activities 
advanced reasons such as the need to meet some of their operational costs. Some of 
the MFIs (Rural banks) are required by regulation to invest a certain percentage of 
their mobilizations in treasury bills. This is what one Chief Executive said during 
the exploratory research: 
„We invest in treasury bills and term deposits as a backup for us to fall on in any emergency 
situation.  We however ensure that we always have enough funds to meet the demands of our 
clients‟‟. 
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9.2.3  Level of Subsidy Dependence 
 
When the respondents were asked to rate their institutions‟ dependence on subsidies 
from donors, 36.8% stated highly and 19.3% described it as average. (Table 9.3).   
 
  Table 9.3: Level of Subsidy Dependence 
 
 
The results in Table 9.3, thus show that the majority of the respondents rated their 
institution‟s dependence on subsidies from donors between average and high. This 
confirms an earlier observation that donor funds were the major source of funds for 
the majority of the MFIs. (Chapter 7 SDI). This is one of the comments on level of 
subsidy by one Chief Executive: 
„‟There are no subsidies for the individual credit unions. But the apex body yes. I will say from 1970 
to 1983 we were supported by so many agencies, especially Konrad Foundation. But in 1983 they 
pulled out because they thought we were self-sufficient, which was not the case, so it failed. It almost 
went into liquidation. In 1988 the Canadians came in, I mean the Canadian Cooperative Association. 
They became our major donors and in 1994 they went into bilateral programme with the Government 
of Ghana to revive credit unions in Ghana. At this point in time credit union started growing in Ghana. 
They also ended the project in 2001 at which time CUA was about 60% self-sufficient and the other 
40% we had to struggle for it. But now I can say we are about 90% self-sufficient.‟‟ 
 
Further analysis revealed that the sustainability of the MFIs was tied to subsidy from 
donors. (X
2
=19.08, df=8 and p<0.05). 
 
 
 
Level of Subsidy Frequency Percentage 
Never 21 18.4 
Rarely 6 5.3 
Low 19 16.7 
Average 22 19.3 
Highly 46 40.4 
Total 114 100.0 
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Table 9.4: Level of Subsidy dependence and level of sustainability 
 of MFI 
Level of 
Subsidy 
dependence 
Level of Sustainability of MFI Total 
Successful Moderately 
successful 
Fairly 
successful 
 
Never 15 (26.3%) 6 (11.8%) - 21 (18.4%) 
Rarely 6 (10.6%)  - 6 (5.3%) 
Low 6 (10.6%) 11 (21.6%) 2 (33.3%) 19 (16.7%) 
Average 7 (12.3%) 12 (23.5%) 3 (50.0%) 22 (19.3%) 
Highly 23 (40.4%) 22 (43.1%) 1 (16.7%) 46(40.4%)   
Total 57 (100%) 51(100%) 6 (100%) 114 (100%) 
  
 
It must be noted that the successes in terms of achievements made so far by the MFIs 
relate more to the provision of startup capital for the MFIs to begin operations. 
Beyond this, one would expect that the MFIs would operate profitably and be self 
financing for sustenance instead of continuing to rely on subsidy from donors for 
sustaining their operations. 
It was felt that the reasons why the MFIs were highly dependent on subsidy from 
donors were because most of the MFIs were foreign owned or partnered by foreign 
micro financing agencies or investors; and as a result their main source of finance 
was subsidy from donors. It was not clear how long the MFIs would be dependent on 
subsidies from donors and governments.  
 
9.2.4 Subsidy Exit Plans 
 
It was expected that the MFIs will rely on subsidies from donors for success for a 
while and enhance their services to become profitable and exit subsidy, but this was 
not the case with the MFIs studied. The data for the study revealed that only 39 
(34.2%) of the MFIs had plans of exiting the subsidy dependence from donors. The 
measures to exit subsidy included expanding the clientele base (20.5%), rely on on-
lending funds (41.0%), motivating staff to increase productivity (23.1%), formation 
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of credit union and investing in central finance facility for liquidity support (Table 
9.5).    
Table 9.5: Measures to exit subsidy dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, 48 (42.1%) of the MFIs who were dependent on subsidies from 
donors indicated that they had no plans to break the chain of the subsidy dependence, 
whilst the remaining 27 (23.7%) MFIs were those who did not or rarely depended on 
subsidy. The question that comes to mind is whether indeed the majority of the MFIs 
would survive if donor funds cease. 
One of the Chief Executives interviewed had this to say: 
 
„‟We have almost exited. We have a way of sustaining ourselves. We have an 
insurance product which insures all members‟ savings and loans and the premiums 
also support our operations. We have central finance facility and every CUA is 
required to deposit 5% of their collections with us so we can invest it to support the 
national association. We also have training departments which provides training at a 
fee. We also have audit department who provide services to Government for a fee. 
The major income is from the central finance facility and the insurance products. We 
charge them dues of one (1) Ghana cedi per member which is now accounting for 
7% of our total income.‟‟ 
 
 
 
Exit plans Frequency Percentage 
Expanding the clientele base 8 20.5 
Better monitoring and screening 4 10.3 
Investing in central finance facility 2 5.1 
Investing idle funds in securities 9 23.1 
Motivating staff to increase productivity 16 41.0 
Total 39 100.0 
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9.2.5  Nature of Relationship with Clients  
 
On their relationship with clients, the respondents made positive remarks.  The entire 
respondents either described their institutions relationship with their clients as 
cordial, very good or normal.  This indicates that there was a positive relationship 
between the MFI‟s and their clients.  One Chief Executive had this to say during our 
exploratory research: 
„‟We have a very good relationship with our clients. Our members are our priority 
that is why we always seek to satisfy them. When they apply for loans we grant it in 
less than 48 hours. It is not only loans, some people want good interest rates on their 
savings so we try to match the treasury bill rate or slightly below it.‟‟ 
 
9.2.6: Depth of Information about Clients 
 
It appears the MFIs had adequate information about their clients.  In response to the 
question as to how much information they had about their clients, 54.4% indicated a 
lot and 37.70% stated they had enough information about their clients whilst 7.9% 
indicated that they had just enough information about their clients. 
 
Table 9.6:  Depth of Information about Clients 
Depth of information Frequency Percentage 
Little - - 
Just Enough 9 7.9 
Enough 43 37.7 
A lot 62 54.40 
Total 114 100.0 
 
Thus, the majority of the MFIs had adequate information about their clients.   
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9.2.7  Methods of sourcing clients’ information  
 
On how they obtained information about their clients 88.0% of the MFI‟s indicated 
that they do so through visits and from the group members which the clients 
belong. Only 8.0% stated that they obtained information on their clients through 
tour of their catchment areas (Table 9.7).   
 
 
 
Table 9.7:  Depth of Information about Clients-Methods of sourcing 
Methods of sourcing information Frequency Percent 
Initial interviews 5 4.0 
Tours 9 8.0 
Visits from Group members 100 88.0 
Total 114 100.0 
 
 
Thus the use of group collaterals guaranteed the MFI‟s access to adequate    
information about their clients. 
 
9.2.8  Contractual Agreement with Clients 
 
When the MFIs were asked if they enter into contractual agreements with their 
clients, all the MFIs said they had one form of contract or another with the clients. 
The nature of these contracts is shown in Table 9.8. 
  
Table 9.8: Nature of Contractual agreement with clients   
Nature of Contractual agreement Frequency Percentage 
Group collateral 19 19.2 
Loan contract 15 15.2 
Legal contracts 39 39.4 
Loan repayments contracts 17 17.2 
Clients savings contract 9 9.1 
Total 99 100.0 
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Thus the majority of the MFIs enter into diversified contracts with their clients all 
aimed at enforcing repayments and reducing default rates. 
9.3 Hypotheses testing on impact of Agency Cost on Sustainability of MFI 
 
In an attempt to understand accurately how agency cost influence the sustainability 
of the MFI‟s, the question posed was; which agency cost factors impact significantly 
on the sustainability of MFI‟s. In an attempt to answer this question five hypotheses 
(H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d and H2e) were postulated and tested. The construct for agency 
cost were alternative sources of income, subsidy dependence, number of branches, 
contractual agreements and lender-borrower relationship. 
 
9.3.1  Alternative Sources of Income and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Critical to the sustainability of any organization is its ability to raise enough revenue 
to support its activities. According to Schreiner (2000) an MFI that is unable to 
generate enough revenue will collapse quickly after donor withdrawal. Even in the 
midst of permanent subsidy, increased revenue generation by an MFI will help 
increase outreach and expand its operations, enhance its sustainability and to provide 
for its target clients and ultimately reduce poverty. It was therefore hypothesized 
that: “If sources of income for MFI‟s increase, then their sustainability will also 
increase”. 
 
The results in Table 9.9 show the relationship between availability of alternative 
sources of income and the sustainability of the MFI‟s. It can be observed that for 
those MFI‟s that increased their sources of income, their sustainability was enhanced. 
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 Table 9.9: Alternative source of finance and sustainability of MFI 
 
Alternative source of finance  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 77 (72.6%) 8 (100%) 85 (74.6%) 
No 29 (27.4%) - 29 (25.4%) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
The majority (72.6%) of the MFIs who did not have access to alternative sources of 
income were perceived as sustainable compared to those who had access to 
alternative sources of finance (27.4%). Though the sustainability of the MFIs was 
found to be significantly dependent on the availability of alternative sources of 
finance apart from on-lending interest (X
2
=2.94, df=1 and p>0.05) this result was 
contrary to what was expected. Thus, sustainability was not necessarily dependent on 
access to alternative sources of income by engaging in other income activities. 
Therefore, at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if the sources of income 
for MFIs increase then their sustainability will also increase was not supported. 
 
9.3.2  Subsidy Dependence and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Even though Zeller and Meyer (2002) argued that financial self-sufficiency should be 
the objective of MFIs, they further stated that financial support and public 
subsidization may be justified if it is determined that it is the most cost-efficient 
method to reduce poverty. And Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) also 
state that much of the microfinance movement continues to take advantage of 
subsidies from donors and governments; meaning MFIs are largely dependent on 
subsidy. In line with this it was hypothesized that “If subsidy dependence among 
MFI‟s is high then their sustainability will also increase”. 
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In an attempt to ascertain the implications of subsidy dependence on the 
sustainability of the MFIs, the results in Table 9.10 were obtained. It can be observed 
that about 2 out of 5 MFIs (42.5%) who were highly dependent on subsidy were 
perceived as sustainable.  
 
Table 9.10: Level of Subsidy dependence and sustainability of MFI 
Level of Subsidy 
dependence 
Sustainability of MFI Total  
Yes No  
Never 21 (19.8%) - 21 (18.4%) 
Rarely 6 (5.7%) - 6 (5.3%) 
Low 12 (11.3%) 7 (87.5%) 19 (16.7%) 
Average 22 (20.8%) - 22 (19.3%) 
Highly 45 (42.5)% 1 (12.5%) 46 (40.4%) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
Clearly, the majority of the MFIs were highly or averagely dependent on subsidy 
were perceived as sustainable. The results thus show a significant relationship 
between sustainability of the MFIs and level of subsidy dependence (X
2
=31.25, df=4, 
p<0.05). Thus, MFIs who were highly dependent on subsidy from donors and 
governments were sustainable. Therefore at 95% significant level, the hypothesis that 
if subsidy dependence among MFI‟s is high then their sustainability will also 
increase was supported. 
 
9.3.3  Number of branches and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Business expansion is considered a measure of growth and sustenance on the basis of 
increased number of clientele and hence more businesses. Therefore in an attempt to 
ascertain whether the number of branches impact on sustainability, it was 
hypothesized that: “If MFI‟s increase their branches, then their sustainability will 
increase”. 
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The results in Table 9.11 show the relationship between number of branches 
nationwide and sustainability of the MFIs. It can be observed that most 62 (58.5%) 
of the MFIs did not have branches nationwide they were still perceived as 
sustainable. (Refer Appendix K). 
 
   
  Table 9.11: Availability of branches nationwide and sustainability of MFI 
 
Availability of branches 
nationwide 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 44 (41.5%) 8 (100%) 52 (41.5%) 
No 62 (58.5%) 0 62 (58.5%) 
Total 106 100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
The data clearly revealed no significant relationship between availability of branches 
nationwide and sustainability (X
2
=0.827, df=1 and p>0.05).  Thus, the sustainability 
of an MFI was not dependent on the number of branches it has nationwide. 
Therefore, at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if MFI‟s increase their 
branches, then their sustainability will increase was not supported.   
 
9.3.4  Contractual Agreements and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Typical of the lending-borrowing activities is the issue of contract agreement which 
form the basis of the lending. The contract agreement usually spells out all the terms 
and conditions or duties and responsibilities of both parties and the implications in 
case of violation of the agreement. Critical to the lender-borrower agreement on the 
part of the MFIs is the rigid enforcement of contract agreements which is expected to 
impact on the performance of the MFI. In line with this it was hypothesized that: 
“enforcement of rigid contractual agreements would lead to increased sustainability 
of MFI‟s”. 
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The assertion that enforcement of rigid contractual agreements would lead to 
increased sustainability was found to be true.  From Table 9.12, it is obvious that 
those MFI‟s who enforced rigid contractual agreements were more likely to remain 
in operation for the next few years as opposed to those who did not rigidly enforce 
contractual agreements. 
Table 9.12: Enforcement of rigid contract agreements and sustainability of MFI 
Enforcement of rigid 
contract agreements 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 89 (84.0%) 8 (100%) 97 (85.1%) 
No 17 (16.0%) - 17 (14.9) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
Thus the sustainability of the MFIs was not necessarily and significantly dependent 
on the enforcement of rigid contractual agreements (X
2
=1.51 df=1 and p>0.05). 
Therefore at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that enforcement of rigid 
contractual agreements would lead to increased sustainability of MFI‟s was not 
supported. 
 
9.3.5  MFIs-Clients Relationship and Sustainability  
 
It is believed that customer relationships are critical for the success of organizations; 
and especially in micro financing, trust and tact are key drivers. Indications are that if 
clients are handled with utmost professionalism their level of assurance increases and 
sense of recognition is enhanced. Therefore in an attempt to understand how lender-
borrower relationship impacts on the performance of the MFIs, it was hypothesized 
that: “Improved lender-borrower relationship will increase sustainability of MFI‟s”. 
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The results in Table 9.13 show the relationship between the data on lender-borrower 
relationship and sustainability of the MFIs. It can be observed that the majority (57.5 
%) of the MFIs who had very good relationship with their clients were perceived as 
sustainable.  
 
Table 9.13: Nature of MFIs-Clients Relationship and sustainability of MFI 
 
Nature of MFIs-Clients 
Relationship 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Normal 61 (57.5%) - 61 (53%) 
Good 13 (12.3%) 8(100%) 21 (18.4%) 
Cordial   6 (5.7%) - 6 (5.3%) 
Very cordial 26 (24.5%) - 26 (22.8%) 
Total   106 (100%) 8(100%) 114(100%) 
 
 
The results revealed a very significant relationship between lender-borrower and 
sustainability of MFI (X
2
=38.1 df=3 and p<0.05). Thus the sustainability of the MFIs 
was significantly dependent on improved relationship with their clients. This means 
that the better the relationship between the MFIs and their clients, the better their 
sustainability through repeat borrowing and referrals of prospective clients. 
Therefore, at the 95% significant level, the hypothesis that improved lender-
borrower relationship will increase sustainability of MFI‟s was supported. 
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   9.4: Summary Table for Hypotheses on Agency Cost on Sustainability  
 
Hypotheses 
Impact on 
sustainabil
ity of MFI 
Test 
Results 
H (2a): If sources of income for MFI‟s increase, 
then their sustainability will also increase. 
Positive Not 
significant 
H (2b) If subsidy dependence among MFI‟s is 
high then their sustainability will also increase. 
Positive significant  
H (2c) If MFI‟s increase their branches, then 
their sustainability will increase. 
Positive not 
significant 
H (2d) Enforcement of rigid contractual 
agreements would lead to increased 
sustainability of MFI‟s 
Positive not 
significant 
H (2e) Improved lender-borrower relationship 
will increase sustainability of MFI‟s 
Positive significant 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter covered descriptive analysis and discussions of findings of agency costs 
and sustainability of MFIs. The summary of the results is tabulated under section 9.4. 
 A number of Executives especially from the FNGOs and the Rural Banks rated 
subsidy as important in sustainability of MFIs. Almost all Executives did not 
consider rigid enforcement of contractual agreements but considered cordial lender-
borrower relationship as critical in the delivery of microfinance. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
BUSINESS STRATEGY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF MFI’S 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the analysis of data on the business strategies adopted by the 
MFIs and how it impacts on their success and sustainability. Although Smallbone 
(1993) posits that there is no single type of strategy which is associated with business 
growth, this study focused on certain management actions taken to influence its 
environments. The first part of the chapter thus looks at the descriptive analysis of 
business strategies of the MFI whilst the second part looks at the results of the 
hypotheses and how the business strategies impact on the sustainability of the MFIs. 
 10.2 Descriptive Analysis of business strategy 
 
The descriptive analysis covers the business strategies of the MFIs namely screening, 
use of group collateral, meetings with clients, measures for handling defaulters, peer 
monitoring and innovations in financial products.  
 
  10.2.1  Screening of Clients 
 
In response to the question as to whether the MFIs have any screening mechanisms 
in place, 92.1% answered in the positive whilst 9 (7.9%) answered in the negative. 
Those who did not have any structured or formal screening mechanisms in place 
were mostly the Susu operators, the credit unions and a few FNGOs. They gave 
various reasons. Regarding the Susu operators they contended that the clients were 
mostly market women who were known by their peers and they also reside within the 
same community and therefore there was no need for any form of rigid screening. 
The credit unions gave reasons to the effect that the clients were mostly members of 
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staff in a particular organization and were known. Again, in the event of default or 
the client disappearing, they can fall on their end of service benefits.  The results in 
Table 10.1 show the various screening mechanisms used by the majority of the MFIs. 
  
Table 10.1: Screening Mechanism used by MFIs 
 
 
 
 
It can be observed that a background check (60.0%) was the main screening 
mechanisms used by the MFIs.  When asked whether the screening mechanism 
differed from sector to sector, 91.7% answered in the affirmative as against 8.3% 
who stated otherwise. Those who had sector-specific screening mechanisms 
explained that it was so because their activities vary from sector to sector. During the 
exploratory research, one Chief Executive had this to say; 
„‟We have a stringent form of screening. We use our epicenters and the loan committees to weed out 
those we perceive as not credit worthy. And because we deal with all kinds of people who do different 
kinds of work, we are careful how we apply the screening mechanism. But generally it is about the 
same with slight modifications depending on the person, the work he or she does and the peculiar 
circumstance.‟‟ 
Another Chief Executive had this to say; 
We check your (client) family background, where you live and what you do for a living before we 
disburse loan‟‟ 
 
 
 
 
Type of Screening Mechanism Frequency Percent 
Background check 68 60.0 
Business inspection 23 20.0 
Interview/Verification 23 20.0 
Total 114 100.0 
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10.2.2  Annual loan disbursements to clients  
 
The results in Table 10.2 show the statistics of the loan disbursed by the MFI to the 
various clientele.  
   Table 10.2: Statistics of annual loan disbursement to clients     (GH C) 
Type of Clients Min Max Mode Average 
Farmers 100 14,600 200 4,220 
Traders 100 32,600 1,500 11,306 
Artisans 100 68,300 3,000 8,911 
Fisherman 500 17,200 500 5,550 
Others (salaried 
workers) 
500 17,200 500 2,000 
 
 
It can be observed that loans disbursed to farmers ranged between GH¢100 - GH¢ 
14,600 per annum with an annual average of GHC 4,220.  According to the MFI‟s 
the amount disbursed was informed by the fact that farming activities were annual 
and dependent on sale of farm produce.  Above all, farmers sometimes had problems 
acquiring land for farming.  These made it difficult and risky to grant bigger loans to 
farmers. 
 
Trading activities however attracted the highest annual loans disbursed of 32,600.  
This was because the loans were of short term, of up to six months durations, 
payments were prompt among traders and the risk of default was low particularly 
because the loans are usually for expansion or to take advantage of a coming festivity 
where buying and selling is likely to boom rather than as startup capital as in the case 
of farming.  
 
Annual total loans disbursed to artisans was among the second highest, ranging 
between GH ¢100 - GH ¢ 68,300.  This was because few women were artisans, 
payments were prompt since loans were of short duration and the facilities were 
mainly for buying inputs.  For fishermen, annual total loans disbursed ranged 
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between GH ¢500 - GH ¢17,200 with an annual average of GH ¢5,550.   This was 
because duration of the loans was short - up to 9 months and payments were made 
from sales made after each fishing expedition or fishing season. 
The group of clients that receive the least annual total loan of only GH ¢5,000 were 
salaried workers.  This was because their loans were of short duration; maximum 
nine (9) months and the loans were usually for emergencies such as payment of 
school fees, rent advance or payment of utility bills when faced with disconnection 
by utility service providers such as water and electricity.  Generally, the highest total 
annual loan was disbursed to traders whilst the least amount of loans were disbursed 
to salaried workers. 
 
 
10.2.3 Collateral 
 
In response to the question whether the MFI‟s use group guarantee  for lending, 
83(73.2%) answered in the affirmative (see Table 10. 3 for the nature of collateral).   
 Table 10.3: Nature of collateral 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the few (26.8%) who indicated that they did not use group as 
collateral stated that property and staff recognition rather than group membership 
was used as collateral for lending.  The FNGOs mostly used group guarantee as 
collateral, so that in the event that a member of a group defaults the remaining group 
members will be asked to pay the defaulted amount on behalf of the member. They 
Nature of collateral Frequency Percent 
Cash balance in account  16 13.2 
Compulsory savings/deposit mobilization 11 10.1 
Physical asset   4 3.5 
Group guarantee 83 73.2 
Total 114 100.0 
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sometimes demand a guarantor. One Chief Executive had this to say during the 
exploratory research: 
„‟We use the group liability concept mostly in the farming areas. But for the individual we also ask for 
someone to guarantee for you. Someone known to us already‟‟ 
 The Savings and Loans institutions use compulsory savings and deposits while the 
rural banks used the cash balance in the account of the client as a guarantee. The 
Susu organizations sometimes demand physical assets as collateral before loans are 
disbursed to clients.  
 
 
10.2.4  Meetings with clients 
  
The entire MFI‟s described their level of interaction with the group clients as 
frequent and also affirmed that they were very much involved in group activities. 
The entire MFI‟s also, affirmed that they had regular meetings with their clients. 
When the respondents were asked how often they had meetings with their clients; the 
results in Table 10.4 were obtained. 
 
Table 10.4: Meeting with clients  
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be observed that 80% of the MFI‟s met their clients weekly, 12.0% met them 
fortnightly whilst a further 8.0% also met monthly. Thus, the majority of the MFI‟s 
met with their clients frequently.  The MFI‟s indicated that they spent between 10 
minutes to 30 minutes or average of 20 minutes during their meetings with clients.  
Frequency of meeting with clients Frequency Percent 
1 month 9 8.0 
2 Week (fortnightly) 14 12.0 
1 Week (weekly) 91 80.0 
Total 114 100.0 
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Most of them explained that they did not take much of the time of the clients so as to 
allow them to go back to their places of work especially the traders and the farmers. 
Even with the salaried office workers, the MFIs stated that they did not spend too 
much time with them so as not to take their office hours. 
This is what one Chief Executive said during the exploratory survey: 
„‟ Our clients are mostly traders and farmers who have very little at their disposal. You see they also 
not too interested in long speeches as they see that waste of precious hours when they could be doing 
something productive to be able to pay back the loan they have taken. I will tell you of an experience 
we had at one of our centres. When we started there the attendance at our regular meetings was almost 
always 100%. With the passage of time the attendance started dropping. Some will not come but will 
send their regular cash repayments through the few who will come. When we investigated the gradual 
reduction in meeting attendances, they did not hesitate to tell us the meetings took too much of their 
time. When we agreed to limit the regular meetings to 20 minutes every two weeks the numbers 
increased again. You see they are not interested in long speeches‟‟ 
 
10.2.5  Purposeful use of loan and monitoring  
 
On how the MFI‟s ensure that clients use credit facilities for the purposes for which 
the loans were acquired the respondents mentioned that through discussions and 
report on activities, they were able to ensure adherence to the purposeful use of credit 
facilities by clients. Also by providing training for the client and regular field 
monitoring, the MFI‟s were able to ensure that borrowers used credit for purposes for 
which the loans were granted.   
 
When the respondents were asked whether they were personally involved in 
monitoring clients, 40% answered in the affirmative and explained that the purpose 
of the personal monitoring of clients was to ensure repayment. Thus, 60% of the 
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respondents were not directly involved in monitoring of clients; this was perhaps 
because the majority were top Executives of the MFIs sampled. 
 
10.2.6 Dealing with loan repayment and defaulters  
 
Responding to the question on how the MFI‟s ensure that default rates were kept to 
the barest minimum, the respondents stated among others, constant monitoring of 
payments, encouraging clients to save and through constant reminders. Also, some 
MFI‟s conduct market research, undertake frequent client appraisals, group trainings 
and monitoring of clients, use group collateral, enforcement of loan repayment 
schedules and prosecution of willful defaulters in an attempt to reduce default rates 
to the barest. Thus, the MFI‟s use diverse and multi-faceted techniques in ensuring 
low default rates. 
 
When asked whether their approaches to ensuring low default rates differed from 
sector to sector, only 21.4% answered in the affirmative. Thus, the majority (78.6%) 
of the MFI‟s indicated that they adopted the same strategies in minimizing default 
rates across sectors. Also, 84.6% as against 15.4% of the MFI‟s indicated that they 
employed the same strategies in minimizing default rates across sectors. Also, 84.6% 
as against 15.4% of the MFI‟s indicated that they employed the same default rates 
minimization strategies in all other communities in which they operated. This was so 
because, the communities were culturally the same, had similar economic activities, 
situations were similar and operating rules were standardized and aimed towards the 
same purpose. In effect, these required that the MFI‟s employed the same default rate 
minimization strategies across sectors and also across communities. 
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When asked whether their default minimization strategies were informed by past 
experiences, 90.9% answered in the affirmative whilst 9.1% stated otherwise. Thus, 
the majority of the MFI‟s affirmed that their choice of default rates minimization 
strategies which is employed across sectors and communities were significantly 
influenced by their past experiences. 
 
The respondents explained that from past experiences such as the belief by loan 
beneficiaries that the loans were from Government, delays in court actions with its 
attendant expenses as well as the intelligence gathered from the pilot programs they 
undertook, all informed their decisions to adopt the above strategies in order to 
minimize default rates. 
 
The respondents were quick to add that the default minimization strategies have so 
far been somewhat effective in improving loan repayments. According to them, what 
has worked most is the increased interaction with clients through group meetings 
where the clients are given the opportunity to enumerate their challenges so that 
appropriate repayment methods are fashioned out for them. This presupposes that 
micro financing requires very high individualized attention to clients in order to 
enhance the purposeful utilization, management and repayment of the loans. 
 
To ascertain the effectiveness of group collateral in enhancing loan repayments, the 
MFI‟s were asked how much role do groups play in enforcing repayments. In 
response, 62.5% stated average, whilst 37.5% stated very high. Thus, the MFI‟s 
opined that the use of groups was highly effective in enforcing loan repayments. 
 
Service providers adopt various strategies to enhance repeat-purchase by clients. All 
the world over, financial institutions always use level of risk and creditworthiness. In 
micro-financing, one strategy that is often used to increase loan disbursement is good 
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repayment record. In line with this the MFI‟s were asked whether they do increase 
loan amount disbursed to a client who has a good repayment record. In response, the 
majority (78.9%) of the MFI‟s affirmed that increases in loans disbursed to client 
over time depended on good repayment track record. On the other hand, only 21.1% 
of the MFI‟s stated that increases in loan disbursements were not tied to good 
repayment track record. 
 
The results in Table 10.5 show the mechanisms by which the MFI‟s deal with loan 
defaulters in case there is one. 
  Table 10.5 Dealing with defaulters 
Mechanisms for handling defaulters Frequency Percent 
By legal means 8 7.0 
Report to law enforcement agencies 20 17.6 
Group pays on behalf of defaulter 73 64.0 
Persistent warning letter/notices 3 2.6 
Group compels defaulter to pay 10 8.8 
Report defaulters to chiefs - - 
Total 114 100.0 
 
It can be observed that for group collaterals, either the group compels the defaulter to 
pay (8.8%) or the group pays on behalf of the defaulter (64.0%). Aside group 
enforcement, legal actions (7.0%), or persistent warning letters/notices (2.6%) were 
also a means of handling defaulters. Thus, generally, the MFI‟s employed diverse 
methods in handling default cases but the major means of handling defaulters is by 
group enforcements. This indicates that the MFI„s mostly dealt with group clients 
rather than individuals in order to safeguard the loans or enhance repayments.  
When the MFI‟s were asked whether the mechanism for handling defaulters was 
group/sector/or borrower specific, only 25% answered in the affirmative. They 
explained that usually clients that engage in the same activity form a group and this 
helps in managing the clients and their economic activities in terms of accessibility to 
clients by location. In worst cases, group members contribute to pay and replace 
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clients. On the other hand, the majority (75.0%) of the MFI‟s indicated that the 
mechanism for handling defaulters was not group sector or borrower specific. This 
was so because the environments differ in terms of business operations and members 
of various activities can belong to one group. But in all cases, the mechanism for 
handling defaulters depended largely on the amount of money involved or requested 
for by the client. Thus, the mechanism for dealing with defaulters was more 
dependent on the amount than the group, sector or the borrower. One Chief 
Executive had this to say; 
„‟Depending on the amount, we chase them and keep modifying our collection strategy till we retrieve 
the amount.‟‟ 
On the difficulties the MFI‟s face in ensuring repayment, varied responses were 
obtained. These included lack of proper education, irregular checks of defaulters on 
the part of the MFI‟s. On the part of the clients the difficulties cited include death of 
client, migration/travelling outside, multiple loan, sickness, failure of clients to 
adhere to repayment schedules, misuse of loan on non-income generating activities, 
total disregard to loan contract details by clients and communication difficulties in 
ensuring repayment. Some also cited failure of crops due to bad weather or glut on 
the market thereby forcing them to sell their produce at far cheaper prices.   
Responding to the question as to whether the groups were involved in dealing with 
defaulters who were members, an overwhelming 90.9% of the MFI‟s answered in the 
affirmative. They explained that the groups assisted loan officers to trace defaulters, 
and even undertake follow-ups to threaten the member or appeal and prevail on 
defaulters to repay their loans. In the worst scenarios, since the group acts as 
collateral, group members contribute and pay the outstanding balances of their 
member who defaults in repayment. Sometimes the group uses threats of arrest of 
defaulters as a means of enforcing repayments. On the other hand only few (9.1%) of 
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the MFI‟s indicated that groups were not involved in dealing with defaulters who 
were members because it was normal if an individual defaults. Perhaps, because 
some clients perceive the facility as a solidarity loan, it was difficult in some cases to 
hold the group responsible. Legal action becomes the only option to compel the 
individual and not the group to pay outstanding balances. 
 
On how groups ensure that peer monitoring succeeds, the MFI‟s explain that the 
effectiveness of groups in client monitoring included constant reminders, regular 
meetings/interaction, monitoring by group executives and at worst dismissal from the 
group, all of which enhances the success of peer monitoring of clients. 
 
  10.2.7 Financial Products 
 
  Table 10.6: Number of financial products of the MFI’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Table 10.6, it can be observed that the MFI‟s had between 1-7 financial 
products an average of 2 products but the majority (77.2%) of the MFI‟s had two (2) 
financial products and only 2.6% had as many as seven (7) products. These products 
included trading loans, agro processing loan, current account savings and loans, 
workers credit, business input credit insurance, among others. The product duration 
range between 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months. 
Number of products 
Frequency Percent 
1 product 
2 1.8 
2 products 
88 77.2 
3 products 
8 7.0 
4 products 
11 9.6 
5 products 
2 1.8 
7 products 
3 2.6 
Total 
114 100.0 
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Thus, the MFI‟s had diversified financial products of varying durations, with some 
specifically tailored for men and women.  During our exploratory research, one Chief 
Executive stated: 
„‟ we have two (2) products. We have the SPIA (Strategic Planning in Action) for men. We also have 
AWFI (African Woman Food Farmer Initiative) for women farmers.‟‟ 
The products with longer credit period were designed for mostly farmers depending 
on how long the crop takes to grow and harvested. The product for the traders were 
mostly of shorter durations due to the buy and sell nature of their activity. A feature 
of the traders‟ credit was the insistence on regular short payment intervals such as 
daily or weekly or monthly repayments. 
 
10.3 Hypotheses testing on impact of business strategy on sustainability of 
MFIs 
 
This section looks at the test results of the hypotheses that assess the impact of 
business strategy on the sustainability of the MFIs. This section provides answers to 
the research question as to what kind of business strategies adopted has a significant 
impact on sustainability of MFIs.  The main hypotheses are: 
H (3a): If screening mechanisms are made more effective, it will lead to a significant 
increase in sustainability of MFIs. 
 
H (3b): If group collateral is highly enforced, then sustainability of MFI is increased.  
 
H (3c): If clients‟ meetings are highly enforced, then sustainability of MFIs will 
significantly increase. 
 
H (3d): If Executives intensify their handling of defaulters then sustainability will 
increase. 
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H (3e): If Executives ensure that peer monitoring is intensified, then sustainability 
will also increase. 
 
H (3f): If innovations in financial products increase, then sustainability of MFIs will 
increase. 
 
10.3.1  Screening mechanisms and sustainability of MFI 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) advocate the screening out of “bad” clients before loans are 
disbursed so that people who are likely to default in repayment of loans are weeded 
out. Although the majority of the MFIs had screening mechanisms, the question is to 
what extent is their screening mechanism effective in ensuing that microfinance 
institutions achieve their stated objectives. In line with this, it was hypothesized that: 
“if screening mechanisms is made more effective, it will lead to a significant increase 
in sustainability of MFIs”. 
 
The results in Table 10.7 show the relationship between the availability of an 
effective screening mechanism and sustainability of MFIs. It can be observed that the 
majority (93.0 %) of the MFIs who had an effective screening mechanism were 
perceived to be sustainable. Only few (7.0 %) MFIs did not have an effective 
screening mechanism and were perceived as not sustainable.  
   Table 10.7: Screening mechanisms 
 
Availability of screening 
mechanism  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 106(100%) - 106 (93.0%) 
No - 8(100%) 8    (7.0%) 
Total 106(100%) 8(100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
The test results yielded X
2
=21.13, df=1, p<0.015; which show a significant 
relationship between availability of an effective screening mechanism and 
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sustainability of MFIs. Therefore, at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if 
screening mechanisms are made more effective, it will lead to a significant increase 
in sustainability of MFIs was supported. 
 
10.3.2  Group collateral and sustainability of MFI 
One way by which MFIs avoid high default rates is the use of group collateral where 
loans are made available to individuals in a group but the group faces the 
consequences if any member defaults in repayment.  This has been found to be 
effective in minimizing default rates. The question therefore is, to what extent does 
group collateral impact on the performance of MFIs. In line with this it was 
hypothesized that “if group collateral is highly enforced, then sustainability of MFI is 
increased”. 
  
   Table 10.8: Use of group collateral and sustainability of MFI 
 
Use of group collateral  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 83 (100%) - 83(72.8%) 
No - 31(100%) 31(27.2%) 
Total 83(100%) 31(100%) 114(100%) 
 
 
From Table 10.8 show it can be observed that the majority 83 ( 72.8%) of the MFIs 
who used group collateral were perceived as sustainable whilst among those who did 
not use group collateral, 27.2 % were perceived as not sustainable. The test results 
revealed a significant (X
2
= 29.33 , df=1, p<0.010) relationship between use of group 
collateral and sustainability.  This means sustainability was dependent on use of 
group collateral. Therefore at 95% significant level, the hypothesis that if group 
collateral is highly enforced, then sustainability of MFI is increased was supported. 
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 10.3.3  Clients’ meetings and sustainability of MFI 
 
Regular meetings between MFIs and their clients, helps the credit officers of the 
MFIs to know their clients very well through the regular face-to-face interactions. 
This platform provides loan officers with cues about emerging problems from the 
attitudes and behaviour of the clients. Frequent meeting with clients in effect 
provides avenue for personalized relationships for the credit officers for effective 
monitoring. In line with this it was hypothesized that: “if clients‟ meetings are highly 
enforced, then sustainability of MFIs will significantly increase”. 
   
 Table 10.9: Clients meetings 
 
Frequent meeting with 
clients‟  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 114(100%) - 114(100%) 
No - - - 
Total 114(100%) - 114(100%) 
 
 
The results on the relationship between clients meeting and sustainability of MFIs 
revealed that, sustainability was significantly dependent on a highly enforced clients 
meetings (X
2
=21.33 , df= 1 and p<0.013).  Thus, all the MFIs who met frequently 
with clients were perceived as more sustainable than those MFIs who did not enforce 
high clients meetings. Therefore at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if 
clients‟ meetings are highly enforced, then sustainability of MFIs will significantly 
increase was supported.  
 
 
10.3.4  Intensive handling of defaulters and sustainability of MFI 
 
In case clients default, the MFIs adopt various measures to handle the defaulters such 
as holding the group responsible for the payment, persistent reminders and 
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persuasions and even court actions. The question that remains is whether an intensive 
pursuit of the defaulters impact on the sustainability of the MFIs. In line with this it 
was hypothesized that: “if MFIs intensify their handling of defaulters then 
sustainability will increase”. 
 
 
   Table 10.10: Handling defaulters 
 
Intensive handling of defaulters 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 111(100%) - 111 (97.4%) 
No - 3(100%) 3 (2.6%) 
Total 111(100%) 3(100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
The results in Table 10.10 show the relationship between MFIs intensive handling of 
defaulters and sustainability. It can be observed that whilst the majority (97.4%) of 
the MFIs who intensify their handling of defaulters were perceived to be sustainable, 
among those who did not vigorously pursue their defaulters, 2.6% were perceived as 
not sustainable.  In other words, sustainability was found to be significantly 
dependent on intensive pursuit of defaulters (X
2
=21.12, df=1 and p>0.013). 
Therefore at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis if MFIs intensify their 
handling of defaulters then sustainability will increase was supported. 
 
10.3.5  Peer monitoring is intensified and sustainability of MFI 
 
With group collateral at the bargain front of the lending business of MFIs, peer 
monitoring becomes unavoidable since no member would like to be responsible for 
any members‟ act of omission. And since group members usually share common 
characteristics; or are engaged in similar activities; or stay within a distance of one 
another, one may posit that an intensive peer monitoring will enhance the sustenance 
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of MFIs. Consequently, it was hypothesized that: “if MFIs pursue an intensive peer 
monitoring system, then sustainability will increase”.  
Table 10.11 : Intensifying Peer monitoring 
 
Peer monitoring 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 83 (100%) - 83(100%) 
No - - - 
Total 83(100%) 83 (100%) 83 (100%) 
 
 
The assertion that if MFIs pursue an intensive peer monitoring system, then 
sustainability will increase was found to be true.  From the data in Table 10.11, a 
significant relationship was recorded between intensive peer monitoring by the MFIs 
and sustainability. Thus the majority (100%) of the MFIs who pursued an intensive 
peer monitoring were perceived as sustainable (X
2
=20.12 , df=1  and p>0.015). 
Therefore at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if MFIs pursue an 
intensive peer monitoring system, then sustainability will increase was supported. 
 
10.3.6  Innovations in financial products and sustainability of MFI 
 
The results in Table 10.12 revealed that those MFIs who were innovative in their 
financial products were considered sustainable (86.8%). Conversely, those MFIs who 
were not innovative in their financial product developments were not considered 
sustainable (13.2%). The relationship between innovations in financial product 
development and sustainability was found to be significant (X
2
=24.05  , df=1  and 
p<0.001). 
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   Table 10.12: Product innovations 
 
Innovations in financial products 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 99(100%) - 99(86.8%) 
No - 15(100%) 15(13.2%) 
Total 99(100%) 15(100%) 114(100%) 
 
Thus, there was enough evidence at the 95% significance level to suggest that the 
sustainability of the MFIs was dependent on increased financial products 
innovations. Hence the hypothesis that, if innovations in financial products increase 
then sustainability of MFIs will also increase was supported. 
 
10.4: Summary Table for Hypotheses on Impact of Business Strategy on   
Sustainability  
 
Hypotheses 
Impact     on  
Sustainability 
of MFI 
Test 
Results 
H (3a): If screening mechanisms is made more 
effective, it will lead to a significant increase in 
sustainability of MFIs. 
Positive Strong and 
significant 
H (3b): If group collateral is highly enforced, 
then sustainability of MFI is increased.  
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (3c): If clients‟ meetings are highly enforced, 
then sustainability of MFIs will significantly 
increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant  
H (3d): If MFIs intensify their handling of 
defaulters then sustainability will increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (3e): If MFIs ensure that peer monitoring is 
intensified, then sustainability will also increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (3f): If innovations in financial products 
increase, then sustainability of MFIs will 
increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
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10.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter covered descriptive analysis and discussions of findings of the 
following business strategies in MFIs: screening, use of group collateral, meetings 
with clients, handling defaulters, peer monitoring and innovations. The various 
hypotheses relating to business strategy were also tested and a summary of the result 
tabulated under section 10.4. 
Most of MFIs (60.0%) used screening as a method of weeding out ‟bad customers‟. 
Loans disbursed to clients were not across board as it varied from sector to sector. 
Group guarantee was used by almost all the MFIs (73.2%) and most interacted on the 
average, weekly with their clients. In enforcing repayments and thereby reducing 
default rates, (64.0%) used the group guarantee system where members are held 
liable for group member who defaults. One other method the MFIs used was to 
report to the law enforcement agencies (17.5%). 
To conclude, the major business strategy of MFIs that impacted on sustainability  
were screening mechanisms, group collateral and peer monitoring, though they were 
all significant. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF MFI’S 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focused on the analysis of data on financing and agency cost of the 
MFIs. This covers granting of emergency loans, job creation, competition, Board of 
Directors, personnel, loan recovery and the regulatory framework. It also looks at the 
results of the hypotheses on the impact of environment and governance on the 
sustainability of the MFI‟s.  
11.1.1 Descriptive Analysis of Environment and Governance issues 
 
The MFI‟s responded to questions bordering on the environment as well as issues of 
governance. These include loan disbursement, job creation, personnel, loan recovery 
and the regulatory framework. 
 
11.1.2 Loans for Emergency situations  
 
When the MFI‟s were asked whether they provided loans for emergency situations, 
60% answered in the affirmative. They explained that the rationale for emergency 
loans was to help serve the immediate needs of clients in critical situations such as 
ill-health, funeral, and for addressing other social needs and also to ensure clients 
who have already accessed a facility not to default. However, such facilities were 
extended only to deprived women mostly engaged in petty trading or farming. On the 
other hand, 40% of the MFIs indicated that they did not grant emergency loans 
because clients do not have collaterals, and also as a measure to protect their money 
and curb risk. But generally, most of the MFI‟s sampled grant emergency loans. 
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11.1.3  Job creation for Clients  
 
Responding to a question on job creation opportunity for clients, whilst 47.8% of the 
MFI‟s stated that they have not created any job for clients, 52.2% stated that they 
have created jobs for their clients by offering them loans in many ventures that 
demanded labour force. It appears as though the jobs created by these institutions 
were indirect jobs. One Chief Executive had this to say: 
„‟By extension yes, we have created jobs. This is confirmed by our baseline studies.‟‟ 
 
11.1.4  Competition in the industry 
 
On competition in the micro financing business, with the exception of 6.3% of the 
MFI‟s who indicated that they did not face any competition, 93.7% of the MFI‟s 
affirmed that they face a lot of competition in the industry. The main competitors 
were other microfinance institutions and the commercial banks. 
 
11.1.5  Availability and Composition of Board of Directors 
 
The MFI‟s also responded to questions on various issues bordering on governance. 
When asked whether they have board of directors in place, with the exception of 
12.5% of the MFI‟s, the majority (87.5%) affirmed that they had board of directors. 
The commitment of the board of directors was described as either high or excellent. 
Thus, all the MFI‟s who had board of directors stated that they were very impressed 
with the commitment of the board of directors. 
 
On the structure of the board, only few (26.7%) had the CEO as chairman. For the 
majority (73.3%) of the MFI‟s, they have a separate chairman from the CEO. 
 
The members of the boards range between 4 and 12, with an average number of 6 
board members, but 35.9% of the boards, were however, composed of 7 members. 
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The MFI‟s also responded to question on the constitution/composition of the boards. 
Interestingly, the least group represented on the board of the MFI‟s were other 
professional bodies with an average of 3 members whilst women representation was 
highest averaging 4 women board of directors. This emphasizes that micro financing 
activities were pro-women which was reflective in terms of client composition, 
management staff and even board of directors. Perhaps, an indication that women 
were the most economically marginalized group hence poverty reduction 
programmes like micro financing should begin and end with women at the forefront. 
 
On the responsibility of the board, the respondents stated that the board serves as the 
policy formulation grounds with the managers as implementers of the policies of the 
institutions. Thus, the respondents were highly aware of the existence and 
responsibilities of the board of directors of their respective institutions. 
 
 
11.1.6  Personnel Constraints  
 
Problems and challenges faced by the MFI‟s with regard to personnel included poor 
or low quality of personnel who lack professionalism, as a result of inadequate in-
house training. Also, the MFI‟s cited lack of capacity building for staff coupled with 
difficulty in getting the right calibre of personnel. Inadequate staff therefore remains 
a major human resource challenge of the MFI‟s. The most critical issue in this regard 
cited by the MFIs was the fact that the big commercial banks use the power of the 
purse to attract their staff after they have trained them. 
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11.1.7  Management Constraints  
 
The resultant effect of personnel constraints of the MFIs was that middle or 
supervisory levels were weak, lack of human resource management, lack of capacity 
building and a restrictive environment which ultimately affect the management of the 
operations of the MFI‟s. 
 
11.1.8  Loan Recovery Constraints  
 
The challenges faced by the MFI‟s with regard to loan recovery, included low 
salaries of clients, low yields for farmers, all of which affect clients ability to meet 
repayment schedules. Other loan recovery challenges enumerated by the MFI‟s 
include; few loan officers to enhance monitoring, lack of insurance for loans and 
sometimes non-purposeful utilization of the loans by the clients which result in high 
default rates.  
 
 
11.1.9: Financial Constraints  
 
On financial challenges, the MFI‟s stated that they are hindered by inadequate funds 
to meet their growing customer base, low savings by clients especially during 
Christmas, inadequate lending facilities, high interest rates from funding agents, and 
sometimes single donor support. The MFI‟s described their financial status as good, 
except for the Susu operators 
 
11.1.10: Environmental and regulatory framework 
 
 On environmental and regulatory framework, 61.5% of the MFI‟s affirmed the 
existence of environmental and regulatory framework which was perceived as more 
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restrictive (69.2%) than favourable. Thus, the majority of the MFI‟s had negative 
perception about the environmental and regulatory framework. This is what one 
Chief Executive said in response to the regulatory environment: 
„‟The regulatory environment is restrictive in that we as FNGOs are by law not allowed to collect 
client‟s money for savings. Savings you and I know is the foundation for building a strong capital base 
which would have helped us to expand our outreach programme. What we are doing now is to direct 
our clients to a certain bank to deposit their monies there.‟‟ 
Another Chief Executive in the savings and loans institution reflected as thus: 
„‟Our ultimate goal is to transform this operation into a commercial bank, but the increase in the 
minimum capital requirement by the government is a big blow to us. It has somewhat derailed our 
plans but we are going back to the drawing board to see how we can strategize to achieve our goals. 
We are talking to our partners abroad.‟‟ 
Again, another Chief Executive who operated a Susu company was rather concerned 
about tax payments: 
„‟You see all Susu companies are not the same in terms of size and even where they operate 
significantly affect their revenue generation. We pay assessed tax which is across board and I think it 
is arbitrary and discriminatory. We operate mostly in the markets and the market women only do 
repayments on these market days when they have come to sell their wares. Some parts of the country 
have large markets and again some have more market days in a week. We only have one market day 
in a week while others have two or three market days in a week.‟‟ 
 
11.1.11 Future Sustainability of MFI 
 
The opinions of the MFI‟s were sought on the future and sustainability of micro 
financing in Ghana. With the exception of few (11.90%) of the MFI‟s who doubted 
the sustainability of micro financing in Ghana, describing it as highly constrained 
and short-lived, the majority (88.10%) were optimistic. They expressed the hope of a 
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bright future for micro financing in Ghana, but only if the operational framework is 
based on sound business principles and measures. 
11.2.0 Hypotheses testing on environment and governance and MFI 
Sustainability 
 
In order to understand both the micro and macro factors that impact on the 
sustainability of the MFIs, issues relating to governance and environment were 
considered in the study. Governance issues related to the regulatory framework 
governing the operations of the MFIs which Staschen (2003) categorizes as primary 
(laws and acts of parliament) and secondary (benchmarks and procedures) that need 
to be adopted by the MFIs. The main issues considered were emergency loans, job 
creation, competition, Board of Directors, personnel constraints, loan recovery and 
the regulatory framework.  
 
The research question therefore was which environmental and governance issues 
adopted has significant impact on the sustainability of the MFIs? In an attempt to 
find answers to this, seven hypotheses were postulated as follows: 
H 4a:  If executives increase their response to emergency loans, then sustainability 
of MFI‟s will increase 
H 4b: If MFIs create jobs directly, then sustainability will increase 
H 4c: Increased competition in microfinance will lead to increased sustainability 
H 4d: If Board of Directors are formed in MFIs, then sustainability will increase  
H 4e: If MFIs employ and retain highly qualified staff, then their sustainability will 
increase 
H 4f: If loan recovery increases for MFIs, then sustainability will increase 
H 4g: If the regulatory framework is improved, it will increase sustainability of MFIs 
significantly. 
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The test results for these hypotheses provided insight into those macro level factors 
that impacted on the sustainability of the MFI in Ghana. 
  
11.2.1 Emergency Loan and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
It is argued that one of the failures of the traditional banks that MFIs came to correct 
was closeness to the community who are mostly poor by responding to their 
emergency needs. Granting of emergency loans was therefore considered a bait to 
attract and retain clients and enhance the sustainability of the MFIs. In line with this 
it was hypothesized that: If executives increase their response to emergency loans, 
then sustainability of MFI‟s will increase. 
 
The results in Table 11.1 show the relationship between granting of emergency loans 
and the sustainability of the MFIs.  
Table 11.1: Emergency Loans and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Granting of emergency loan  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 76 (71.7%) 8 (100%) 84(73.7%) 
No    30(28.3%) - 30(26.3%) 
Total 106(100%)    8(100%) 114(100%) 
 
 
It can be observed that the majority (71.7 %) of the MFIs who granted emergency 
loans to clients were perceived as sustainable compared to those who did not (28.3%) 
and yet were perceived as sustainable. There were others who did not grant 
emergency loans (7.0%) and were not perceived as sustainable. Thus sustainability of 
the MFIs was significantly (X
2
=21.15, df=1, p< 0.012) dependent on the granting of 
emergency loans to clients. Therefore, the hypothesis that if MFIs increase their 
response to emergency loans, then sustainability will increase was supported.  
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11.2.2 MFIs Job Creation and Sustainability 
 
It has been argued that MFIs must move away from only the provision of loans to 
direct job creation by way employment through the setting of businesses with the 
indigenes as the workforce. The premise is that if MFI create jobs they will help 
employ people who are incapable of self-employment and managing the loans or 
funds made available to them, empower them in so doing thereby helping to alleviate 
poverty which is the main aim of micro financing. The direct job creation by the 
MFIs will also enhance their sustainability. In line with this it was hypothesized that: 
If MFIs create jobs directly, then sustainability will increase. 
 
The data for the study as shown in Table 11.2 revealed that those MFIs (55.7 %) that 
created jobs for their clients were perceived as sustainable as those who did not 
(44.3%). Thus there was a significant relationship between direct job creation by the 
MFIs and their sustainability (X
2
 = 6.04 , df =1  and p< 0.05). 
 
Table 11.2 Creation of Jobs for Clients by MFIs and Sustainability 
 
Creation of jobs by MFIs  
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Yes 59 (55.7%) 8 (100%) 67 (58.8%) 
No 47 (44.3%) - 47 (41.2%) 
Total 106 (100%) 8 (100%) 114 (100%) 
 
 
In effect, there was enough evidence at the 95% significance level to suggest that 
MFIs sustainability was dependent on their direct creation of jobs for their clients. 
Therefore the hypothesis that if MFIs create jobs directly, then sustainability will 
increase was supported. 
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11.2.3 Competition and sustainability of MFIs 
Healthy competition is good for all economic activities and for that matter a vibrant 
micro financing industry. Evidence point to increased engagement in micro financing 
activities by commercial banks and even foreign owned institutions who have higher 
capital and can afford to charge lower rates just to attract clients. In effect 
competition for the clients in the industry has direct implications for sustainability. In 
line with this, it was hypothesized that “Increased competition in microfinance will 
lead to increased sustainability”. 
The result (X
2
=1.612 , df=1  and p<0.201), was obtained for the relationship between 
competition in microfinance delivery and sustainability. In effect sustainability of 
MFIs was not significantly dependent on competition. Thus very low levels of 
competition by the MFIs correspond with their low levels of sustainability. The result 
was not significant at 0.05 level. Therefore, at 95% significance level, the hypothesis 
that if there is increased competition in microfinance then sustainability will 
significantly increase was not supported. 
 
 
11.2.4 Availability of Board of Directors and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
The existence of Board of Directors is the first step towards effective and efficient 
institutional management since they give strategic directions for the attainment of 
organizational objectives, vision and mission. It is said that a strong and effective 
Board translates into both efficiency and effectiveness of organizational objectives. 
To answer the question as to whether the presence of Board of Directors ensures 
good performance of MFIs, it was hypothesized that “If Board of Directors are 
existent in MFIs, then sustainability will increase”. 
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The result (X
2
=0.612 , df=1  and p<0.601),  was obtained. The relationship was 
however not significant (p>0.05). Therefore at 95% significant level, the hypothesis 
that if Board of Directors are existent in MFIs, then their sustainability will increase 
was not supported 
11.2.5 Personnel Constraints and Sustainability of MFIs 
  
An institution‟s ability to attract and retain high quality staff, may enhance their 
sustainability in that these high calibre staff then become the pivot on which the 
micro finance delivery revolves. Evidence from the exploratory study point to 
difficulty on the part of most MFIs to retain or attract qualified personnel due to the 
presence of the big financial institutions who could afford better remuneration. To 
ascertain the impact of personnel constraints on the sustainability of MFIs, it was 
hypothesized that “if MFIs employ and retain high qualified staff, then, their 
sustainability will significantly increase” 
From the data, a strong and positive result (X2=22.05 , df=1  and p<0.001), (see 
appendix E) was recorded for the relationship between quality of personnel and 
sustainability of MFIs. This means that a very high calibre staff corresponds with 
sustainability of MFIs. Therefore at 95% significance level, the hypothesis that if 
MFIs employ and retain qualified staff, then their sustainability will significantly 
increase was supported. 
 
11.2.6  Loan Recovery and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
The ability of the MFIs to embark on outreach programmes, recover loans and cover 
their operational costs enhances their survival or sustenance. Considering the 
difficulty in recovery of loans by MFIs due to unplanned movement and relocation of 
clients, among others, the study set out to understand the bearing that loan recovery 
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has on the sustenance of the MFIs. The hypothesis was that “If there are difficulties 
with loan recovery, then the sustainability of the MFIs will decrease”. 
There was a positive and strong relationship between loan recovery and sustainability 
of MFIs. A very high and significant (X2=25.05 , df=1  and p<0.000) result  was 
recorded (see appendix E). This confirms the findings that progressive lending based 
on prompt repayments, frequent repayment schedules and compulsory savings 
(Nissanke, 2002), are most essential in ensuring sustainability of MFIs. Therefore, at 
the 95% significant level, the hypothesis that if there are difficulties with loan 
recovery, then the sustainability of the MFIs will decrease was supported. 
 
 
11.2.7  Regulatory Framework and Sustainability of MFIs 
 
Regulatory framework could be financial (principles, rules, standards and 
compliance procedures) as defined by Ledgerwood (2000) or prudential (designed to 
avoid banking crisis and maintain integrity) as stated by Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega 
(1995). Where the regulatory framework is outdated or perceived as not favourable, 
it is likely to affect the sustainability of the MFIs. The regulation that governs the 
MFIs in Ghana is the Cooperative Decree (NLDC 252 of 1968). The question 
therefore is to what extent does the nature of the regulatory framework impacts on 
the sustainability of the MFIs? In line with this it was hypothesized that “if the 
regulatory framework is favourable, it will increase the sustainability of MFIs 
significantly” 
The results in Table 11.3 revealed that where the regulatory framework was 
considered favourable the MFIs were sustainable (78.1%). Conversely where 
regulatory framework was perceived as restrictive the MFIs were not considered 
sustainable (21.93%). Thus, there was a significant relationship between 
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sustainability of the MFIs and the nature of the regulatory framework (X
2
=28.20 , 
df=1  and p<0.000). 
Table 11.3 : Regulatory Framework and Sustainability 
 
Nature of regulatory framework 
Sustainability of MFI  
Total Yes No 
Favourable  89 (78.1%) - 89 (78.1%) 
Restrictive - 25 (21.93%) 25 (21.9%) 
Total 89 (78.1%) 25 (21.93%) 114 (100.0%) 
 
There was therefore enough evidence at the 95% significance level to suggest that 
MFIs sustainability was dependent on the nature of the regulatory framework. Hence 
the hypothesis that if the regulatory framework is favourable, it will increase the 
sustainability of MFIs significantly was supported. 
11.3: Summary Table for Hypotheses on Environment and Governance; and 
Sustainability  
 
Hypotheses 
Impact on 
sustainability 
of MFI 
Test Results 
H 4a:  If executives increase their response 
to emergency loans, then sustainability of 
MFI‟s will increase 
Positive not significant 
H 4b: If MFIs create jobs directly, then 
sustainability will increase 
Positive Positive and 
significant 
H 4c: Increased competition in 
microfinance will lead to increased 
sustainability 
Positive Weak and not 
significant 
H 4d : If Board of Directors are formed in 
MFIs, then sustainability will increase  
Positive Weak and not 
significant 
H 4e: If MFIs employ and retain highly 
qualified staff, then their sustainability will 
increase 
Positive Positive and 
significant 
H 4f: If there are difficulties with loan 
recovery  for MFIs, then sustainability will 
decrease 
Positive Positive and 
significant 
H 4g: If the regulatory framework is 
favourable, it will increase sustainability 
of MFIs significantly 
Positive Positive and 
significant 
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11.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter covered descriptive analysis of the following governance and 
environmental issues in MFIs; emergency loans, job creation, competition, Board of 
Directors, Personnel constraints, loan recovery and regulatory framework. The 
various hypotheses relating to governance and environment were also tested and a 
summary of the results tabulated in Table 11.3. 
Emergency loans given to clients, was seen as critical to the operations of the MFIs 
as indicated by 60.0% of the sampled institutions. Job creation by the MFIs was high 
(52.2%), even though it appeared to be indirect. Competition from the bigger 
financial institutions was stated as a difficulty for most of the MFIs. There was no 
evidence to support the fact that the existence of the Board of Directors impacts on 
sustainability of MFIs, however there was enough evidence to support the fact that 
employing and retaining high caliber staff impacts on sustainability of MFIs. 
Loan recovery was perceived as critical to the sustainability of MFIs, and so was the 
regulatory framework and environment. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
SUCCESS OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
12.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focused on the success factors of the MFI‟s. It covers results of the data 
obtained on the various success measures of the MFI‟s and also looks at the results 
on the impact of these successes on MFI‟s. 
 
12.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Successes of the MFI’s 
 
The descriptive analysis of the data on measures of success covers growth of clients, 
loan processing periods, clients record tracking and tracing mechanisms, discount for 
prompt repayment, saving schemes, internal and external audit systems, staff 
remuneration and turnover, and the level of success.  
 
12.2.1 Growth of Clients  
 
The monthly growth of clients for the MFI‟s ranged between 5- 1,700 clients with an 
average of 236 clients whilst on yearly basis, the growth of clientele of the MFI‟s 
ranged between 6- 19,994 clients with a mean growth rate of 2,399 clients as shown 
in Table 12.1. It must however, be noted that the average growth rates were affected 
by extreme values in that whilst some MFI‟s had very large clientele others have few 
clients. This notwithstanding, the growth rate of the MFI‟s was very remarkable.  
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  Table 12.1: Growth Rate of Clients  
Statistics Monthly Growth Yearly Growth 
Mean 235.42 2,398.08 
Median 80.00 710.00 
Mode 5 6(a) 
Range 1,695 19,994 
Minimum 5 6 
Maximum 1,700 20,000 
Mean 235.42 2398.08 
   a  Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
 
 
 
12.2.2 Average Loan Processing Period 
 
On the average, only 10.6% of the MFI‟s processed clients loan applications within 
30 minutes or at most 24 hours (1 day). Over a third that is 42.2% of the MFI‟s, 
however, use 2 weeks in processing clients loan application whilst few (5.3%)  of the 
MFI‟s took as much as 6 weeks to process clients loan application (Table 12.2).    
 
Table 12.2: Average Loan Processing Period 
Processing Period Frequency Percentage 
30 minutes 12 10.6 
1 day (24 hours) 12 10.6 
3 days 6 5.3 
4 days 12 10.5 
1 week 12 10.6 
2 weeks 48 42.2 
3 weeks 6 5.3 
6 weeks 6 5.3 
Total 114 100.0 
 
 
The results in Table 12.2 shows that the processing of clients loan applications by the 
MFI‟s took more time than expected.  
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12.2.3 Number of Loan Processing Personnel 
 
The results in Table 12.3 revealed that it took at least 1 and at most 5 staff members 
to process an average loan request. However, it took mostly 2 staff members of the 
MFI to act on loan requests. This accounted for 50.0% of the responses on the 
number of loan processing personnel. 
 
Table12.3:  Number of Loan Processing Personnel 
Number of staff Frequency Percentage 
1 43 37.7 
2 57 50.0 
3 3 2.6 
4 6 5.3 
5 5 4.4 
Total 114 100.0 
 
 
 
 
12.2.4 Clients Record Tracking and Tracing Mechanisms 
 
Records management is very essential if MFI‟s are to effectively carry out their 
functional activities such as loan processing and monitoring of repayment schedules. 
In line with these, the researcher investigated the availability or otherwise of records 
tracing and tracking systems in the MFI‟s (Table 12.4.) 
 
  Table 12.4: Availability of Record Tracking and Tracing Mechanisms 
 
 
 
The result in Table 12.4 shows that the majority of the MFIs, that is 82.5% of the 
MFI‟s affirmed that they had a complete records tracing and tracking mechanism for 
Availability of Records system Yes No Total 
Loan 94(82.5%) 20(17.5%) 114(100%) 
Clients  94(82.5%) 20(17.5%) 114(100%) 
Repayment schedules 94(82.5%) 20(17.5%) 114(100%) 
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loans, clientele and repayment schedules. These tracking system ranged from 
sophisticated software packages to simple Ms excel design.  These indicate a high 
level of commitment on the part of the majority of the MFI‟s towards ensuring 
success through proper internal control and quality client record management 
systems. 
 
12.2.5  Discount for Prompt Repayment 
 
On affirming discounts for prompt or full payment, only 14 (12.5%) of the MFI‟s 
affirmed that they offered client‟s discounts in the form of reduced interest rate for 
prompt payment.  On the other hand, 100 (87.7%) of the MFI‟s indicated that they 
did not offer any form of discount to clients for prompt or full payment. According to 
most of the MFIs prompt and early payments, qualifies a client for a new loan and 
sometimes higher loan amount. This was confirmed by the Chief Executive Officer 
of one of the MFIs as stated below: 
„‟ We do not give discounts as a policy. What we do is that if a client shows a good repayment track 
record he or she then qualifies for higher loan amount with or without collateral. This we believe is a 
good incentive for clients to want to pay back quickly. We may want to consider giving cash discounts 
in future, but now, no‟‟. 
 
Table 12.5:  Nature of Discount for Prompt Repayment Scheme 
Discount scheme Frequency Percentage 
Reduced interest rate 14 (12.5%) 14 (12.5%) 
No discount 100 (87.5%) 100 (87.5%) 
Total 114 100.0 
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12.2.6  Savings Scheme 
 
When asked whether they had saving scheme, 71 (62.3%) of the MFI‟s answered in 
the affirmative as against 43 (37.7%) who stated otherwise.  This was due to the fact 
that FNGOs are not allowed by law to take deposits from clients. 
 
12.2.7 Auditing in the MFI’s 
 
On internal and external auditing 79.8% of the MFI‟s indicated that they had both 
internal and yearly external auditing systems in place.  Thus, the majority of the 
MFI‟s affirmed that they had auditing systems in place even though it was voluntary. 
This was borne out of their belief that subjecting their institutions to periodic audit 
will improve accountability and corporate governance. 
Also, 14.1% of the MFI‟s stated that they had external auditors and further undertake 
statutory yearly external auditing, 2.6% indicated only an external statutory mid-year 
audit due to the volume of transactions, whilst 3.5% of the MFI‟s (all Susu 
companies) did not have any form of formal audit (Table 12.6). 
 
Table 12.6: Rate and form of Auditing 
Response Frequency Percentage 
Internal/External/ 
Yearly 
91 79.8 
Only External/ yearly 16 14.1 
Only External/half year 3 2.6 
No Audit 4 3.5 
Total 114 100 
 
 
 
The result in Table 12.6 therefore indicates that most of the MFI‟s undertook both 
internal and external auditing on annual basis.   
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12.2.8 Staff Remuneration 
 
On staff remuneration, whilst 43.8% of the MFI‟s indicated that their staff were 
sufficiently remunerated, 65(57.0%) stated otherwise.  Thus, most of the MFI‟s 
indicated that their staff members were not sufficiently remunerated especially when 
compared to what the big traditional banks were paying their staff.  One Chief 
Executive had this to say about staff remuneration during the exploratory research; 
„‟In terms of remuneration, I can say with all confidence that we are not the best nor are we the worst. 
We try to complement this with good training both locally and abroad.‟‟ 
 
12.2.9  Staff Turnover Rate 
 
A measure of satisfaction or dissatisfaction could be measured by the rate the staff 
leave the employment or are retained. If they are satisfied they will stay for a long 
time and feel a part of the organization. On the other hand if members of staff are 
dissatisfied they would leave in search of better job opportunities. The effect is that it 
would add to cost as new recruits will take time to learn and adjust to their new 
positions. Level of remuneration was cited as the main reason for high staff turnover 
rate (refer to 12.2.8). 
 
The results in Table 12.7 show the level of staff turnover in the MFI‟s sampled. 
Table 12.7:  Level of Staff turnover 
Level of Staff turnover Frequency Percentage 
High 14 12.3 
Moderate 63 55.3 
Low 37 32.4 
Total 114 100.0 
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It can be observed that only 37 (32.4%) of the MFI‟s described the staff turnover in 
their outfits as low. Sixty three of the MFIs representing 55.3% rated the level of 
staff turnover as moderate with the remaining 14 (12.3%) describing it as high. Thus 
most of the MFIs rated their level of staff turnover between moderate and high. They 
however conceded that most of the big banks entice their staffs with big and better 
offers; hence their outfits have become poaching grounds for these multinational 
banks. One Chief Executive explained this in this way; 
„‟It has been observed that staff turnover is low among the older staff who are about going on 
retirement but very high among the youth. These young ones are very ambitious and are not prepared 
to sacrifice for anything. If any of the big financial institutions come to them offering them anything 
slightly above what they are currently receiving they quickly resign and leave. I do not blame them 
too much because we cannot match the big banks in terms of salaries and incentives. You see we have 
become virtual training grounds for these multinational corporations. These are people we have 
trained at great cost to the institution. This is unfair.‟‟ 
 
 
12.2.10 Closure of Branches 
 
When the MFI‟s were asked whether they have ever closed down any branch office 
within the last five years, only 11.1% answered in the affirmative.  They stated the 
reason for the closure as lack of funds and bad debts, fraud or misappropriation of 
funds. On the other hand, 88.9% of the MFI‟s indicated that they have not closed 
down any of their branch offices within the last five years. 
 
12.2.11 Opening of New Branches 
 
The number of branches opened by the MFI‟s within the last five years range 
between 6 - 45, all totalling 35 branches, most of the MFI‟s had opened at least a 
branch over the last five years. 
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Table 12.8:  Number of New Branches established 
Number of New Branches Frequency Percentage 
FNGO 14 31 
Savings and Loans 11 25 
Credit Unions 8 18 
Rural Banks 6 13 
Susu 6 13 
Total 45 100 
 
 
From Table 12.8 the FNGOs opened more branches 14 (31%) probably due to their 
large capital base which were mostly foreign, followed by the Savings and Loans 
institutions 11 (25%). 
 
 
12.2.12 Level of Success of MFI 
 
The results in Table 12.9 show the perceived level of success achieved by the MFI‟s. 
Table 12.9:  Level of Success of MFI 
Level of Success Frequency Percentage 
Successful 57 50.0 
Moderately successful 51 44.7 
Fairly successful 6 5.3 
Total 114 100.0 
 
 
It can be observed that half (50.0%) of the MFI‟s rated themselves as successful. 
They explained that they have been able to achieve their targets, improve their 
institutional capacities, increased their profit margins, and recorded increased growth 
in clientele coupled with regular monitoring and auditing and low default rate. On 
the other hand, 44.7% of the MFI‟s described themselves as moderate success 
achievers with the explanation that there was still room for improvement and even 
though profits had been moderate they had not grown as they would have wished.  
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The remaining 5.3% of the MFI‟s, described themselves as fairly successful because 
their loan recovery had dropped and they had very little capital to work with. 
 
 
12.2.13 Success of MFI 
 
On the success of the MFI‟s, only 8 (6.3%) of the respondents believed that their 
institutions would not survive in the next 2 years under the current economic and 
political conditions. This was because funds were very hard to come by. On the other 
hand, the majority (93.7%) of the MFI‟s indicated that their institutions would not 
collapse or were sustainable beyond the next two years even under current 
conditions. They explained that they had put in place strong internal control 
mechanisms, increased deposit mobilization and enhanced customer care, increased 
product innovations and given the high level of commitment of staff and 
management, there was a lot of hope for the sustainability of their institutions. 
 
12.3 Hypotheses testing on impact of MFI’s Successes  
 
Jain (1996), is of the view that the success of Grameen Bank and MFIs in general lies 
in the adoption of such policies which he terms „‟strategic credit policies‟‟Yaron 
(1994), Khandker and Khan (1995), Schreiner and Yaron (1999) have further gone 
ahead to define success as economic sustainability and institutional viability as a 
means of measuring the success of MFIs. The construct for success of the MFI‟s 
include client growth, effective and efficient loan processing, good record keeping, 
increased savings by clients, availability of proper internal and external auditing 
systems, high staff remuneration, and low staff labour turnover.  In an attempt to 
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determine how the MFI‟s successes impact on its sustainability, seven hypotheses 
were postulated and tested on success factors and the MFI‟s. 
 
 
12.3.1  Client Growth and Success of MFI 
 
The growth of client may enhance the success of the MFI‟s through increased returns 
on loans granted to clients. Expectations are that if the MFI‟s acquire more clients 
they may be described as being successful and ultimately sustainable.  It was 
therefore hypothesized that: 
 
H (5a) If the MFI‟s acquire more new clients, then success will significantly 
increase. 
 
On clients growth and success, the result (X
2
=22.20, df=1 and p<0.000) was recorded 
This means that increases in the level or numbers of new clients correspond with 
increased level of success of MFIs. Thus the more clients that MFIs get the more 
successful they will become through increased outreach and more on-lending 
interests. Therefore at 95% significance level the hypothesis that if the MFIs acquire 
more new clients, then success will significantly increase was supported.  
 
12.3.2  Loan processing and Success of MFI 
 
Prompt loan processing induces confidence in client about the institution. This 
however, depends on a host of factors including the quality of information provided 
by clients for the purpose of conducting background checks, and the number of loan 
officers involved in the processing of documents and the time of receipt of clients 
request to the time of disbursement of the loan to the clients. In order to ascertain 
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how the loan processing systems impact on the success of the MFI‟s, it was 
hypothesized that:   
H (5b) If loan processing is effectively and efficiently managed, then success of 
MFI‟s will increase. 
The results in Table 12.10 show the relationship between the loan processing period 
of the MFI and the perceived level of success of the MFI.  
 
Table 12.10: Loan processing period and level of Success of MFI 
Loan 
processing 
period 
Level of Success of MFI  
Total 
Successful Moderately 
successful 
Fairly 
successful 
Unsu
ccessf
ul 
Very 
Unsu
ccessf
ul 
Within 24 
hours 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
1 day – 1 
week 
 
41(71.9%) 
 
36 (70.6%) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
77(67.5%) 
1 – 2weeks 10 (17.5%) 11(21.5%) 6 (100%) - - 27(23.7%) 
More than 2 
weeks 
 
6 (10.6%) 
 
4 (7.9%) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
10(8.8%) 
Total 57(100%) 51(100%) 6 (100%) - - 114(100%) 
 
 
It can be observed that whilst the majority ( 71.9%) of the MFI‟s who processed 
clients loans promptly were perceived as successful, those of the MFI‟s who delay in 
processing clients loan were perceived as not successful. The chi-square test yielded 
(X
2
=21.01, df=4, p<0.011). This means that there was a significant relationship 
between loan processing period of the MFI and the perceived level of success of the 
MFI. Thus, those MFI‟s who processed clients loans promptly were perceived to be 
successful. Therefore at the 0.05 level, the hypothesis that if loan processing is 
effectively and efficiently managed, then success of MFI‟s will increase significantly 
was supported.  
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12.3.3  Record keeping and Success of MFI 
 
Keeping records of clients enables MFIs to effectively monitor their clients towards 
achieving success and sustainability. Since good records‟ keeping enhances 
accountability, transparency and efficient administration, it was hypothesized that: 
H (5c) If record keeping is effective, then success of MFI‟s will increase. 
 
The result in Table 12.11 shows that 89.4% of the MFIs who monitored their clients‟ 
records effectively were to a large extent successful as compared to 10.6% of the 
MFIs who said they were moderately successful because some clients still managed 
to elude them despite the detailed information they had about them.  
 
 
 
Table 12.11: Tracking and keeping of clients’ records and level of success of 
MFI 
 
Tracking 
and keeping 
of clients 
records  
Level of Success of MFI  
Total 
Successful Moderately 
successful 
Fairly 
succes
sful 
Unsuc
cessful 
Very 
Unsuc
cessful 
Yes 102 (89.4%) 12 (10.6%) - - - 114 
(100%) 
No - - - - - - 
Total 102 (89.4%) 12 (10.6%) - - - 114 
(100%) 
 
The results in Table 12.11 thus show a significant relationship between tracking of 
clients records and the level of success of the MFI‟s, thus MFIs who kept an 
effective clients records systems were perceived as successful than those who did not  
(X
2
=25.14, df=1  and p<0.00). Hence, at the 95% significance level the hypothesis 
that if loan processing is efficient and effectively managed, then success of MFI‟s 
will increase was supported. 
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12.3.4  Savings and Success of MFI 
 
A compulsory saving programme helps clients of microfinance institutions to build 
up assets over time and develop the discipline of savings (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). This in a way also helps the institutions to acquire capital and to 
secure a form of collateral from borrowers thereby enhancing the success and 
sustainability of the microfinance institution. All the microfinance institutions except 
the FNGOs indicated that deposit taking were very critical to the growth of their 
organizations. The FNGOs by law are not allowed to take deposits from clients. 
However, most of the Chief Executive Officers interviewed indicated that they 
would be happy to see that law amended to enable them take deposits since they 
believed that deposits collection from clients significantly impacts on sustainability 
of MFIs. Of the 81 FNGOs sampled, 72 (88.8%) believed their operations would be 
better enhanced by deposit taking. Only 9 (11.1%) indicated that deposit taking has 
no bearing on the sustainability and success of their operations. In line with this it 
was hypothesized that:  
H (5d) If savings increase in MFI‟s, then success of MFI‟s will also increase 
significantly. 
 
Table 12.12: Operation of savings scheme and level of success of MFI 
Operation of 
saving 
scheme 
Level of Success of MFI  
Total Successful Moderately 
successful 
Fairly 
succes
sful 
Unsu
ccess
ful 
Very 
Unsu
ccess
ful 
Yes 33(78.6%) 72(100%) - - - 105 92.1%) 
No 9(21.4%) - - - -      9 (7.9%) 
Total 42(100%) 72(100%) - - - 114 (100%) 
 
 
The results in Table 12.12 show the level of success of the MFI‟s as against the 
operation of savings scheme. It can be observed that 33 (78.9%) of the MFI‟s 
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operated saving schemes and those who believe that it would impact on their 
businesses as against 9 (21.4%) who did not think deposit taking had any success 
effect on their operations. The test results, that is (X
2 
=21.12, df=1 and p<0.012), 
indicates a significant relationship between availability of saving scheme and level of 
success of MFI. Therefore at the 95% significance level the hypothesis that if savings 
increase in MFI‟s, then success of MFI‟s will also increase significantly was 
supported. 
 
 
12.3.5  Audit systems and Success of MFIs 
 
Evidence of internal and external financial audit system was used as a precursor to 
audits which ensures that the laid down rules of the organization are adhered to with 
the ultimate result that the organization becomes profitable. Given that the 
availability of the internal and external audits is indicative of a properly functioning 
system, it was hypothesized that: 
H (5e) If the internal and external audit divisions function properly, then success of 
MFI‟s will increase. 
 
 
 
Table 12.13: Availability of properly functioning audit unit and level of success 
of MFI 
Availability 
of properly 
functioning 
audit unit 
Level of Success of MFI  
Total Successful Moderately 
successful 
Fairly 
succes
sful 
Unsucces
sful 
Very 
Unsuc
cessful 
Yes 110 (100%)       -        -         -          
- 
110(96.5%) 
No         -       -        -    4 
(100%) 
          
- 
    4(3.5%) 
Total 110 (100%)       -        -    4 
(100%) 
         
- 
114(100%) 
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The results in Table 12.13 show that the perceived level of success of the MFI‟s was 
dependent on the availability of properly functioning audit units. That is the MFI‟s 
with properly functioning audit units were perceived to be successful (96.5%) than 
those who without properly functioning units who were largely unsuccessful (3.5%) 
who were mostly the Susu institutions. The test results was X
2
=20.05, df=1 and 
p<0.00, which means that at the 95% significance level the hypothesis that if the 
internal and external audit divisions function properly, then the success of the MFI‟s 
will increase was supported. 
 
 
12.3.6  Staff remuneration and Success of MFI 
 
Motivation in the form of salary, no doubt has great impact on employee job 
satisfaction and performance. It is thus obvious that when there is salary differentials 
within a particular industry, poaching will be high and employees in organizations 
with low remuneration will be most attracted to those institutions with higher 
remuneration. To ascertain if the sustainability of the MFI‟s was dependent on the 
staff remuneration, it was hypothesized that:   
H (5f) If staff remuneration is high, then success of MFI‟s will increase. 
 
Table 12.14: Level of staff remuneration and level of success of MFI 
Level of 
staff 
remunerati
on 
Level of Success of MFI  
Total Successful Moderat
ely 
successf
ul 
Fairly 
successful 
Unsucce
ssful 
Very 
Unsucce
ssful 
Low         - - 4 (3.5%) - - 4 (3.5%) 
Moderate         - - - - -       - 
High 110(96.5%) - - - - 110 (96.5%) 
Total 110(96.5%) - 4 (3.5%) - - 114 (100%) 
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From Table 12.14  it can be observed that the perceived level of success of the MFI‟s 
was dependent on the level of staff remuneration. That is the MFI‟s with high staff 
remuneration were perceived to be successful (96.5%) than those with low 
remuneration whose level of success was low (3.5%).  The test results was X
2
=21.12, 
df=1  and p<0.001, which means that at the 95% significance level, the hypothesis 
that if MFI‟s staff remuneration was high, then the success of the MFI will increase 
was supported. 
 
12.3.7  Staff turnover and Success of MFI 
 
When employee turnover is low, organizations are able to save on cost of recruitment 
and hiring and rehiring of employees to replace departed staff while retaining their 
high quality staff. High staff turnover has been strongly linked to staff remuneration, 
dissatisfaction among staff due to poor conditions of service, lack of career 
development, among others. In order to determine the impact of staff turnover on the 
success of the MFI‟s it was hypothesized that: 
H (5g) If staff turnover is low, then success of MFI‟s will also increase. 
The results show that the assertion that if staff turnover is low then success factors 
will increase is true. A chi-square result of X
2
=20.15, df=1 and p<0.002 was 
recorded. This means that if MFIs are able to retain their staff for long periods then 
they will be perceived as successful and therefore at the 95% significance level the 
hypothesis that if staff turnover is low then success of MFIs will also increase was 
supported. 
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Table 12.2: Summary Table for Hypotheses on impact of success on MFI’s   
 
Hypotheses 
Impact 
on  MFI 
Test 
Results 
H (5a) If the MFI‟s acquire more new clients, then 
success will significantly increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5b) If loan processing is effectively and 
efficiently managed, then success of MFI‟s will 
increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5c) If record keeping is effective, then success of 
MFI‟s will increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5d) If savings increase in MFI‟s, then success of 
MFI‟s will also increase significantly 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5e) If the internal and external audit divisions 
function properly, then  success of MFI‟s will 
increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5f) If staff remuneration is high, then and success 
of MFI‟s will increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
H (5g) If staff turnover is low, then success of MFI‟s 
will also increase. 
Positive Positive 
and 
significant 
 
12.4 Conclusion  
 
The data for the study revealed that success of the MFI‟s depended on some factors. 
In all instances the success was found to be dependent on client growth, loan 
processing period, good record keeping, savings in MFI‟s, availability of audit 
systems, staff remuneration and staff turnover. The results of the hypotheses on the 
impact of success factors on MFI‟s are shown in Table 12.2. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the study and draws conclusions based on the 
findings that emerged from the data collected from the MFI‟s by the use of 
questionnaires as well as the interviews held with the CEO‟s of the MFI‟s. 
Recommendations for enhancing the sustainability and success of micro financing 
activities and MFI‟s in Ghana for national development have also been included in 
this chapter.  
 
13.2 Nature and Scope of the Investigation 
 
The thesis examines factors that influence sustainability and success of microfinance 
institutions in Ghana. The topic is important, particularly in poverty stricken Africa, 
where micro-financial institutions play a significant role in supporting governments‟ 
initiatives to reduce/alleviate poverty. The developed model is tested using data 
collected from 14 face-to-face interviews and 114 questionnaires. The data is 
analyzed using different techniques- descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and 
regression analysis. The research design and scale of the study are appropriate to 
both the problem addressed and doctoral level research. A number of factors in the 
model developed were found to be influencing the sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions 
 
The study was guided by five principal objectives which was supported by a total of 
31 hypotheses. The major goal of this study was to develop an explanatory 
framework for a better understanding of the factors that affect sustainability and 
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success of Microfinance institutions in Ghana. The main objective therefore was to 
determine which factors (institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, 
environment/governance and success) affect sustainability of Microfinance 
Institutions in Ghana and to make recommendations for enhancing the efforts of 
Executives in Microfinance institutions.  
 
13.3 Discussion of the Research Model 
The study revealed that the level of subsidy dependence was high among the MFIs. It 
must be noted that the objectives of the study were met. Not only did the study 
confirm the research model, but it also revealed that, to large extent sustainability 
and success of microfinance institutions is possible in Ghana although slow. 
Although there were positive relationships between the dependent variable 
(sustainability) of  Microfinance institutions and their independent variables 
(success, business strategy, environment and governance institutional characteristics 
and agency costs), the study revealed a very strong and significant interrelationships 
between success,   business strategy, environment/governance, agency costs, 
institutional characteristics and sustainability of MFIs. This means that though all the 
perceived factors tended to impact on sustainability of MFIs, they placed much 
emphasis on their success, business strategy, and environment/governance  (see table 
13.1). This is a deviation from the original model which seeks to suggest the same 
level of impact between independent variables (institutional characteristics, agency 
costs, business strategy, environment and governance and success) and the dependent 
variables of MFIs. 
Table 13.1 shows the summary of hypotheses tested and the differentiation of those 
supported and those not supported by our test. There is therefore the need to proceed 
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to discuss only the hypotheses supported and their relevance to Managers/Executives 
of MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 13.1 Listing of significant and non-significant hypotheses 
Hypothesis Path 
Institutional characteristics →    Sustainability of 
MFI 
P value Sig Results 
HIA Ownership of institution→ sustainability of MFI 0.718 p>0.05 Not 
supported 
HIB More funds for lending→ Sustainability of MFI 0.202 p>0.05 Not 
supported 
H1C Motivation to grow business.→ Sustainability of 
MFI 
    0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H1D Lending to Urban traders→ Sustainability of MFI 0.012 P<0.05 Supported 
H1E Increase funding→ Sustainability of MFI 0.087 p>0.05 Not 
supported 
H1F Good quality information→ Sustainability of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
        Agency costs → Sustainability of MFI    
H2A Increased sources of finance→ Sustainability of 
MFI 
 0.100 P>0.05 Not 
Supported 
 
H2B 
 
 
High subsidy dependence → Sustainability of MFI 
 
0.000 
 
P<0.05 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
H2C 
 
Increased branches→ Sustainability of MFI 
  
0.827 
 
P>0.05 
 Not 
Supported 
2D Rigid enforcement→ Sustainability of MFI  0.100 p>0.05 Not 
Supported 
H2E Improved lender-borrower relation→ Sustainability 
of MFI 
 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
    Business strategy → Sustainability of MFI    
H3A Effective screening → Sustainability of MFI 0.015 P<0.05 Supported 
H3B Enforcing group collateral → Sustainability of MFI 0.010 P<0.05 Supported 
H3C Regular clients meetings → Sustainability of MFI 0.013 P<0.05 Supported 
H3D High methods of minimizing default rates→ 
Sustainability of MFI 
    0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H3E Intensifying peer monitoring→ Sustainability of 
MFI 
 0.015 P<0.05 Supported 
H3F Innovation in financial prod. → Sustainability of 
MFI 
 0.001 P<0.05 Supported 
 Environment and Governance → Sustainability of 
MFI 
 
   
H4A Emergency loans→ Sustainability of MFI 0.012 P<0.05 Supported 
H4B Job creation→ Sustainability of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H4C Increase competition→ Sustainability of MFI 0.201 p>0.05 Not 
supported 
H4D Board of Directors→ Sustainability of MFI 0.601 p>0.05 Not 
supported 
H4E Highly qualified staff→ Sustainability of MFI 0.001 P<0.05 Supported 
H4F Increased loan recovery→ Sustainability of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H4G Favourable regulatory framework→ Sustainability 
of MFI 
0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
         Success factors→ Success of MFI    
H5A Acquire more clients→ Success of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H5B Effective & Efficient loan processing→ Success of 
MFI 
0.011 P<0.05 Supported 
H5C Effective record keeping→ Success of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H5D Increased savings→ Success of MFI 0.012 P<0.05 Supported 
H5E External & Internal Audits→ Success of MFI 0.000 P<0.05 Supported 
H5F High staff remuneration→ Success of MFI 0.001 P<0.05 Supported 
H5G Low staff turnover→ Success of MFI 0.002 P<0.05 Supported 
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Fig 13.1: The research model as observed from the findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.3.1 Institutional Characteristics 
On the impact of the institution‟s characteristics on sustainability, the results 
supported hypotheses on motivation to grow, lending to urban traders and good 
quality information. 
Motivation to grow is important if a microfinance institution is to become 
sustainable. Managers of MFIs must understand the difficulties involved in 
microfinance delivery and adopt prudent measures including the use of modern 
technology to enable the institution to grow. An institution that does not learn and 
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adapt to changing technology can face a slow death.  
Our study supported lending to urban traders as a sustainability factor. Of all the 
types of clients in the microfinance delivery, traders appear the most dominant. This 
is because they are classified as less risky and able to sell their wares quickly in the 
market and pay back their loans. 
Good quality information is critical for the sustainability of MFIs. Lack of adequate 
and reliable information on the depth and breadth of outreach remains a challenge to 
the industry. These problems adversely affect the ability to properly target the right 
clients in order to meet the specific needs of such clients. 
 
13.3.2 Agency costs 
Another objective of the study was to ascertain which agency costs impacts 
significantly on sustainability of microfinance institutions. The study confirmed high 
subsidy dependence, and improved lender-borrower relationship as significant and 
positive on sustainability of MFIs. 
Our study revealed that most of the MFIs were managing the agency issues fairly 
except for the FNGOs. This situation supports the reason why most of the FNGOs 
were highly subsidy dependent, with most of them not having any immediate plans 
of exiting (refer to chapter 7). However the managers of MFIs that depend on 
subsidies need to understand that their long term survival and sustainability depends 
on being financially self-sufficient. As noted by Morduch (1999), financial 
sustainability is the ability of an MFI to operate without reliance on donor subsidy. 
Indeed Schreiner and Yaron (1999) contend that the subsidy dependence index is a 
summary of the sustainability of an MFI. 
From the results the importance of managing the agency problem in microfinance is 
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revealed in three ways; managing the lender-borrower relationship, the agency-staff 
relationship and subsidy dependency. In the first instance, reducing the dropout rate, 
increasing the number of active borrowers and increasing the usage of smaller loans, 
all help to develop a good lender-borrower relationship. These require paying special 
attention to regular and potential borrowers and monitoring borrowers to ensure 
prompt repayment. A good lender-borrower relationship ultimately results in greater 
outreach, the production of quality loans, efficient operations and greater 
sustainability. Again, increasing staff productivity and reducing the cost per 
borrower help to promote staff efficiency. An efficient staff translates into the 
production of more and quality output in the form of active borrowers and loans. 
This provides an incentive for the institution to further motivate the staff to become 
more productive. A well managed agency-staff relationship further produces higher 
staff quality and output which reduces operational cost and deepens the operations of 
the MFI making it more sustainable. In addition, the results show the importance of 
reducing costs of lending to borrowers. Such costs increase the operational burden of 
MFI‟s and reduces their self sufficiency levels.  It can therefore be argued that the 
results point to the fact that to be sustainable, MFI‟s need to be effective in managing 
borrowers, staff and cost. 
 
13.3.3 Business Strategy 
On business strategy factors that impact significantly and positively on sustainability, 
the study confirmed effective screening, enforcing group collateral, regular clients 
meetings, high methods of minimizing default rates, intensifying peer monitoring 
and innovation in financial products as significant.  
The combination of effective screening, enforcement of group collateral, regular 
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clients meeting intensified peer monitoring will all culminate into high methods of 
minimizing default rates. According to Adjei, J.K., (2010), growth in new products 
and services and in the use of technology will characterize the microfinance industry 
soon. Credit cards, smart cards and mobile phones are already being used by players 
in the industry. Technology could used to add to add point-of-sale systems, to make 
the administrative work of the loan officers more efficient, to transfer information 
and to lower costs of operations as well as interest on loans and other charges borne 
by poor clients. 
 
 
13.3.4 Environment/Governance 
On how the environment and governance impact on sustainability, the study 
supported emergency loans, job creation, highly qualified staff, increased loan 
recovery and favourable regulatory framework. 
Microfinance institutions in the formal sector operate within a rigid regulatory and 
supervisory environment which presents some challenges for innovations, outreach 
and the overall performance of such institutions. There is also an absence of specific 
Central Bank regulatory guidelines for the apex bodies in the semi-formal and 
informal sectors for the supervision of their members which may account for the high 
interest rates charged by most MFIs. This has culminated in uncoordinated oversight 
roles and responsibilities which do not adequately address the need for better and 
safer performance by their member institutions. Regulations for disclosure and 
transparency could help build confidence in the operations of microfinance 
providers. 
A recently released report by the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI, 
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2008) identified the greatest risk for microfinance as being in the area of governance 
and human resources. The dominance of today‟s microfinance leaders will be 
sustained only if these institutions can develop a set of highly skilled staff which they 
do not currently possess today. They will face difficulties in loan recovery. To be 
prepared for such situations, these MFIs will need good corporate governance and 
dynamic management who will pursue an agenda of improvement in efficiency and 
innovation. 
 
 
13.3.5 Success 
The study supported all the success factors of acquiring more clients, effective and 
efficient loan processing, effective record keeping, increased savings, external and 
internal audits, high staff remuneration and low staff turnover. 
Institutional capacity building is amongst the principles for success. Capacity 
building, in the form of a skilled and professional human capital base coupled with 
decent remuneration is essential for the building of a sustainable and efficient 
microfinance sector. With regard to human capital, there is the need to develop 
consistent, comprehensive and coherent training targeting the existing and potential 
employees and taking into consideration their respective roles and responsibilities as 
well as their needs. This is a means of ensuring a low staff turnover. Internal and 
external audits are necessary especially where most of the MFIs depend on subsidies 
and grants from donors.  Compulsory savings that are associated with MFIs provides 
an opportunity for members to begin to accumulate their own financial resources 
reducing their vulnerability to crisis and dependency on outside credit sources. It also 
serves as a form of security for the group in times of default. These funds also serve 
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as a source of increased savings to support its lending programme especially in this 
era of limited grants from donors and development partners. 
 
13.4 Summary 
 
The general aim of the study was to investigate the sustainability and success of 
MFI‟s in Ghana  and to suggest ways for enhancing the sustainability and success of 
micro financing activities in Sub-Saharan Africa especially Ghana for national 
development. The study was based on the sustainability and success model of an 
MFI and was guided by five principal objectives and 31 hypotheses.  
The study used the survey methodology and adopted both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques to collect data. The quantitative techniques involved the use of 
questionnaires to collect primary data on institutional characteristics, agency cost, 
business strategy, environment and governance as well as success of the MFI‟s. In 
addition, secondary data on the economic and financial performance of the MFI‟s for 
a period of 5 years (2003-2007) was also collected. On the other hand, qualitative 
technique involved interviewing some selected CEO‟s of the MFI‟s. In all 130 MFI‟s 
were surveyed with 114 responding and 14 selected CEO‟s of the MFI‟s were 
interviewed. Micro Excel 2007 and Statistical Package for Social Scientist (SPSS 
version 16) were used to analyze the data. The chi-square tests of independence and 
Spearman‟s ranked correlation co-efficient were used to test the hypotheses at the 
95% significance level. 
 
The following were the major findings of the study; 
i. Subsidy dependence among the MFI‟s in Ghana was high especially the 
FNGOs who do have any immediate plans of exiting and the significant operational 
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self-sufficiency (OSS) variable were drop-out rate and average loans. 
ii. The management of the agency issues-moral hazard and adverse selection 
appear to shore up in the subsidy and sustainability indicators of MFIs. 
iii. Most of the MFIs appear to apply general ways of dealing with borrowers and 
staff and do not exhibit a deep sense of involvement and innovation. 
iv. There are no clear policy guidelines governing the operations of all the 
various sectors of MFIs in Ghana especially in the area of interest charged on loans 
to clients. Consequently the microfinance sector is „littered‟ with institutions which 
could be described as vampires sucking the poor. Microfinance loans are designed to 
be offered at market rates of interest such that the microfinance institutions can 
recover their costs with surplus for growth, but not so high that they make immoral 
excessive profits from the poor. This is an important concept because institutions 
which charge very high rates can be scarcely cheaper than the moneylenders they are 
supposed to replace (Adjei, J.K., 2010). 
 
13.5 Conclusions 
 
The study analyzed the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions, by 
observing 114 MFIs in Ghana over a five year period 2003-2007. The analytical 
framework for a sustainable and successful MFI is drawn from the literature on 
microfinance and hinges on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in 
microfinance. Results from the model of determinants of operational self-sufficiency 
show that a reduction in dropout rates helps MFIs to increase the worth of outreach 
and obtain additional revenue from lending (see Table 7.7). This further helps MFIs 
to cover their operational costs and thereby increase operational sustainability. 
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Similarly an increase in the number of active borrowers results in operational costs 
being spread thin across thereby reducing costs. Again operational sustainability is 
enhanced through the use of small loans (average loans) to increase the depth of 
outreach. Furthermore, increasing staff productivity in producing quality loans and 
borrowers and reducing the cost per borrower go a long way in increasing 
operational sustainability. These determinants of operational sustainability also form 
the main crux of managing the agency problem in microfinance. 
13.6 Contributions made to the subject field 
 
The thesis has potential to make a useful contribution to the theory and practice on 
the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in terms of the factors 
influencing sustainability and success, particularly in an African context. There are a 
number of interesting results. These interesting results and contributions have been 
grouped under LDCs literature, managerial contribution and policy implications. 
13.7 Contribution to LDCs Literature 
 
This research is important in that it adds to the relatively small number of studies in 
sustainability and success of MFIs in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Most of 
the studies done in this area in LDCs were qualitative based due to the difficulties 
associated with carrying our surveys in LDCs. Again, it must be emphasized that 
there is a general difficulty in getting financial data in most organizations. Most 
Organizations are always suspicious of researchers and would not trust them with 
their financial data thinking it may end up in the hands of their competitors or made 
public, especially when most of the MFIs rely on donor funding. 
Since there are not many previous studies on LDCs for comparative analysis it is 
important the exploratory and descriptive studies which have been limited in LDCs 
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receive much attention (Samir et al., 1997). Due to this limitation, Gibb (1992) and 
Kirby (1995) suggested the use of stepwise „‟stage „‟ approach that involves an initial 
exploratory qualitative research aimed at developing initial insight or understanding 
into a firm‟s activities to be followed by qualitative research intended to identify the 
specific practices of the firm. Kirby (1995) suggests that each research stage builds 
upon what has been learnt in previous stages, in making an incremental contribution 
to the established base, thus allowing researchers to provide an in-depth and focused 
analysis of firm characteristics. 
Kirby (1995) concludes that the debate is not about either a „qualitative‟ or 
„quantitative‟ approach, but developing a research design, which is appropriate for 
the issue under investigation. What is important is that this research benefited from 
the stepwise „‟stage‟‟ approach of Gibb (1992) and Kirby (1995); it combined both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies to explore sustainability and success of 
MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
13.7.1 Managerial Contributions 
 
For a MFI to be sustainable and successful it should be able to reduce reliance on 
subsidies, manage clients and staffs effectively and further increase its operations 
and revenue levels. This implies that an MFI that manages the agency problem 
effectively increases its operational sustainability and also rely less on subsidies. In 
effect, while microfinance institutions may need subsidies from donors to increase 
the depth and breadth of microfinance provision to the poor, their success and 
sustainability depends on their ability to exit subsidy independence in the event of 
donor fatigue. To be subsidy independent, an MFI must be in the position to increase 
its revenue from on lending substantially, whilst maintaining a high quality outreach 
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level, with a low client dropout, high loan quality and a good repayment/enforcement 
scheme. In addition there should be a concerted effort at providing incentives at 
motivating staff to be highly productive in credit extension. 
 
13.7.2 Policy implications 
 
The study concluded that poverty alleviation using the vehicle of microfinance is 
indeed very important. The study will help give a new perspective on the debate and 
provide additional evidence that prove or disprove existing evidences. For example 
in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in the area of poverty 
reduction, development partners including the World Bank, bilateral partners and 
philanthropic investors will have to continue to be essential players by providing 
resources to develop the institutional capacities necessary for microfinance 
operations. Development partners will need to build the capacities of MFIs by using 
lessons that they know are working effectively in other countries.  
Government should as a matter of urgency streamline the laws governing 
microfinance sector as it is becoming clear that some MFIs are rather exploiting the 
already poor and marginalized by the prohibitive on-lending interest rates they 
charge their clients. The regulatory framework as observed is too broad and general. 
It does not seem to put the informal lenders like the Susu operators into a regulatory 
framework. Indeed there is the concern that some of them are not registered. Again, 
the Government should refrain from engaging directly in microfinance since it is 
always coloured with political affiliations and patronage with the result that the loans 
are thought to be free and should not be paid back. Therefore the Government should 
desist from being a regulator and a player at the same time in the microfinance 
industry. 
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13.8 Limitations 
 
The study looked at the aggregate effect of each of the five factors namely 
institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, environment/governance 
and success. 
The study was based on cross sectional data; therefore causal links among variables 
could not be established clearly.  The model developed therefore suffers from this 
limitation. To compensate for this however, our hypotheses benefited from the initial 
exploratory research where respondents took us through their microfinance activities. 
Additionally, the hypotheses were developed based on existing theories and 
empirical research, hence having positive effects on the validity of the results. In this 
regard, longitudinal data may be required to control differences in time and its effects 
on the research results. 
The results were based on the perception of owners of the microfinance institutions 
without any reference to clients or donors; undoubtedly data collected from dyadic 
sources could have enhanced reliability and validity of the study. In view of this 
limitation, efforts were made to interview Chief Executive Officers who ultimately 
receive complaints from customers and donors. Additionally many relationship 
officers who were closer to the clients were involved in the qualitative study to 
corroborate the testimonies of the Chief Executives. Again it must be emphasized 
that only seven out of the ten regions of Ghana were covered. 
Finally, it must be said that data collected from both Chief Executives and 
Relationship Officers was based on self-reporting and we did not verify these from 
any other independent source; we assumed what the respondents told us were true. 
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13.9 Future Research 
 
This study focused on MFIs as a unit of analysis by looking at sustainability and 
success. Earlier researches in this area in Sub-Saharan Africa had concentrated more 
on impact and to some extent sustainability but not sustainability and success. The 
study confirms the view that sustainability and success of MFIs is a complex 
phenomenon, hence more research that combines multiple factors to arrive at a better 
understanding of what leads to sustainability and success is advocated. The 
replications of this research by covering all the ten regions of Ghana showing their 
peculiarities in the delivery of microfinance are advocated.  
Finally, an appraisal of the professional capabilities and experience of the Chief 
Executives and staff in the delivery of microfinance in Ghana can be conducted to 
evaluate the training needs and requirements of the staff who are employed for such 
positions. Most Chief Executives are not trained in microfinance delivery and they 
tend to use general knowledge in finance or banking. Consequently, most MFIs are 
not helping the cause of the poor as intended. 
 
The End 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Questionnaire Administered to sampled MFIs 
EXPLORATORY RESEARCH GUIDE 
The exploratory research guide is divided into 5 segments. 
 
1. Institutional Characteristics 
2. Agency costs 
3. Business Strategy 
4. Environment/Governance 
5. Success 
 
1. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
  
Q1. Name of your organization: 
Q2. When was the institute established? 
Q3. In which district/region is your institution? 
Q4. What is the main economic activity of the area? 
Q5. Why was the organization established? 
Q6. What is the source of your funds? 
Q7. What is the ownership? 
Q8. Who are your clientele? 
 b) How do you obtain information on your clients? 
 c). How would you describe your relationship with your clients? 
 
Q9 Apart from on-lending interest, do you have any other source of finance?  Yes   No 
Q9b If  „Yes‟, name the source. 
 
2. a) SUSTAINABILITY/AGENCY COSTS 
Q10a. Does your institution engage in investment in Financial Securities such as T-Bills? 
         i)Yes     ii) No  
Q10b. If Yes, how often does your institution do that? 
Q 10c. How do you obtain information about your clients? 
Q11. What is your institution‟s level of dependence on subsidies from donors? 
          a) Never             b) Rarely        c)Low         d) Average      e)  Highly             
Q12. If your institution depends on subsidies, do you have plans of exiting?  a) Yes     b) No 
Q13. What measures have you put in place towards exiting? 
b) agency costs 
 
Q14. How much information do you have about your clients 
         a) Little        b) Just Enough        c) Enough          d)   A  lot 
 
Q16. Does your institution enter into any contractual agreement with your clients? a) Yes b) No                  
Q17b. If Yes, what is the nature of such contracts? 
Q18. How many branches does your institution have across the country? 
Q19. Are the processes for obtaining information about your clients the same across branches?  
 i)Yes    ii) No 
Q19b. If is No, give reasons………………………………………… 
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3. BUSINESS STRATEGY 
a) Screening and selection 
Q20. Does your institution have in place any screening mechanisms?      i)Yes    ii) No  
Q21. What does this screening mechanism entail? 
 
Q22. Does the screening differ from sector to sector?  i)Yes    ii) No  
Q22b. Give reasons for your answer? 
Q23. On the average how much (On annual basis) do you give the following clients and why?   
a) Farmers  ................................................  Why……………………………………...  
b) Traders    ................................................  Why……………………………………... 
c)  Artisans   ................................................  Why……………………………………...  
d)  Fishermen ................................................ Why……………………………………...  
e)  Other (specify) ........................................... 
Why…………………………………….. 
 
b) moral hazard and adverse selection 
Q24. Does your organization use group as collateral for lending?        i)Yes    ii) No                           
 Q25. What type of collateral do you require?......................................................................... 
Q26. What level of interaction does the organization have with the group? 
a) Never         b) Low   c)   Frequent        d)   Seldom 
Q27. Is the organization very much involved in group activities?            i)Yes    ii) No 
Q27b.If your answer to question 30 is Yes, what is the form and nature of involvement? 
Q28. Do you have regular meetings with your clients?                              i)Yes    ii) No  
Q29. How often do you meet your clients in a year? …………………………….................. 
Q30. How long does a meeting take? 
Q31. How do you ensure that borrowers use credit for purposes, for which the loan is required? 
 
Q32. How many financial products do you have? 
Q32b. Why? 
 
 
c) repayment and default rates 
Q33. What does your institution do to ensure that default rates are kept to the barest   
          minimum? 
 
Q34. Do these actions differ from sector to sector?                     i)Yes    ii) No 
Q35. Are the same strategies employed in other communities where you operate? a)Yes b)No 
Q35b. Explain; 
Q36c. Are these strategies informed by past experiences?                 i) Yes    ii) No 
Q36d. Explain: 
Q37. How much role do the groups play in enforcing repayments? 
a) Never    b)  Average        c) Very           d)  Modest 
Q38. Do you increase the loan amount disbursed to a client over time when the client has a  
          Good repayment track record?  a) Yes    b) No 
Q39. How are defaulters handled in case there is one?.................................................... 
Q40. Is this group/sector /borrower specific? i)Yes    ii) No 
Q40b. Explain: 
Q41. State some of the difficulties involved in ensuring repayment? 
 
Q42. Are the groups involved in dealing with defaulters especially if they are group members?  
         a)Yes    b)No 
Q42b. Explain: 
Q43. How do the groups ensure that peer monitoring mechanism succeeds? 
 
4. ENVIRONMENT/GOVERNANCE,  
 
44. What difficulties do you have regarding personnel?  
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……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Q45. Do you provide loans for emergency situations?              i)Yes    ii) No 
Q46. What is the rationale for these products?  
Q47. Apart from your core activity, do you engage in other income generating activities(such as 
investments) a ) Yes    b) No  
Q47b. Why? 
Q48. Have you created any job for your clients and why?...................................................... 
Q49. Are the above activities undertaken to reduce risk?     i)Yes    ii) No 
 
b) competition 
Q50. Do you face competition a)Yes    b)No  
Q51. What is the source of such competition...  
 
c) Board of Directors 
Q52. Does your institution have a Board of Directors in place?     i)Yes    ii) No 
 
Q53. Answer the following questions with respect to your Board: 
a) How committed is the board to your institutional mission……………  
b) What kind of Board structure do you have?: a) CEO chairman   b) Separate chairman  
c) How many people are on your board? 
d) How many of your board members come from outside your institution? 
e) How is your Board composed? 
     Number of women: 
     Members from University/Professional bodies:  
     Members from Clients: 
     Other Professionals: 
     Fiduciary responsibility of Board 
 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
 
54(a)regulation 
1. Explain the nature of your main constraint with  regards to the following:  
     i. Personnel : 
     ii. Management : 
      iii. Loan Recovery : 
       iv Finances: 
Q54 (b). Are there environmental and regulatory difficulties?    a) Yes       b) No 
Q55. Is the regulatory framework   a) restrictive or   b) favourable ?: 
 
Q56. Kindly give your candid comments towards the future and sustainability of   
            microfinance in Ghana:  
 
Q57. On the average how many new clients do you obtain on the following basis:  
           a) Monthly…………………..                     ) Yearly…………………………….. 
Q58. How long does it take on the average to process a loan request?  : 
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Q59. How many staff members does it take to process an average loan request? : 
Q60. Do you have in place a mechanism for tracking and keeping record of : 
a) Loans?                                  i) Yes            ii)  No 
b) Clients?                                 i)  Yes            ii)   No 
            c) Repayment schedules?          i)  Yes            ii)   No 
 
         
SUCCESS 
 
 
d) savings and discounts 
Q61. Do you have discounts for prompt or full repayment?              i)Yes            ii)No  
Q61b. If yes how does this scheme work? 
 
Q62. Do you have a savings scheme?                                            i)Yes            ii)No 
e) systems and controls 
 
Q63. Do you have an internal auditing system in place?               i)Yes            ii)No 
Q64. How often do you have external auditing?  a) Yearly    b)  other (specify): 
e) staff motivation 
 
Q65. Would you say your staff is sufficiently remunerated?          i)Yes            ii)No 
Q66. How would you rate your staff turnover?    i)    High       ii) Moderate  iii) Low 
Q67. Have you closed down any opened branch since 2003?          i)Yes            ii)No 
 Q67b. If yes how many:  
Q67c. Why? 
Q68. How many new branches have you opened since 2003? 
Q69. How would you rate your performance over the past 3years?   a)  Successful  b)  Moderate     
             c)  Fair   d)  Low   e) Poor 
Q69b. Please provide reasons for your choice above 
Q70. Is there a possibility that your institution may collapse in the next 2 years under current 
conditions?            Yes                                 No  
Q70b. Explain…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix B- Institutional Characteristics 
Name of  
institution 
ownership Geographical 
spread 
motivation clientele funding Informatio
n gathering 
FNGO 1 Foreign Five regions 
and ten 
districts. We 
have a fund 
springing up in 
the E/R. 
To eradicate 
poverty and 
hunger in 
partnership 
with rural 
community 
Farmers, 
but we try 
to balance 
the risk 
with others 
Foreign 
revolving 
capital 
Through 
group 
leaders and 
project 
officers 
FNGO 2 Foreign 
and local 
Three regions First  to finance 
the church, but 
now 
empowering 
people through 
MF to rise to 
their God given 
potentials 
Traders Foreign 
capital 
and local 
borrowing 
During 
training 
and 
application 
forms 
FNGO 3  Foreign & 
Local 
Ten regions To bring 
financial 
services to the 
economically 
active 
Traders Borrowin
g from the 
internatio
nal and 
local 
market 
Sourced 
from 
markets 
queens, 
chiefs, 
opinion 
leaders and 
from the 
people 
themselves 
FNGO 4 Local and 
foreign 
Eight regions Empower 
people 
economically 
Farmers, 
traders, 
artisans, 
fishermen 
 
Borrowin
g from the 
local 
market 
From the 
community 
by field 
officers 
FNGO 5 Foreign One region To help small 
businesses 
Traders Grants 
and 
subsidies 
By 
interviewin
g them and 
cross 
checking 
with 
application 
forms 
S&L 1 Foreign Five regions To transform 
the 
economically 
active into 
sustainable 
livelihood 
Traders Equity 
and debt  
From loan 
officers and 
other 
reliable 
sources 
S&L 2 Foreign Four regions To encourage 
people to save 
to get out of 
poverty 
Traders, 
artisans, 
farmers and 
workers 
Foreign 
capital 
but now 
self-
dependent 
Loan 
officers 
S&L 3 Foreign 
and local 
Four regions To provide 
credit to 
businesses 
Traders, 
tailors, food 
vendors, 
garage 
owners 
Foreign 
and local 
Through 
interviews 
CUA 1 Local Ten regions To use savings 
as the basis for 
human 
development 
 All forms of 
businesses, 
and 
personal 
loans  
Foreign 
subsidies 
and 
grants but 
now self-
funding 
Through 
the loan 
officers 
CUA 2 Local One region To give people 
the opportunity 
to save and 
borrow 
Staff 
members 
From 
members 
own 
savings 
Through 
interviews 
RB 1 Governme
nt 
One region To bring 
banking near to 
the community 
All forms of 
businesses  
Governme
nt 
Field 
officers 
 
RB 2 Governme
nt 
One region To help advance 
loans to rural 
Workers, 
traders, 
Governme
nt 
From the 
community 
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folk teachers, 
and student 
nurses 
and field 
officers 
SUSU 1 Sole 
proprietor 
Two regions To bring 
banking to the 
unbanked and 
the 
downtrodden 
Traders, 
corporate 
farmers 
Family 
capital 
Field 
officers 
SUSU 2 Sole 
proprietor 
One region Help in savings 
mobilization 
Traders Personal 
capital 
Field 
officers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C-Agency costs 
Name of  
Institution 
Sources of income Subsidy 
dependence/exiting
? 
Number of 
branches 
Contractual 
agreements 
Relations
hip 
With 
clients 
FNGO 1 Interest on loans and 
treasury bills 
Yes, but no 
immediate plans of 
exiting 
Ten branches Yes, by filling  
forms 
Very 
cordial 
FNGO 2 Interest on loans and 
treasury bills 
Yes, but weare also 
looking internally 
for other sources of 
funding 
Three 
branches 
They fill 
forms 
accepting 
terms 
Very 
cordial 
FNGO 3 Interest on loans and 
treasury bills 
Yes, but very low. 
We are about 
exiting 
Twenty two 
branches 
By filling out 
forms 
Good 
FNGO 4 Interest on loans             yes Thirteen 
partners 
Yes, by filling 
forms 
Very 
cordial 
FNGO 5 Interest on loans  Foreign subsidies 
and grants. Cannot 
tell when exiting. 
Four 
branches 
Loan contract 
form 
We call 
them 
partners, 
we create 
a strong 
bond. 
S&L 1 Interest on loans and 
treasury bills 
 Yes , from our 
partners overseas 
Ten branches Yes, contract 
form 
Very good 
S&L 2 Interest on loans, 
treasury bills and 
other income 
generating activities 
No more. Currently 
self-sufficient 
Seven 
branches 
Yes, by 
signing a loan 
form 
Based on 
trust,  
quality of 
service 
and 
profession
alism 
S&L 3 Interest on loans, T-
bills ,commissions 
and fees 
           yes Six branches Yes ,a loan 
agreement 
Good 
relations 
our 
clients are 
our 
priority. 
CUA 1 Interest on loans, 
treasury bills and 
No more. We are 
about 90% self-
One They fill 
forms 
Very good 
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fixed deposits sufficient now. 
We‟ve almost exited 
CUA 2 Interest on loans, 
dividends and 
treasury bills  
           No subsidy   One They fill a 
loan form 
Cordial 
RB 1 Interest on loans, 
treasury bills 
Yes, from 
government 
One Filling a loan 
form 
It is good 
RB 2 Interest on loans, 
treasury bills 
   Yes, from 
government 
Two Filling a form Very 
friendly 
SUSU 1 Interest, commissions 
and other ventures 
  No Five  Loan form Excellent 
SUSU 2 Interest on deposits 
by clients 
  No   One Agreement 
form 
Very 
cordial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D-Business Strategy 
Name 
of  
institut
ion 
Screening 
mechanism 
Group      
as 
collater
al 
Meetings  Minimizing  
default 
rates 
Handling 
Defaulters 
Peer 
monitorin
g 
Financial 
products 
FNGO 1 Yes. We use 
our 
epicenters 
and the 
loan 
committees 
to weed out 
those we 
perceive as 
not credit 
worthy. 
Yes Yes. We 
meet 
them once 
or twice a 
month 
Partners 
must 
adhere to 
regular 
repayment 
schedule 
The whole 
group loses 
the chance 
of a future 
loan. It is 
based on 
trust 
Through 
regular 
meetings 
Two. We 
have „SPIA‟  
for men and 
„AWFI‟ for 
women 
FNGO 2 Yes. We use 
eight weeks 
orientation 
to assess 
them 
Yes, but 
for the 
individu
al we 
demand 
a 
guarant
or 
Yes, we 
meet 
twice a 
month 
We use 
permanent 
recovery 
team and 
group 
guarantee 
system 
The group 
takes 
responsibili
ty 
Communi
ty based 
so they 
know 
themselve
s 
Five 
FNGO 3 Yes, 
through the 
field officers 
Yes, but 
for the 
individu
al we 
demand 
movable 
or 
unmova
ble 
asset 
2 weeks. 
They are 
interested 
in long 
speeches. 
Max of 20 
mins. 
Regular 
follow-ups 
Resort to 
guarantor 
or resort to 
legal means 
Regular 
monitorin
g among 
themselve
s 
Two 
FNGO 4 We have 
eligibility 
criteria 
Yes Weekly Group 
guarantee 
Group 
becomes 
responsible 
Regular 
interactio
n 
NA 
FNGO 5 Cross check 
information 
supplied 
Yes Weekly Through 
training 
and 
education 
Group 
handles 
They 
choose 
their own 
members 
Two 
S&L 1 We compare 
your 
Yes the 
group is 
Weekly 
depending 
We ask for 
guarantors 
Our legal 
dept takes 
They 
choose a 
Four 
287 
 
application 
form with 
our own 
assessment 
used as 
the 
collater
al 
on what 
the group 
decides 
and 
collateral 
over leader 
from 
among 
themselve
s who 
ensures 
complianc
e 
S&L 2 Our field 
officers are 
trained to 
do 
evaluation 
of clients 
No we 
do not  
believe 
in 
sharing 
responsi
bility of 
a loan 
among 
several 
people 
Yes, it is 
not fixed. 
But 
mostly 
weekly 
Regular 
monitoring 
by our loan 
officers 
The final 
resort is our 
legal dept. 
taking 
responsibili
ty. 
We do not 
give group 
loans, so 
no peer 
monitorin
g 
four 
S&L 3 Save for at 
least six 
months, 
and we visit 
your 
workplace 
and home. 
Yes we 
use 
liability 
concept 
where 
the 
group 
collectiv
ely is 
responsi
ble 
Weekly or 
bi-weekly 
Regular 
monitoring 
and 
interaction 
We chase 
them and 
keep 
modifying 
our strategy 
till we 
retrieve 
They 
police one 
another 
Three 
CUA 1 No, we use 
education to 
change the 
mind-set of 
the 
members 
Individu
als  we 
demand 
collater
al 
sometim
es. No 
group 
lending 
Once a 
month 
We enforce 
the rules to 
the letter 
Loan 
officers use 
phone calls 
and follow 
up with 
demand 
letters 
The group 
exerts 
pressure 
We meet 
every need 
of our 
clients 
CUA 2 Does not 
apply 
because 
they are 
known staff 
members of 
the 
university 
No 
group 
lending 
Yearly We hold 
your 
benefits due 
you from 
the 
university 
We use the 
university 
It does 
not apply 
to us 
We only 
give loans 
for good 
different 
purposes 
RB 1 We require 
a new client 
to be 
introduced 
by an old 
existing 
client 
Yes. Every 
quarter 
Regular 
visits 
We issue 
first, second 
and third 
demand 
notices with 
threats of 
prosecution 
We rely 
on the 
executives 
Three 
RB 2 We use the 
community 
and people 
who deal 
with the 
client 
No As often 
as 
possible 
Through 
monitoring 
We use the 
police as the 
last resort 
Not 
applicable 
to us 
Three 
SUSU 1 We do some 
background 
checks 
No Weekly We demand 
a guarantor 
We use the 
police as the 
last resort 
Not 
applicable 
four 
SUSU 2 We check 
your family 
standing, 
where you 
live and 
what you do 
No Regular 
visits 
 We use 
guarantors 
I use  
persuasion 
Not 
applicable 
Two 
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Appendix E- Environment/Governance 
Name of  
institution 
Emergency 
loans 
Job 
creation  
competition Board of 
Directors 
Personnel 
constraints 
Loan 
recovery 
Regulatory 
framework 
FNGO 1 Sometimes, 
not always 
By 
extension. 
Confirme
d by our 
baseline 
studies 
Intense. 
Many 
institutions 
including 
banks are 
coming in 
Eight 
members , 
with four 
women 
Not at all Difficult
. 
because 
we are 
dealing 
with 
farmers 
the risk 
is high 
Favourable 
FNGO 2 On a pilot 
basis 
Yes 
indirectly 
From all 
levels as the 
banks are 
coming in. 
Fifteen 
member 
board. 
Number 
of women 
not 
available 
The big 
banks keep 
poaching 
them away 
Recover
y 
depends 
on the 
economi
c 
conditio
n 
Restrictive 
because we 
are FNGO 
we cannot 
do savings 
FNGO 3 A new 
product we 
are 
developing 
Yes 
through 
giving of 
loans 
Because the 
commercial 
banks are 
also coming 
in. 
Yes eight 
with two 
women 
When they 
get 
attractive 
offers they 
leave 
Encoura
ging 
We cannot 
take 
savings 
FNGO 4 Yes, but 
restrictive 
Yes as a 
result of 
the loans 
and the 
education 
Serious one Five 
members, 
with one 
woman 
We are 
unable to 
attract  
high caliber 
staff due 
low 
remunerati
on 
Difficult 
but 
quite 
encoura
ging 
indifferent 
FNGO 5 No Not 
directly 
Yes, but  we 
try to be 
different by 
targeting 
the poorest 
of the poor 
Five 
members, 
with one 
woman 
Inadequate 
remunerati
on 
Our  
major 
task 
Good 
S&L 1 No, but we 
are 
developing 
one 
Yes we 
can say so 
because 
we give 
loans 
The 
emergence 
of the big 
banks 
Seven 
members 
with two 
women 
Our salaries 
are lower 
compared to 
the market 
rate 
 We do 
our 
possible 
best to 
recover 
all 
No 
difficulty as 
at now 
S&L 2 No because 
we deal 
with 
businesses. 
Yes to a 
large 
extent 
From 
several 
levels 
Five 
members 
with four 
women 
We train 
them well 
and they 
leave 
Not 
much 
difficult
y 
The 
increase in 
the 
minimum 
capital 
requiremen
t 
S&L 3 Yes we call 
it express 
Indirectly 
though 
The 
universal 
banking law 
given to the 
banks has 
allowed 
them to 
come down 
into MF 
Five 
members 
with two 
women 
We have to 
recruit 
graduates 
without 
experience 
We 
have a 
section 
that 
deals 
with 
this 
The 
universal 
banking law 
is unfair to 
MFIs 
CUA 1 Yes Yes The coming 
in of the big 
banks 
Eleven  
with four 
women 
Attracting 
the good 
caliber staff 
Not 
much of 
a 
difficult
y 
The 
cooperative 
decree  
CUA 2 Yes, but it 
is treated as 
ordinary 
loan 
We 
believe so. 
From the 
big banks 
Eight 
members 
with one 
woman 
No 
constraints 
Not 
much 
difficult
y 
Current 
cooperative 
bill is 
outdated 
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RB 1 Yes Yes by the 
nature of 
our 
operations 
From the 
big banks 
Thirteen 
members 
with one 
woman 
We train 
them and 
they leave 
We are 
able to 
collect 
them 
We are 
comfortable 
RB 2 Yes Because 
we give 
loans our 
clients are 
able to 
expand 
and 
employ 
people 
From the 
big 
financial 
institutions 
Nine 
members 
with one 
woman 
We are now 
computerizi
ng so we 
need well 
trained 
personnel 
Our 
rate of 
collectio
n is 
good 
Not at the 
moment 
SUSU 1 Yes ,we call 
it “walk-in” 
No not for 
clients 
The big 
banks 
Five with 
one 
woman 
Our 
personnel 
are good 
Not 
much 
Lack of code 
of ethics 
SUSU 2 Even 
though the 
agreement 
does  say so 
we do give 
Not 
exactly 
From the 
big banks 
No board I have four 
people who 
have been 
with me 
since 
Not a 
problem 
We pay 
assessed 
tax which is 
arbitrary 
and 
discriminat
ory 
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Appendix F-Success 
Name 
of  
institut
ion 
New 
clients 
Loan 
processing 
Record 
Keeping 
Savings/ 
Discounts 
Internal
/Extern
al Audit 
Staff 
remuneration 
Staff  
turnover/perform
ance 
FNGO 1 Many 
applicat
ions but 
we 
screen 
them 
A week 
with two 
officers 
We use 
excel 
spreads
heet 
We do not 
have 
savings 
scheme.10
% 
discount if 
paid 
within 6 
months 
We have 
both 
internal 
and 
external 
audit 
Salaries are 
subjective, 
but it is good 
Low turnover 
Good 
performance 
FNGO 2 Not less 
than 
two 
hundred  
Eight weeks 
for the 
group, one 
week for the 
individual, 
with two 
officers. 
Yes No 
savings. 
We give 
bonus for 
early 
payment 
We have 
both 
About eight 
on the scale of 
ten 
Low turnover 
Performance is 
good 
FNGO 3 About 
three 
hundred 
Two weeks 
for the 
individual 
and four 
weeks for 
the group 
We use 
a 
softwar
e 
No 
savings, 
no 
discounts 
Both, 
we have 
Good Low turnover 
Very good 
performance 
FNGO 4 Not 
availabl
e 
Two  weeks 
maximum 
Yes  No 
Savings, 
no 
discount 
We have 
both 
Good Average turnover. 
Performance is 
good 
FNGO 5 Seven 
hundred 
and fifty 
One week 
with two 
officers 
Softwar
e 
develop
ed in 
Uganda 
No 
savings, 
no 
discount 
Yes we 
have 
both 
Average Mixed turnover 
Average 
performance 
S&L 1 Not 
availabl
e 
One week, 
with five 
people 
Softwar
e called 
Image 
Savings 
yes, but 
no 
discount 
We have 
internal 
and 
external 
auditors 
Good within 
the MFI, but 
average 
within the 
wider 
financial 
sector 
High among the 
loan officers. 
S&L 2 Not 
availabl
e 
We have a 
three day 
rule, but it 
could take 
longer. 
Yes We have 
savings. 
No 
discounts 
but we 
lower 
rates for  
a long 
good 
payment 
record 
Yes 
both 
We are not 
the best, nor 
are the worst. 
We 
complement 
this with good 
training. 
Relatively stable 
S&L 3 Twelve  
new 
clients 
per 
officer 
per 
month 
Three days, 
with two 
officers 
Yes Savings 
yes, but 
no 
discount. 
We have 
both 
Yes, it is good Low. Good 
performance 
CUA 1 About 
one 
hundred 
and fifty 
a month 
It ranges 
from a day 
to a month 
with three 
officers 
Yes Savings 
we have, 
but no 
discount 
We have 
both 
No, but we 
try to 
motivate our 
staff in other 
ways 
Low among the 
older staff but 
high among the 
youth 
CUA 2 It 
depends 
Two days 
with four 
people 
processing 
We 
have a 
softwar
e 
Yes we 
have 
savings, 
but no 
Yes we 
have 
both 
Good Very Low. 
Performance is 
good 
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discount 
RB 1 About 
fifty 
A 
month 
About three 
days, With 
a  whole 
department 
We use 
a 
softwar
e 
We have 
savings, 
but no 
discount 
Both 
internal 
and 
external 
auditors 
Better than 
before 
High, but 
management is 
trying to stem 
that trend. Good 
performance 
RB 2 About 
eighty a 
month 
Two weeks 
with three 
department
s 
Yes We have 
savings, 
no 
discount 
but we 
reduce 
the 
interest 
rate for 
good 
performa
nce 
Both 
internal 
and 
external 
audit 
Average Turnover is  low. 
Performance is 
good 
SUSU 1 About 
four to 
five 
hundred 
a month 
From two 
hours to 
three days, 
with two 
officers 
We use 
an  IT 
network 
We have 
savings. 
We also 
give 
discounts 
Yes  we 
have 
both 
Very good, 
and in 
addition we 
give 
commission 
for exceeding 
target 
Low turnover. 
Performance is 
good 
SUSU 2 It 
depends 
About one 
month 
I use a 
softwar
e 
Yes we 
have 
savings 
but no 
discount 
I do 
both 
function
s myself 
through 
monitori
ng 
I pay them 
well 
Low turnover. 
Very good 
performance 
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APPENDIX G 
DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Adverse selection is defined as the inability of banks to easily determine which 
customers are likely to be more risky than others. 
 
 Collateral  is defined traditionally to include property such as land, machinery and 
other fixed assets. 
 
Financial products The general name given to all the types of loans and incentives 
given to clients. 
 
Group lending is defined as the lending involving the formation of groups of people 
who have a common wish to access financial services; often including group 
guarantees. 
 
 
Microfinance is defined as the provision of financial services to low-income clients, 
including the self-employed. 
 
 
Moral hazard is defined as the incentive of an agent who holds an asset belonging to 
another person to endanger the value of that asset because the agent bears less than 
the full consequence of any loss. 
 
 
Peer monitoring this is where members in a group who have accessed loans 
collectively, ensure that every member acts responsibly in order to avoid defaults in 
the loan repayments. 
 
Portfolio at risk is defined as the outstanding balance of all loans having an amount 
overdue. In distinction to arrears, portfolio at risk includes the amount in arrears 
plus the remaining outstanding balance of the loan. 
 
Savings is defined as regular or periodic deposits of money by customers into a fund 
which attracts interest and also enables them to access bigger loans. It sometimes 
acts as a collateral. 
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Screening is defined as where financial institutions use some methods to enable them 
identify potential good and bad customers who may default in repaying loans 
advanced to them. 
 
Subsidy is defined as funds donated to cover operational costs. 
 
 
Subsidy Dependence Index is defined as the percentage increase required in the on-
lending interest rate to completely eliminate all subsidies received in a given year 
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APPENDIX H 
 
FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire is designed to solicit information for purely academic purposes. 
Any information provided therefore will be used only for academic work. I thank 
you in advance. 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. Name of your 
organization……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………. 
2. When was the institute 
established?......................................................................................... 
3. In which district/region is your 
institution?............................................................................... 
4. What is the main economic activity of the 
area?...................................................................... 
5. Why was the organization established? 
.................................................................................... 
6. Was the nature of economic activity part of the reason for establishment? 
............................ 
7. Tick as appropriate your clientele 
base……………………………………………………………………………
…….. 
a) Farmers     b) Traders          c)  Artisans                    d)      Fishermen 
8.  What is the ownership of your institution?  a)  Local  b) Foreign  c) Local and 
Foreign 
 
     FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY/AGENCY COST 
 
8. Apart from on-lending interest, do you have any other source of finance?   
Yes            No 
9. If your answer to question 8 is Yes, name the 
source……………………………………………………………. 
10. Does your institution engage in investment in Financial Securities such as T-
Bills? Yes      No 
11. If Yes to question 10, how often does your institution do that? 
........................................... 
12. What is your institution‟s level of dependence on subsidies from donors? 
a) Never             b) Highly            c)Low         d) Average      e)  Rarely 
13. If your institution depends on subsidies, do you have plans of exiting? 
.................................. 
14. What measures have you put in place towards 
exiting………………………………………………………….. 
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AGENCY COSTS 
 
15. How would you describe your relationship with your 
clients………………………………………………….. 
16. How much information do you have about your 
clients…………………………………………………………. 
a) Little        b) Just Enough        c) Enough          d)   A  lot 
17. How do you obtain information about your clients? 
.................................................................. 
18. Does your institution enter into any contractual agreement with your clients? 
........................ 
19. If Yes to question 18, what is the nature of such contracts? 
....................................................... 
20. Does your institution have other branches across the country? 
................................................. 
21. Are the processes for obtaining information about your clients the same 
across branches? 
a) Yes                   b) No 
       22. If your answer to question 22 is No, give 
reasons…………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Please complete the following table : 
                                                                      2003      2004     2005     2006     
2007 
 
1. No. of clients 
2. No. of active borrowers 
3. Dropout rate 
4. No. of women 
5. Product/ type/ mix 
6. Interest on loans 
7. Outstanding balance   
Of loans exceeding 
90 days overdue 
8. No. of loan officers 
9. Total credit provided 
10. Cost of administering  
credit 
11. Total bad debt 
12. Total loans disbursed 
13. Total administrative  
expense 
14. Portfolio at risk 30 days 
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 3. BUSINESS STRATEGY 
 
a)SCREENING & SELECTION: DEALING WITH MORAL HAZARD AND 
ADVERSE   SELECTION 
 
23. Does your institution have in place any screening mechanisms? 
.............................................. 
24. What does this screening mechanism entail? 
........................................................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
25. Does the screening differ from sector to sector?  Yes                             No 
26. Give reasons for your answer to question to question 
25……………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
27. On the average how much (On annual basis) do you give to clients from the 
sectors below and why?  a) Farmers  b) Traders    c)  Artisans   d)  Fishermen 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
      28a. Does your organization use group as collateral for lending?  
               Yes                             No 
      28b. What type of collateral do you require? 
........................................................................................ 
29. What level of interaction does the organization have with the group? 
a) Never         b) Low   c)   Frequent        d)   Seldom 
30. Is the organization very much involved in group activities?          
      Yes                     No 
31. Do you have regular meetings with your clients?     Yes          No 
32. How often do you meet your clients in a year? 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
33. How long does a meeting 
take?...................................................................................................... 
34. If your answer to question 30 is Yes, what is the form and nature of 
involvement?..................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………. 
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35. How do you ensure that borrowers use credit for purposes, for which the loan 
is required?....... 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
36. Do you personally monitor your clients? And 
why?........................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
 
       DEALING WITH REPAYMENT AND DEFAULT RATES- 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
37. What does your institution do to ensure that default rates are kept to the 
barest minimum? ...... 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….. 
38. Do these actions differ from sector to sector?         Yes          No 
 
39. Are they the same strategies employed in other communities where you 
operate and why? ....... 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………… 
40. Are these strategies informed by past experiences?  Yes       No 
Explain…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………… 
41. How much role do the groups play in enforcing repayments? 
a) Never    b)  Average        c) Very           d)  Modest 
42. Do you increase the loan amount disbursed to a client over time when the 
client has a good repayment track record? 
................................................................................................................ 
43. How are defaulters handled in case there is one? 
......................................................................... 
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……………………………………………………………………..…………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………….. 
44. Is this group/sector /borrower specific? 
......................................................................................... 
Explain…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
45. Name, if any, some of the difficulties involved in ensuring repayment? 
........................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….. 
46. Are the groups involved in dealing with defaulters especially if they are 
group members? .......... 
Explain…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………..………………………. 
47. How do the groups ensure that peer monitoring mechanism succeeds? .... 
..................................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................................
............................. 
        ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
 
        48a. How many financial products does your institution have, and name. 
                them……………………………………………………………………                               
        48b. Do you provide loans for emergency situations?   Yes    No    
                       
49. What is the rationale for these products? 
.................................................................................................................... 
50. Apart from your core activity, do you engage in other income generating 
activities, (such as investments) and 
why?............................................................................................................. 
51. Have you created any job for your clients and why? 
.................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
52. Are the above activities undertaken to reduce risk?     Yes                                         
No 
53. Do you face competition and what is the source of such competition?  
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
54. Does your institution have a Board of Directors in place?  Yes   No   
                          
55. Answer the following questions with respect to your Board: 
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How committed is the board to your institutional 
mission…………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
What kind of Board structure do you have? 
a) CEO of institution is the board chairman     b) separate chairman for the 
Board 
How many people are on your board? 
How many of your board members come from outside your institution? 
.................................................................................................................... 
How is your Board composed? 
Number of 
women…………………………………………………………………… 
 
Members from University/Professional 
bodies………………………………….………………………………… 
 
Members from 
Clients…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
Other Professionals  
……………………………………………………..................................... 
 
Fiduciary responsibility of Board 
 
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
 
56. Explain the nature of your main constraint with  regards to the following: 
a) Personnel 
b) Management 
c) Loan Recovery 
d) Finances 
57. Are there environmental and regulatory 
difficulties?................................................................................................. 
Explain…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
58. Is the regulatory framework restrictive or 
favourable?................................................................................................. 
59. Kindly give your candid comments towards the future and sustainability of 
microfinance in 
Ghana…………………………………………………………………….……
……………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
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 SUCCESS 
 
60. On the average how many new clients do you obtain on the following basis: 
Monthly 
Every 3 months 
Yearly 
61. How long does it take on the average to process a loan request? 
62. How many staff members does it take to process an average loan request? 
63. Do you have in place a mechanism for tracking and keeping record of : 
Loans 
Clients 
Repayment schedules? 
64. Do you have discounts for prompt or full repayment?    Yes       No 
65. If yes how does this scheme work? 
.................................................................................................................... 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
66. Do you have a savings scheme?                                Yes               No 
67. Do you have an internal auditing system in place?   Yes               No 
68. How often do you have external auditing? 
a) Every year        b)  Once every two years       c) Occasionally  d) other 
(specify) 
69. Would you say your staff is sufficiently remunerated? Yes            No 
70. How would you rate your staff turnover?   
a) High                     b) Low 
71. Have you closed down any opened branch since 2003?  Yes          No 
If yes how many, and why? Skip 71 if yes. If no, continue. 
72. How many new branches have you opened since 2003? 
…………………………………………………….. 
73. How would you rate your performance over the past 3 Years? 
a) Successful  b)  Moderate  c)  Fair   d)  Low   e) Poor 
Please provide reasons for your choice above 
74. Is there a possibility that your institution may collapse in the next 2 years 
under current conditions?            Yes                                 No 
Explain…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX I 
Sustainability and Success of Microfinance Institutions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Research Survey 
 
Purpose of the Research 
 
My name is Felix Kwame Aveh. I am a student of Bradford University (School of 
Management, UK) and also a lecturer at the Institute of Professional Studies 
(IPS), Legon. I am currently researching into sustainability and success of 
microfinance institutions as part of my Doctoral thesis. The purpose of this 
research is to gain a better understanding of how the twin problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection affect sustainability and success of microfinance 
institutions. 
 
Your institution was randomly selected from the Ghana microfinance institution‟s 
network (Ghamfin) .This research is for academic purposes only and is not in any 
way sponsored by any institution. However, your honest opinions, whether 
favourable or unfavourable, would greatly enhance our understanding of 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
 
Any data provided will be kept strictly confidential. Under no circumstance will 
any individual be identified in the research, as your response will be combined 
with those of many others for the purpose of statistical analysis. 
 
I sincerely thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
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Appendix J 
TABLE OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Category of 
factor 
Research 
Question 
Hypotheses Questionnaire 
Numbers 
1.Institutional     
Characteristic 
Which are the 
major institutional 
characteristics 
that impact on 
sustainability of 
MFIs? 
H (1A) If the ownership of 
a microfinance institution is 
foreign, then sustainability 
will increase. 
 
H (1B) If microfinance 
institutions commit more 
funds to lending then 
sustainability will increase. 
 
H (1C) If Executives‟ 
motivation to grow and 
empower the poor is high 
then sustainability will 
increase. 
 
H (1D) If there is increased 
relationship between MFIs 
and traders then their 
sustainability will increase 
significantly. 
 
H (1E) If funding for MFIs 
increase, then their 
sustainability will 
significantly increase. 
 
H (1F) If executives obtain 
good quality information on 
clients, then sustainability 
of MFIs will increase. 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
8c 
 
 
 
 
 
9, 9b 
 
 
 
 
10c 
2. Agency Costs Which agency 
costs impact 
significantly on 
the sustainability 
of MFIs? 
H (2A) If sources of 
income for MFIs increase, 
then sustainability will 
increase. 
 
H (2B) If subsidy 
dependence among MFIs is 
high then sustainability will 
also increase. 
H (2C) If MFIs increase 
their branches, then their 
sustainability will increase 
 
H (2D) Enforcement of 
rigid contractual 
agreements rigidly would 
lead to increased 
sustainability of MFIs. 
 
H (2E) If lender-borrower 
10, 10b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11, 12, 13 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
17 
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relationship improves then 
sustainability of MFIs will 
increase. 
 
 
14 
3.Business 
Strategy 
Which of the 
business 
strategies adopted 
has a significant 
influence on 
sustainability of 
MFIs? 
H (3A) If screening 
mechanisms are made more 
effective, it will lead to 
significant increase in 
sustainability of MFIs. 
 
H (3B) If group collateral is 
highly enforced, then 
sustainability of MFIs will 
be increased. 
 
H (3C) If clients‟ meetings 
are highly enforced, then 
sustainability of MFIs will 
significantly increase. 
 
H (3D) If executives 
intensify their handling of 
defaulters then 
sustainability will increase. 
 
H (3E) If executives ensure 
that peer monitoring is 
intensified, then 
sustainability will also 
increase. 
 
H (3F) If innovations in 
financial products increase 
then sustainability of MFIs 
will increase. 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
28, 29, 30 
 
 
 
 
 
34, 35, 36, 39 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
4. Environment/ 
Governance 
Which 
environmental/go
vernance factors 
have the most 
impact on 
sustainability of 
MFIs? 
H (4A) If executives 
increase their response to 
emergency loans, then 
sustainability of MFIs will 
increase. 
 
H (4B) If MFIs create jobs 
directly, then sustainability 
will increase. 
 
H (4C) Increased 
competition in 
microfinance will lead to 
increased sustainability 
 
H (4D) If Board of 
Directors are present in 
MFIs, then sustainability 
will increase. 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
52 
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H (4E) If MFIs employ and 
retain highly qualified staff, 
then their sustainability will 
increase. 
 
H (4F) If loan recovery 
increases for MFIs, then 
sustainability will increase. 
 
H (4G) If the regulatory 
framework is improved, it 
will increase sustainability 
of MFIs significantly. 
 
52, 53a,b,c,d,e 
 
 
 
 
54a 
 
 
 
 
54b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Success Which success 
factors have the 
most impact on 
MFIs? 
H (5A) If MFIs acquire 
more new clients, then 
success will increase. 
 
H (5B) If loan processing is 
efficiently and effectively 
managed, then success will 
significantly increase. 
 
H (5C) If record keeping is 
effective, then success of 
MFIs will increase. 
 
H (5D) If savings increase 
in MFIs, then success will 
also increase significantly. 
 
H (5E) If the internal and 
external audits function 
properly, then success will 
increase. 
 
H (5F) If staff remuneration 
is high, then success will 
increase. 
 
H (5G) If staff turnover is 
low, then success will also 
increase. 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
58,59 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
63,64 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
66 
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Appendix K : Sampling Frame 
NAMES GREATER. 
ACCRA 
REG 
CENTR
AL 
REGION 
WEST
. 
REG. 
EAST. 
REG. 
VOLTA 
REG. 
ASH. 
REG. 
NORTH. 
REG. 
FNGOs        
1.Adra-Ghana x       
2.Kraban Support Foundation x x x x  x  
3. Assemblies of GOD Dev. & Relief serv. x       
4.Freedom from hunger x       
5. GECLOF x       
6. Bread of Life x    x   
7. Catholic Relief services x      x 
8. Christian mothers Association x x x x x x x 
9. Initiative Development Ghana x       
10. IFESH Ghana x       
11. ENOWID x  x x x   
12. Dignity Coop. society x   x    
13. Development Action Assoc. x       
14. Copama Agric services x x x x x x  
15. Enterprise support serv.for Africa x       
16. OAK extension x     x x 
17. Plan International x       
18. Rural Action for the Poor x    x   
19. Sustainable rural initiatives x       
20. Women and Development Project x    x   
21. Youth Development Foundation x       
22. Youth and social Enterprise Fund  x      
23. Aidez small project int.     x   
24. Women ventures Int. x       
25. Hopeline Institute x x      
26. Opportunity Industries centre x  x x  x x 
27. Action Aid Ghana       x 
28. Hunger Project x       
29. Association of productive Entrep.        
30.Christian Rural Aid Network  x   x   
31. Institute of Cultural Affairs   x  x  x 
32.Association of Productive Entrepren.    x    
33. Sweema Rural Developm‟t    x    
34. African Centre Human Development     x   
35. Better Life Organization     x   
36. Onuapa Financial services     x   
37.CEDEP      x x 
38. Cedi Finance Foundation      x  
39. GDCA       x 
40. BILFACU       x 
41 CALID       x 
42. Community Action for Development       x 
43. Maata-N-Tudu Association       x 
44. Management Aid       x 
45. Northern Rural Development       x 
46. Northern Rural Development       x 
47. E-Life Development       x 
48. Centre for Agricultural & Rural Dev.       x 
        
SAVINGS & LOANS        
49. Sinapi Aba Trust x       
50. Opportunities Intl. x       
51. ProCredit x       
52. Johnsons Savings & Loans x  x     
53. Womens World Banking   x   x  
54. First Allied Savings &Loans      x  
55. Union Savings and Loans      x  
56. Women Entrepreneurs Guarantee     x   
        
CREDIT UNION ASSOCIATIONS        
57. Legon Credit Union Assoc. x       
58. Credit Union Assoc.  x      
59. Credit Union Association    x    
60. St. Peter‟s Coop. Credit Union      x  
        
RURAL BANKS        
61. Abokobi Rural Bank x       
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62. Bawjiase Area Rural Bank  x      
63. Mfantseman Community Bank  x      
64. Ahantaman Rural Bank   x     
65. Lower Pra Rural Bank   x     
66. Anum Rural Bank    x    
67. South Birim Rural Bank    x    
68. Upper Manya Rural Bank    x    
69. Adansi  Rural Bank      x  
70. Juaben Rural Bank      x  
71. Bosomtwe Rural Bank      x  
72. Bessefa Rural Bank       x 
73. West Mamprusi Community Rural B.       x 
74. Agave Rural Bank     x   
75. Anum Rural Bank     x   
        
SUSU        
76. Adom Susu   x       
77. Jar Susu x       
78. Jab Image Susu Services  x      
79 . Adom Susu  & Loans Centre      x  
TOTAL 33 10 10 12 15 15 19  
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Appendix L:Microfinance Impact Studies: Asia 
 
Study 
 
Coverage 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
Hulme and  
Mosley 
(1996) 
 
Indonesia 
(BKK, KURK, 
BRI), India 
(Regional Rural 
Banks), Bangladesh 
(Grameen, BRAC, 
TRDEP), Sri Lanka 
(PTCCS) 
 
Borrowers and control 
Samples, before and 
after. 
 
Growth of incomes of borrowers always 
exceeds that of control group. Increase 
in borrowers‟ income larger for better-
off borrowers. 
 
MkNelly et 
al (1996) 
 
Thailand (village 
banks-Credit with 
Education) 
 
Non-participants in non- 
Program villages used 
as 
Controls 
 
Positive benefits, but no  
statistical test for difference reported 
 
Khandker 
(1998) 
 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen, BRAC) 
 
Double difference 
comparison between 
eligible and ineligible 
households and between 
program and non- 
program villages 
 
5% of participant households removed 
from poverty annually. Additional 
consumption of 18 taka for every 100 
taka of loan taken out by women. 
 
 
 
Pitt and 
Khandker  
(1998) 
 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, BRDB, 
Grameen Bank) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
eligible and non-eligible 
households and programs 
with and without 
microfinance programs. 
Estimations are 
conducted separately for 
male and female 
borrowing. 
Positive impact of program 
participation on total weekly 
expenditure per capita, 
women‟s nonland assets and 
Women‟s labor supply. 
Strong effect of female participation in 
Grameen Bank on schooling of girls 
Credit programs can change village 
attitudes and other village 
characteristics. 
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Coleman 
(1999) 
Thailand 
(village Banks) 
Double difference 
comparison between 
participant and non- 
participant households 
and between villages in 
which program 
introduced and villages 
where not yet introduced 
No evidence of program  
Impact. Village bank membership no 
impact on assets or income variables. 
Chen and 
Snodgrass 
(2001) 
 
India (SEWA 
Bank) 
Control group from same 
geographic area 
Average income increase rose 
for bank‟s clients in comparison 
with control group. Little overall 
change in incidence of poverty,  
but substantial movement 
above and below poverty line. 
Coleman 
(2004) 
Thailand 
(village Banks) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
participants and non- 
participants and villages  
with and without 
Microfinance program 
Programs are not reaching the poor as 
much as they reach relatively wealthy 
people. Impact is larger on richer  
Committee members rather 
than or rank-and-file members. 
 
 
 
 Showing Microfinance Impact Studies: Latin America 
Study Coverage Methodology Results 
 
Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) 
 
Bolivia BancoSol 
 
Borrowers and control 
samples, before and 
after. Retrospective 
assessment of incomes 
 
Growth of incomes of borrowers always 
exceeds that of control group. Absolute 
increase in borrowers‟ income larger for 
better-off borrowers. 
 
 
Mosley (2001) 
 
Bolivia BancoSol 
ProMujer, 
PRODEM and 
SARTAWA 
 
Borrowers and control 
samples, before and 
after. Time series data 
for BancoSol only; for 
other retrospective 
assessment of incomes. 
 
Growth of incomes and assets of 
borrowers always exceeds that of 
control group. Increase in borrowers 
income larger for better-off borrowers. 
No evidence of impact on „extreme 
poverty‟ 
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Banegas et al 
(2002) 
Ecuador, Banco 
Solidario and 
Bolivia, Caja de 
los Andes 
Logit model. Control 
groups selected from 
households working in 
the same sector but with 
no loans from other 
institutions. 
Being a client of a program is associated 
with rising incomes. 
 
Dunn and 
Arbuckle 
(2001a, 2001b) 
 
Peru, Mibanco 
  
 
Longitudinal study using 
„analysis of covariance‟ 
methodology; control 
group based on non-
participants with similar 
observable 
characteristics to 
participants. Focus on 
microenterprises. 
 
Microenterprises of participants found 
to have substantial increases in net 
income, assets and employments relative 
to those of non-participants. Positive 
impact on poverty reduction with 
incomes in participating households 
rising relative to control group. Poor 
participants more likely to sell assets in 
face of a shock than control households. 
 
MkNelly and 
Dunford (1999) 
 
Bolivia, Credit 
with Education 
program 
 
Longitudinal study of 
comparison with 
baseline for nutritional 
data. Control group of 
communities who would 
be offered same program 
two years later. 
 
No evidence of improvements in 
household food security or nutritional 
status of client‟s children relative to the 
control group. 
 
 
 
Source:  ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 15 Sept 2004 
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Appendix M 
 
                                                    Total Operational Income 
1. Operational Self-sufficiency ratio =                       
                                           Interest expense + loan loss provision + Admin.                                      
                                            expense 
 
The explanatory variables for the operational self-sufficiency model are defined as 
administrative expensive ratio, the dropout rate, cost per borrower, portfolio yield, 
loan staff productivity, average loan size, portfolio at risk and active borrowers. 
Other variables are also considered by Woller (2003). The theoretical motivation 
for modeling these variables as determinants of operational self-sufficiency is 
based on the following hypothesized a-priori expectations between these variables 
and OSS. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     Administrative expenses + in-kind donations 
2. Cost per Borrower         =    
 Average number of Borrowers 
 
 
 
The cost per borrower is the ratio of total administrative expenses and in-kind 
donations to the average number of active borrowers. This is a measure of the 
value of inputs required to produce a given level of output, as measured by loan 
per borrower. A higher ratio shows that more money and in-kind contributions are 
needed to produce a given number of loans per borrowers. 
 
                                                                        Total Administrative Expense 
3. Administrative expense ratio  =  
                                         Total Loans 
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Administrative expense ratio is the ratio of total administrative expenditure to 
total loans. It is the expenditure per loan output that measures the amount of 
resources committed to producing a loan output. There is also some staff 
productivity variables used in explaining the efficiency of MFI‟s. The cost per 
borrower is the ratio of total administrative expenses and in-kind donations to the 
average number of active borrowers. This is a measure of the value of inputs 
required to produce a given level of output, as measured by loan per borrower. A 
higher ratio shows that more money and in-kind contributions are needed to 
produce a given number of loans per borrowers. 
                                                                                Total Borrowers 
4. Staff Productivity ratio          =  
                                                     Total Staff 
 
 
                                                                                 Total Borrowers 
5.  Loan Officer Productivity Ratio = 
                                                           Loan Officers   
        
 
The loan officer productivity ratio is the ratio of total active borrowers to loan 
officers and measures the number of loan officers required to produce a given 
level of output as measured by borrowers. A higher ratio is an indication that 
fewer loan officers are required to manage a given a given number of borrowers 
 
                                              Outstanding Balance of Loans exceeding 90 days 
6. Portfolio at Risk       =               
     Total Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
 
The quality of loan portfolio is also captured by the portfolio-at-risk. This is 
measured as the ratio of the outstanding balance of loans exceeding 90 days 
overdue to gross loan portfolio. The portfolio at risk (PAR) is also a cost indicator 
and also signifies the quality of loans. It also shows deterioration in the quality of 
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loans service. Thus increases in this variable push up the costs incurred by a MFI 
and results in an adverse effect on operational self sufficiency. Real portfolio 
yield, the real return on loan portfolio (a proxy for real interest charged) is also 
expected to be positively correlated with operational self-sufficiency. 
                                                                      
                                                             Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
7. Average Loan Size    = 
  Number of Active Borrowers 
 
 
The average loan size is defined as the average gross loan portfolio divided by the 
number of active borrowers. 
 
 
                                                                   
                                                      Number of Clients who have dropped out 
8. Dropout Rate     = 
                      Total Clients 
 
 
The dropout rate is the number of clients who have dropped out divided by total 
clients, also measures the worth of output and the level of client dissatisfaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
